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ABSTRACT
NATURAL-KIND TERM REFERENCE AND THE DISCOVERY OF ESSENCE
MAY 1998
JOSEPH F. LAPORTE, B.A. FRANCISCAN UNIVERSITY OF STEUBENVILLE
M.A. UNIVERSITY COLLEGE LONDON
Ph D. UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by Professor Bruce Aune
According to a doctrine that has been popularized by Kripke and Putnam, a
natural kind term like ‘bird’ rigidly designates the kind with the microstructure (DNA, in
this case, perhaps) of sample birds. This microstructure is the essence of birdhood, so our
learning what the relevant microstructure is is our discovery of the kind’s essence. We
have discovered that some statement like ‘The bird is the taxon with such and such DNA
structure’ is true. Further, it is commonly added, the discovered microstructure is
essential to each particular bird.
I argue that this general picture is mistaken. I do accept and defend the view that
terms like ‘bird’ are rigid designators. However, the picture at issue has other difficulties.
Individual birds are not essentially birds. And the view that biologists have discovered or
will discover that the bird kind is identical to some DNA structure or other type of
structure seems wrong. We don’t discover just what particular characteristic a kind is to
be identified with. Rather, the meaning of natural kind terms changes; as science
advances, more sophisticated concepts attending kind terms replace older ones. So the
Kripke-Putnam account of our discovering the truth of theoretical identity statements
seems wrong.
Fortunately, the account retains some interest despite its falsity, because of its
association with the claim that statements like ‘The bird is the taxon with such and such
DNA structure’ are necessary but a posteriori. The above sentence does not express a
vii
truth, much less a necessary truth, but the idea that it could have expressed the sort of
necessary a posteriori truth it is supposed to express is epistemologically interesting. The
very possibility of such necessary a posteriori knowledge deserves some account. I offer
an account, arguing that this sort of knowledge is no more impressive from an
epistemological standpoint than is knowledge of analytic necessity: indeed, I argue, it is
best understood as knowledge of a species of analytic necessity. Independently of this
claim, I argue in a concluding discussion that analyticity ought to be accepted by
proponents of the necessary theoretical identity statements in question.
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CHAPTER 1
ESSENTIAL MEMBERSHIP
For a couple of decades now, the philosophical position that so-called “natural
kinds, such as the oak, tiger, and water kinds, have microstructural essences and that it is
the scientist s work to discover these essences has been a popular one. According to this
position, the essence of water, for example, is supposed to have been discovered to be
H2O: nothing could even possibly be water without being H2O, or H2O without being
water. Since it is not supposed to be a priori that H2O is the essence of water, we could
leam by empirical investigation that it is not the essence of water. But if our scientific
picture is right, then for something to be water in any possible world, it must be H2O, and
vice-versa.
Indeed, the kind H2O just is the kind water on the view in question. Hence, when
scientists discovered that H2O is the essence of water, they discovered the truth of the
identity statement ‘Water = H20 \ Other identity statements scientists might discover to be
true include, e.g., those identifying a species with a DNA structure, such as The tiger =
the X-DNA species’.
After our discoveries, we can check the accuracy of speakers past and present in
their attempts to identify instances of any kind. Mediaeval fishermen who believed that
whales are fish were wrong. Anyone who may have pointed to matter composed of H2O
and denied that it is water was in error. We are in a position to correct these speakers
because we have discovered the essence (or, in some cases, enough of the essence) of
these kinds.
Now, the doctrine that natural kinds have microstructural essences for scientists to
discover is often associated with the related doctrine that the individual members of any
natural kind, e.g., particular biological organisms, essentially belong to that kind. Indeed it
is common to run the two doctrines together in discussions of essentialism. According to
the latter doctrine, organisms essentially possess the essences of their kinds, so by
discovering the essences of those kinds scientists discover properties essential to the
organisms in question.
Differences between the position that organisms essentially belong to their
respective natural kinds and the position that those natural kinds have microstructural
essences can be made clear by considering various ways natural kinds could turn out to be
delimited. If (and this is an if) all natural kinds should turn out to be necessarily
characterized by particular microstructural characteristics, then it would be true that natural
kinds have microstructural essences. But it would not follow that organisms belong to
their respective kinds essentially. The latter would have to be admitted only if every
member of any natural kind possessed its kind’s defining microstructure in every possible
world in which that member exists. For example, suppose that it were true that natural
kinds had microstructural essences, and that Homo sapiens turned out to be a natural kind
characterized by some DNA structure X. In that case, Darwin and all other humans would
have X in virtue of being human. But this might be true even should there be possible
worlds in which Darwin exists (as a non-human) while failing to be characterized by X.
So if it could be established that kinds have essences, it would not follow that individual
members essentially belong to those kinds.
Take a very different scenario: suppose that, say, morphological characteristics
should define natural kinds. In that case, it would be false that natural kinds have
microstructural essences. But it might be true, nevertheless, that the members of each
natural kind are members of the kind essentially. This would be the case if each member of
each natural kind were to possess the defining morphological characteristics of the kind in
every possible world in which the member exists. So the two essentialist claims are
distinct.
The primary concern of the present treatise has to do with the essences of kinds, not
their members. Nevertheless, the theory that members of kinds are essentially members is
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an important part of a popular general picture of science as the discoverer of essential truths
concerning natural kinds. It is worth a look for this reason, as well as for its ties to the
primary doctrine at issue. The theory of essential membership is sometimes associated
with key features of its cousin: in particular it has been associated with rigidity, which, as
we shall see in the following chapter, plays a role in the claim that we discover the truth of
statements specifying kinds’ essences. Showing the theory of essential membership false
will be seen to limit viable accounts of rigidity.
I
As it will be enlightening to examine the theory of essential membership before
proceeding with related essentialist claims, that is the task of the present chapter. Before
launching into any particular essentialist thesis about natural kinds, however, it will be
helpful to clarify what is at issue, by way of saying something about what sorts of things
count as natural kinds. Some examples have already been given. The essentialist literature
tends to rely on such paradigmatic examples, and intuitive extrapolation from them, rather
than explicit definitions, for determining what counts as a natural kind. Typical examples
fall into two camps, the biological and the chemical camp. The former would include the
tiger, beech, and mammal kinds. The latter would include the water, gold, and jade kinds.
These biological and chemical kinds stand in sharp contrast to the pencil kind, or the
bachelor kind, whose essences are more bound up with human-centered interests and
functions than are the essences of natural kinds. Somewhere probably too close to the
artifact kinds to be called ‘natural kinds’ as that word is generally used would be the mud,
dust, and tree kinds. Treatments of natural kinds and natural-kind terms (‘beech’, ‘water’,
and so on) typically avoid discussion of these. Closer to natural-kind terms are terms like
‘electrical charge’. However, terms like this are generally not incorporated into the camp of
natural-kind terms, either. Putnam, for example, proposes to treat “physical magnitude
terms (e.g., ‘temperature’, ‘electrical charge’),” in his (1975c), promising to “try to
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indicate similarities between [these] and what I have said elsewhere about natural kind
words” (p. 198). Since the paradigm cases of natural kind words on offer are generally
biological and chemical kind terms like the above, these will be the focus of this
dissertation. Points made about these terms may have similar application to terms like
loud
,
heat
,
energy
,
and ‘red
,
but the proper extension of these points will be left to
further research.
^
Unfortunately, an obstacle threatens to create problems for the paradigm natural
kinds. According to some biologists and philosophers of biology, the biological examples
offered above are not kinds at all. It has often been argued that species are individuals
rather than kinds (Ghiselin 1974; Hull 1976, 1978, 1980, 1987; but cf. Kitcher 1984b,
1987), and sometimes, too, that higher taxa are historical entities, if not individuals, and
therefore that they must be non-kinds (see, e.g., Ereshefsky 1991 and references therein).
One frequently cited reason for supposing species, in particular, to be individuals is
that they evolve. Natural kinds, it is said, cannot evolve. Michael Ghiselin, a biologist,
counts this to be ‘‘the most compelling” reason for counting species individuals (Ghiselin
1981, p. 303). Kinds are deemed incapable of evolving because they are abstract objects,
with immutable essences. A natural kind cannot change in any respect. Only particular
concrete objects are capable of change. So if species evolve, they must be individuals, not
kinds.
This objection is not persuasive. Abstract objects’ incapacity for change is certainly
a barrier to their evolving, but when we say that this or that species evolves, the intent is
presumably not that any abstract kind evolves; rather, the intended claim is that successive
members of a kind gradually develop different characteristics from their ancestors. And the
statement that one species can evolve into another is not the claim that any abstract object
can become a different abstract object, but rather that the instances of one species-kind can
give rise to instances of another species-kind. A parallel can be drawn to the
incontrovertible natural kinds lead and water. It is true that lead can be transmuted into
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gold, but when this is affirmed, the intent is that lead particles can be transmuted into gold
ones, not that one abstract kind is transmuted into another. Similarly, water can be created
with hydrogen and oxygen. But that is not to say that two abstract kinds can be used to
create a third abstract kind. Rather, it is to say that instances of two abstract kinds can be
used to create instances of a third abstract kind. In none of the above cases is there any
commitment to abstract objects changing. The argument from evolution fails for taking
idioms too seriously.
Another common objection to counting biological taxa to be kinds alleges that
species and higher taxa are spatio-temporally restricted, whereas kinds are spatio-
temporally unrestricted. No matter how similar to our terrestrial horses Alpha Centaurian
organisms may be, they are not members of the horse species. Genetic similarity,
interfertility, and so on could not establish conspecificity, because the Alpha Centaurians
are not historically connected to the terrestrial species. Therefore, the horse species is not a
kind. Hull draws a comparison to an undisputed kind, gold:
If all atoms with atomic number 79 ceased to exist, gold would cease to exist,
although a slot would remain open in the periodic table. Later when atoms with the
appropriate atomic number were generated, they would be atoms of gold regardless
of their origins. But in the typical case, to be a horse one must be bom of horse
(Hull 1978, p. 349).
Hull notes that once a species has disappeared, the impossibility of reappearance is
“conceptual”, rather than contingent ( ibid. ). And this is supposed to reveal that species
cannot be kinds, being spatio-temporally restricted, but rather that they must be individuals.
Nevertheless, as Kitcher (1984b, p. 314) has emphasized, there is evidently no
reason there cannot be historical kinds as well as non-historical ones. A historical kind
would simply be one whose membership conditions involve members’ having some causal
2
connection to an independently specified item, e.g., the beginning of a lineage."
Kitcher (1984b p. 315n.) takes pains to emphasize that his own differences from
Ghiselin and Hull involve his rejection of certain results they wanted from the individuality
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thesis. He rejects the individuality theorists’ claim that species must be historically bound,
in particular (though he agrees that some species are historical kinds). This is not
necessary for the present purposes. For all that is at issue here, individuality theorists are
welcome to their claim that species are historical. The point here is just that these thinkers
have not done much to show that biological taxa are not the kinds they are widely said to be
in mainstream philosophical discourse.
Now, if species must be historical, as individuality theorists emphasize (or even if,
as Kitcher grants, some species are historical), then the view, popular in the philosophical
community, that some genetic essence characterizes each species or other taxon, is
mistaken. And there is a growing consensus among biologists and philosophers of biology
that biological taxa are indeed historical. But to agree to this is not to commit to a position
with respect to species’ ontological status.
There are other less central reasons, indeed a sizable, tangled knot of such reasons,
for the position that taxa are not kinds. These other reasons seem to me to be similarly
unimpressive (see above references for further discussion). It is not necessary to explore
them all. While I hope that the above discussion of the most prominent arguments gives
some indication of the unpromising nature of attacks on the kind-status of biological taxa,
popular essentialist claims in the philosophical literature about natural kinds to be discussed
below do not crucially ride on the outcome of this debate. ‘Natural-kind term’ has served
as an umbrella word for a group of terms including, first and foremost, terms naming
biological taxa, along with those naming chemical elements, compounds and so on. Such
biological and chemical terms have been discussed under the rubric ‘natural-kind term'
because they are assumed to name natural kinds. This background assumption seems
right. But if it happens not to be right, so that the rubric should turn out to be unfitting,
then the popular philosophical claims made about natural kinds and natural-kind terms
could be couched in other terms. I will have more to say about backup expressions in the
following section and in chapter 3.
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II
Just what sorts of kinds are at issue has been better clarified, and two prominent
essentialist claims about these kinds have been introduced. It is now appropriate to look
more deeply into the essentialist doctrines in question. In the present chapter, I will
examine essentialism about kind membership. This thesis will receive a briefer treatment
than the essentialist thesis to be discussed in future chapters. With respect to the thesis
presently at issue, I intend to concentrate attention on specifically biological kinds. These
cases are particularly decisive, so it is worth focusing just on them, though a plausible case
may be made that at least some chemical kinds are not such that members are essentially
members, either. (Marc Lange’s 1996 makes some gestures toward extending the thesis to
chemical kinds.) I will examine the relevant version of essentialism in the light of
biological systematics. It shall be seen that essentialists have tended to be rather naive on
scientific matters relevant to their claims. When the biological information that is needed to
evaluate the doctrine is supplied, I hope to show, it becomes apparent that the doctrine is
quite implausible.
The doctrine under consideration can be put as follows:
TEM (for Theory of Essential Membership): If, in any possible world, an
organism belongs (or doesn’t belong) to a particular natural kind, then there is no
possible world in which the organism ever fails to belong (or not to belong) to that
kind.
It should be observed that TEM gives an answer to two distinct questions: first, whether a
thing could have failed, from its inception, to belong to a natural kind it belongs to, and
second, whether it could cease to belong to its natural kind, turning into something of a
different kind. TEM says no, no. The second answer is the more controversial, in part
because of sorites problems. It can seem possible for a change of kind to occur in gentle
stages (see Carter 1986). This consideration and others put TEM’s answer to the second
question on less firm footing than its answer to the first. Thus, Kripke (1980, pp. 1 14-5:
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see especially the lengthy n. 57) distances himself from the second issue while suggesting
an essentialist line on the first. Nonetheless, explicit endorsement of the principle’s answer
to the second question has been given by various philosophers, including Wiggins (1980,
pp. 169-70) and Doepke (1992), for whom no member “of a natural kind... could become
a member of a different kind instead (p. 89). For example, he says, “no human person
could become a member of another species” ( ibid. ).
TEM is popular. Indeed, it is sometimes taken to capture precisely what is
distinctive about natural kinds. It is supposed to reveal what differentiates natural kinds
from artificial kinds, like the bachelor or lawyer kind, which are contingently instantiated
since bachelors and lawyers could have failed to be bachelors or lawyers (see, e.g. Cook
1980; Boer 1985, pp. 134f.; see also discussions by Linsky 1982; de Sousa 1984, esp. p.
565; Carter 1986). Nevertheless, while TEM receives frequent affirmations, I should like
to consider briefly the possibility that it fails to capture the essentialist intuition behind it.
Essentialists express their own position in terms of natural kinds under an assumption that
this will include taxa : species, and so on. Sometimes this intended application to taxa is
made explicit. Thus, N. Cocchiarella, for whom “an individual can belong to a natural
kind only if being of that kind is essential to it” (1976, p. 205, original emphasis) explicitly
understands “natural kinds to include the various genera and species of plants and
animals,” ( ibid.
,
p. 203, my emphasis) along with lifeless substances like water. Other
times, essentialists’ examples provide the clear signal that their theory is intended to apply
to taxa: thus, the essentialist claim is applied to species, such as Homo sapiens (Doepke,
1992, p. 89) and the common otter (Mondadori 1978, p. 34), families, such as the cat
family (Cook 1980; see also discussion by Price 1977, esp. p. 202), and so on. If
biological taxa are indeed natural kinds, as essentialists assume when they appeal to
principles like TEM, then TEM should fairly accurately convey the essentialist idea it is
intended to convey. But if taxa are not kinds, then TEM, being a claim about natural kinds,
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is not an adequate rendering of the essentialist idea behind it, the latter being rooted in
intuitions about the essentiality of humanhood, cathood, oakhood, and so on.
If taxa are not natural kinds, then the essentialist view should be expressed
something like this:
TEM': If, in any possible world, an organism belongs (or doesn’t belong) to a
particular biological taxon, then there is no possible world in which the organism
ever fails to belong (or not to belong) to that taxon.
I think that taxa are kinds. Hence, I think TEM captures the essentialist intuitions it
is supposed to generalize. I have noted, however, that there is some disagreement over the
question of whether taxa are kinds. Though I am unimpressed by objections to the kind-
status of taxa, it is important to stress that the essentialist doctrines at issue, which concern
alleged kinds, do not depend on the ontological status of taxa. Since I take taxa to be
kinds, and thus find no reason not to attribute TEM to essentialists, TEM is the doctrine I
shall critically evaluate, under the assumption that taxa are indeed kinds (even if they are
historically connected — cf. Kitcher 1984b, p. 314). If I am wrong in supposing that taxa
are kinds, then TEM is no doubt inadequate, and TEM' provides a much better rendering of
the relevant essentialism. So those who maintain that taxa are not kinds are welcome to
attribute TEM' to the essentialist, and to read the following arguments as attacks on that
claim. All of the arguments I raise against TEM serve quite as apparently to undermine
TEM'.
Ill
TEM has had its critics. J. Bailie (1990), for example, takes on Wiggins (1980),
by appealing to examples from science fiction: it seems broadly logically possible that a
man could turn into a giant fly, Bailie says, or a dog into a blob of living organic tissue.
But the arguments of the present paper will be quite unlike Bailie’s and the many others like
them (e.g.. Price 1977). One difference is that the arguments to be offered here hinge upon
scientific conclusions about the character of the kinds in question. In some cases these
9
conclusions are incompatible not only with essentialism but also with the above type of
criticism of essentialism, which appeals to scenarios from science fiction. We will see, for
example, that cladists would not alter an individual’s place in various biological taxa even
after a radical mutation.
4
Bailie argues for the possibility of massive changes in an organism’s function and
design; the intuition that such changes are not possible lies at the very core of essentialist
thinking. Another difference in the present strategy is that it does not offer such wholesale
resistance to essentialists’ intuitions. Rather, on the present view, essentialism fails
because membership in natural kinds can hinge on features that would seem to be accidental
on just about anyone’s account.
This method of attack is surprisingly new. The beeinnings of a gesture in the
direction I head, which appeals to scientific work, has been provided recently by M. A.
Khalidi ( 1993). Khalidi has taken stages of an individual organism’s development to
constitute natural kinds: hence, the natural kinds pupa , larva , and imago . He suggests that
membership in these natural kinds is not essential to an individual, and therefore that TEM
is false. Membership in these kinds is not essential because individuals may instantiate
these kinds without doing so in all possible worlds; indeed, many developing individuals
will instantiate and then cease to instantiate each of these kinds in the actual world (ibid., p.
112 ).
I find Khalidi ’s case to be interesting. He may be right. My own present thesis can
only be strengthened if he is right. Still, it should be pointed out that his examples are not
ideal for making his claim. Essentialists’ examples of natural kinds from biology (human ,
cat , and so on) tend to fit into the Linnaean categories (species, etc.) reasonably neatly.
Examples as different from these as pupa , etc., invite the reply that the newly purported
examples just aren’t natural kinds. The fact that pupa , etc. are temporal stages that
organisms pass in and out of in the natural course of life might allow for their principled
exclusion from the natural kind camp. Our grasp of the concept natural kind is by way of
examples, and typical examples that have been used as a handle for natural kindhood
simply do not involve this temporal element. Thus, Wiggins (1980, pp. 24-7, 64; chaps. 3
and 4) and others have not counted examples like Khalidi’ s to be natural kinds. 5
This possible objection to Khalidi may or may not succeed. Whether it does or not
is irrelevant to the fate of my arguments. But it is desirable to clearly avoid such an
objection in the arguments that follow. The problem for Khalidi arises on account of
essentialists not recognizing his examples as ones that were ever intended to apply to their
theory. To avoid this problem, it will be important to evaluate the essentialist doctrine in
the light of the sorts of examples that essentialists themselves offer by way of illustrating
their theory’s application: species and higher taxa. That way, it will be ensured that the
examples considered in the arguments are the very entities that are supposed to conform to
the doctrine in question. So in what follows, I will consider examples that are found in
essentialists own accounts. In the present section, I will consider whether organisms
essentially belong to their respective species. In the section that follows, I will go on to
inquire whether higher taxa, like oak
, cat , and mammal , are such that one is essentially a
member or not. In both cases I shall conclude that essentialism is untenable.
I argue in the present section that organisms do not essentially belong to the species
to which they belong. To show this, I do not want to assume any particular theory about
what determines the boundaries of species. This complicates matters, since biologists do
not agree about what species are, about what it is that makes the members of a species
members of the species. It is not feasible or necessary to review every last one of the many
approaches to the species question that are on the market (see the great variety in
Ereshefsky’s 1992b alone). But it is necessary to run through the theories that are both
promising and very prominent in the literature. These tend to fall into three camps: the
interbreeding approach, the ecological approach, and the cladistic approach. Which, if any,
of these approaches succeeds is immaterial to my project. I only wish to show that each of
these approaches, and any which incorporates one or more of them, such as any typical
form of species pluralism (e.g., Dupre 1 98 1 ; Kitcher 1984a, 1984b, 1987: Mishler and
Brandon 1987; Ereshefsky 1992a; Stanford 1995) sacrifices the essentiality of species
membership.
Consider, first, the interbreeding approach. This is most famously exemplified in
Mayr’s biological species concept (BSC). According to the BSC, species are “groups of
interbreeding natural populations that are reproductively isolated from other such groups”
(Mayr 1969, p. 26, 1970, p. 12; 1976a, p. 518).^ The BSC is closely related to
Paterson’s (1985) recognition species concept, on which a species is a group of organisms
with a shared mate recognition system. According to the second, ecological approach,
endorsed by Van Valen (1976) and Andersson (1990), a species is characterized as a
lineage with a unique adaptive zone, or ecological niche.
Both the interbreeding approach and the ecological approach seem to distinguish
species on the basis of features that are only contingently possessed by organisms. Hence,
species membership or non-membership would not seem to be essential if either account is
right. Consider a large population of organisms, from which a small population splinters
off and takes up a new ecological niche, adapting to a new way of life. Organisms of the
two branches cease to be recognizable to one another as mates, and thus become
reproductively isolated. Both of the above approaches would consider the two branches to
be distinct species. Organisms of the smaller branch do not belong to species “A”, whose
members constitute the larger branch. Yet this could be a plainly contingent matter. Had
the members of the little branch not taken on a new niche, or had there not been
reproductive isolation (or failure of mate recognition) between them and the members of A,
they would belong to species A, given the species concepts in question. And surely it is
possible that members of the side branch should have remained in the original niche.
Taking on a new niche might have involved such alterations as a change in diet or in
predators. But clearly the members of an isolate like the above are not essentially such that
their lineage has the diet or predators it has.
Likewise, it is certainly possible that the side branch should have failed to become
reproductively isolated from members of the mam branch. Reproductive isolation between
lineages need not be essential to organisms in those lineages. Consider the reproductive
isolation that obtains between two lineages of flowering plants on account of insect
pollinators preventing crossing between the lineages. It is hardly essential to any
individual plant that its lineage is not crossed with another lineage because of local insects’
behavior. Similarly, it is possible that organisms of the two branches should have
continued to recognize one another as mates. Being such that one recognizes these as
opposed to those as mates would not seem to be an essential property. For example, many
frogs use distinct calls to recognize mates; but it is unlikely indeed that any frog should
essentially have the call it has, especially since the acoustic properties of its call depend on
variables such as the temperature of the surrounding environment. Since organisms in the
isolate of our above example might not have taken on a new niche, become reproductively
isolated, or ceased to recognize members of the stock branch as mates, its members might
have been members of the original species A, according to the ecological and interbreeding
accounts.
In the same way organisms of the smaller branch constitute a unique species, call it
‘B\ but this is a contingent matter for the above accounts of species; things could have
gone in such a way that these organisms were not members of B (being members of A
instead). Hence, on the interbreeding and ecological accounts of species, organisms can be
contingently included in or excluded from a species.
Now let us turn to cladism. According to this growing school of systematics,
founded by Willi Hennig, genealogy is all that counts for classification. On this view, an
individual species (see Figure 1.1) is a lineage of organisms between two speciation
events, or between one speciation event and one extinction event (see Ridley 1989 for
further details).
Figure 1.1. Cladistic species. From W. Hennig’s Phylogenetic Svstematics
. Copyright
1 966 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Used with permission of the
University of Illinois Press.
Now, cladism might seem at first to offer some hope to the essentialist. If whether
one belongs to this species or that depends on one’s place in the family tree, then it might
be a matter of necessity: after all, Kripke has argued ( 1980) that organisms are essentially
products of their genetic parents. One’s place in one’s lineage might, therefore, be
essential to an organism, rather than contingent. In that case, granted cladism, one’s place
in one’s own species might seem to be essential too, since it is, for cladism, entirely
determined by one’s place in a genealogical tree.
But alas! Cladism is bound to disappoint the essentialist. Observe that according to
cladism, a species goes extinct whenever it sends forth a new side species. This is so even
if the lineage undergoes no change after sending out the side branch, so that earlier
members are indistinguishable from later ones. Thus, in Figure 1.1, species A goes extinct
upon the arrival of C, even though the lineage including A and B does not evolve at all.
Various critics have charged that this is a defect of cladism, since whether a species,
such as A, goes extinct depends on matters entirely removed from the organisms
comprising it, namely, what happens to potential side branches like C. Kitcher (1989, pp.
200-202) has brought these critics’ point forcefully home by remarking that whether or not
a species (like A) goes extinct at a particular time depends upon whether a side isolate
threatening to branch off at that time is wiped out by a cataclysm before achieving species
status.
I am not in the business here of criticizing cladism, so I will not join the discussion
about whether the above implications undermine it; rather, my aim is to point out that, be
they a credit or a liability for cladism, those implications do set cladism at odds with
essentialism. Members of some new species, such as B above, are not essentially
members of that species. They would be members of the ancestral species instead, if only
a side branch (C, in this case) had never attained reproductive isolation, perhaps having
been destroyed by some cataclysm first. Whether members of B belong to one species or
the other is dependent on a contingent event entirely external to those members. It is clear,
then, that if the cladistic account of species is good, placement in a particular species is not
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essential to an individual.
Indeed, it is doubtful that any account according to which species are historical
entities (lineages), results in organisms essentially belonging to their respective species.
This is best shown by way of an example from Kitcher ( ibid.
, pp. 202 ff.), though Kitcher
uses the example to make a point very different from the one I wish to make, one that has
nothing to do with essentialism.
Kitcher imagines (see Figure 1.2) an evolving population, which divides at t into
equal halves. By f the branches have diverged sufficiently to constitute separate species,
whatever the criterion used to determine that: reproductive isolation, or something else.
The divergence stops at t\ At no time is the distance between the ancestral lineage and
either branch sufficient for speciation; speciation occurs only because of the distance
attained between the two branches.
tim*
Figure 1.2. Speciation on a historical account. From P. Kitcher’s “Some Puzzles About
Species,” in M. Ruse (ed.), What the Philosophy of Biology Is: Essays Dedicated to
David Hull . Copyright 1989 by Kluwer Academic Publishers. Used with permission of
Kluwer Academic Publishers.
One is not sure what to say in such a case. S i and S2 are stages of different
species. It might be said that So and S \ are conspecific, as are So and S2 , though this is
odd, given that S\ and S2 are not conspecific. Perhaps we can live with the oddity of So
belonging to two species. But if so, then it cannot be said that membership in any given
species is an essential property. Members of So might not have belonged to both species
they are members of. They might have belonged only to one species. They would have,
had one branch been wiped out before speciation could occur.
Another option is to declare the ancestral species to be extinct at t. This, too, ill
accords with essentialism. Members of each branch would not necessarily belong to a
species other than the ancestral species. A cataclysm could have made things otherwise:
for had either branch been prevented from evolving until V, there would not have been
sufficient distance between the branches for speciation to have occurred. Kitcher’s third
solution involving pluralism may be the best one available, but clearly it provides no lifeline
for essentialism. It looks as if the matter cannot be resolved in a way that allows
membership in the species to be essential.
Essentialism is, then, in some trouble. The three prominent species concepts
discussed above, the biological, ecological, and cladistic concepts, are all hostile toward it.
Of course, I have only considered landmark biological views about how species are to be
delimited. Though these views are ill-disposed toward essentialism, there is always the
possibility that a friendlier view will come into prominence and out-compete the others.
But, of course, if essentialism is forced to bank upon this hope, it is undergirded by little
support indeed.
Further, any friendlier view that might come along would apparently have to be
non-historical; 8 if the above considerations are right, any historical species concept will
allow for members to belong contingently to a species. But at present, the standard views,
at least, are historical. (Indeed, according to one author, all currently proposed monistic
views are historical [Ereshefsky 1992a, p. 687], though this is probably an overstatement.)
For the above reasons, essentialism finds itself to be embarrassingly at odds with
mainstream current systematics.
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IV
Species are apparently not natural kinds whose members are necessarily members
of them. But, it might be wondered, how about higher taxa? Could individual mammals
be such that they are mammals in all possible worlds? The same might be wondered for
birds, oaks, and so on. Perhaps the essentialist model works for this vast and important
class of taxa, even if it fails for species.
But, in fact, an examination of higher taxonomic placement reveals that here, too,
essentialism is hard pressed for a toehold. There are three main competing modem schools
of classification: phenetic taxonomy, evolutionary taxonomy, and cladism. Again, my aim
is not to argue for any one school, nor to try to bring out the various strengths and
weaknesses of the schools: rather, my aim is to show that none of the schools is consonant
with TEM, and hence to show that TEM is out of touch with biological systematics.
Take, first, phenetic taxonomy, whose outstanding proponents are Sneath and
Sokal (1973). This method of taxonomy eschews consideration of evolutionary descent,
and other non-observable criteria, in classifying the biological world. It takes into account
the various characteristics observed to belong to organisms, and gives these characteristics
equal weight. Then, it makes use of computers to provide groupings by overall similarity.
But if our taxa are defined phenetically, essentialism about kind membership loses.
For the pheneticist prides herself on not giving any special weight to characters traditionally
viewed as essential. So the various characters considered, such as presence of hair, hair
color, hair length, skin color, body length, arm length, ear size, immunoglobulin
concentration, etc., are often what the essentialist unhesitatingly calls accidental. No one
supposes that an individual, Socrates to take an old standby, is essentially snub-nosed, or
hirsute, or small-eared, or of his particular color, or height, etc. Yet just these sorts of
characteristics place, by phenetic principles, a population of organisms into one taxonomic
camp (of any rank) rather than another. So pheneticism does little for the essentialist.
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When discussing pheneticism, it is natural to discuss a school known as pattern (or
transformed) cladism in the same breath. Pattern cladists have been called peculiar phenetic
taxonomists (Ridley 1986, p. 91), and this subsumption is apt for the purposes of the
present investigation. While there are some important differences between pattern cladism
and standard pheneticism, they cross with essentialism for much the same reason.
Pattern cladism, like cladism proper, classifies organisms according to shared
derived characters. But with ordinary cladism (herein just called ‘cladism’ without the
qualifying adjective), derived characters are understood to indicate phytogeny, and are used
as clues to classify by phylogeny. Pattern cladists believe the evolutionary framework to
be otiose in systematics. Therefore, while they use cladistic techniques, they do so without
assuming their classifications to be phylogenetic.
Now, pattern cladists classify by characters, just as ordinary pheneticists do. But
the former redefine character’ in order to allow a character to define a group even after it
has been modified or lost. In that way, pattern cladism sharply differentiates between
absent and lost attributes. So for the pattern cladist, possession of fins can define
Vertebrata, even though in many vertebrates, the fins of their fish ancestors have been
modified or lost (Nelson and Platnick 1981, p. 328; Platnick 1982).
The relationship between essentialism and pattern cladism is not quite as simple as
that between essentialism and straightforward pheneticism. For let us suppose, plausibly
enough, that the pattern cladist could define the tetrapods as having four limbs (in virtue of
a common four limbed ancestor). Some (e.g. Beatty 1982, p. 31) have maintained that in
that case, pattern cladists are committed to holding that tetrapods could cease to be tetrapods
by losing their limbs. But this is mistaken: for pattern cladism, the creatures would still be
“recognizable as having the original plesiomorphic character (state)” (Nelson and Platnick,
ibid. ). Thus, the pattern cladist can count snakes as tetrapods.
Nevertheless, pattern cladism is at odds with essentialism. For it is apparent that
the derived character or characters defining a taxon need not be essentially possessed by
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individual organisms. This is not because the lineage containing the organisms might have
lost the character(s), but because the organisms comprising it might never have possessed
the character(s) to begin with: hence, they might never have comprised their unique taxon.
The derived characters that define taxa needn’t be, and in many cases would seem
patently not to be, essential to organisms. Among such characters might be included
possession of fins, possession of limbs, having shortened teeth, having internal remnants
of limb bones (whales), or eye resembling organs (cave fish), and so on. None of these
attributes would seem to be essential to one who possesses them. And it may be just one
of these inessential traits, or some conjunction of them, that defines a taxon for pattern
cladism. Thus, for pattern cladism, the members of particular taxa might not have been. It
looks as if pheneticism, whether standard or pattem-cladistic style, disagrees with
essentialism.
So phenetic classification does little for the essentialist. Can evolutionary taxonomy
do better? It seems unlikely.
Evolutionary taxonomy, championed by Mayr, Linsley, and Usinger (1953),
Simpson (1961), Mayr ( 1 969), and Mayr and Ashlock (1991) uses both phenetic and
phylogenetic information in classification. That is, evolutionary taxonomy considers the
various observable characteristics of organisms as it organizes them into groups, but it also
considers evolutionary ancestry.
In the course of using phenetic principles, the evolutionary taxonomist inherits
those features of pheneticism that make the latter incompatible with TEM. So long as
phylogeny is respected either way a given split between taxa is made, evolutionary
taxonomy can, like pheneticism, allow individuals existing simultaneously, or at different
times, to fall into separate camps on the basis of plainly accidental characters. A simple
example will suffice to illustrate the point. Birds originally evolved from the reptiles. But,
of course, evolutionary change is not instant. The first pioneers along the line leading to
birds were probably reptilian in all respects, though perhaps with feather-like scales. The
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evolutionary taxonomist must, as Mayr (1976b, pp. 456-7) confesses, draw a line, on the
basts of phenetic principles, somewhere between present day birds, with all of their avian
characters, and the ancestors that first displayed one of these characters. So at some point
along the line, some newly acquired character (flight, perhaps) will distinguish the first
birds from the birds’ last ancestors.
But surely there is no guarantee, nor even a likelihood, that the characteristic that
separates the one taxon from the other is essential to those who possess it. Suppose it is
flight, for example. No essentialist will want to say that the very identity of an individual
rests on its ability to fly. Whether an individual takes to the air is not essential to its being
that very individual. But in that case the problem for the essentialist is plain: the last non-
bird ancestors of the birds were not essentially non-flyers, and thus they were not
essentially non-birds. And the earliest birds, though they flew, might not have flown, and
hence they might not have been birds. 9 Evolutionary taxonomy does not yield taxa that are
such that nothing can belong to them accidentally.
Perhaps as the first two taxonomic methods have failed because of phenetic factors,
the remaining method, cladism, which is entirely free of pheneticism, will count taxa as
being delimited in such a way that organisms will belong or fail to belong to these taxa
essentially. Cladists hold that evolutionary branching constitutes the origin of new higher
taxa, just as it does in the case of species.
We have seen the cladistic species concept disappoint the essentialist. Cladism
applied to higher level taxonomy will do likewise. Cladism recognizes only taxa that are
“monophyletic”, which is to say (for cladists; others use the term differently) taxa that
include all descendants of a common ancestral species. For cladism, a “stem” species,
which gives rise to different successor species that together comprise a single taxon, is
itself part of the taxon (Hennig 1966, pp. 71-2). For example, some particular species of
Archaeopteryx gave rise to the many existing birds. Hennig ( ibid. ) counts that species as
the stem species of the birds, and hence counts it itself as a species of bird.
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But if cladism is right, it is a contingent matter that any individual member of the
relevant Archaeopteryx species is a bird (see Figure 1
.3). For consider: it could have
happened that the Archaeopteryx species also budded forth a non-bird taxon at any time
before the first bird branch was sprouted. Suppose, for example, that this non-bird branch
should have led to a taxon having, say, the same number of organisms, variation, and rank
as the Aves, but that was comprised of salamander-like creatures. In that case, those
organisms that exist prior to the non-bird offshoot (t, in the figure), and that, as things
actually are, comprise the stem for the Aves, would fail to count as birds. Otherwise the
Aves taxon would not include all ancestors of the stem (since it wouldn’t include the non-
bird taxon that branches off), and this would violate the cladistic restriction that all taxa be
monophyletic. So a contingent event’s occurrence or non-occurrence determines
membership in the Aves: whether the side branch does or does not bud off decides the
boundaries of the taxon.
\
\ Birds, in the
/ absence of N
/
Figure 1.3. A hypothetical reconstruction of the Aves taxon up to a time f as it is, for
cladism, and as it might have been.
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Indeed, it is a contingent matter even whether any of the organisms that could
belong to a taxon do so, if cladism is right. Again, this is because of the cladist’s
insistence that taxa include all ancestors of the stem. This restriction bars the cladist from
recognizing the fish: the would-be fish do not share a common ancestral species
exclusively; tetrapods, such as elephants, are also descendants of the closest common
ancestor of the would-be fish. If cladism holds the key to taxonomy, then the fish do not
comprise a scientifically recognized natural kind. Their superficial similarities simply
misled us into believing them to comprise a natural group. Accordingly, individual
salmon, lungfishes, coelacanths, etc. fail to belong to a common, exclusive taxon. The
taxon they were thought to comprise, Pisces, turns out to be non-existent.
Nevertheless, this is cjuite an accident. It could have turned out that these creatures
did belong to the fish taxon: it all hinges on the coming into existence of non-fish
descendants of the fish (or would-be fish), such as the elephant. Suppose the fish never
gave rise to such creatures. No branching lineage leading to non-fish ever got started, or if
it did, it was quickly terminated. This could have happened. And had it happened,
individual salmon, lungfishes, coelacanths, and so on would have belonged to the fish
taxon, which would have existed according to cladistic principles. Therefore, it is a
contingent matter whether any individual salmon or lungfish belongs to a fish taxon. As it
happens, it belongs to no such taxon. But it could have.
V
In conclusion, the essentialist position summarized in TEM (or perhaps TEM')
seems wrongheaded. It is tempting to suppose that nothing could belong to any species but
its own, and that likewise a thing essentially belongs to its own family, and so on. Despite
the naturalness of this supposition, it does not measure up to current biological systematics.
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Biological taxa are not distinguished by essential properties. If metaphysics is to keep pace
with biology, essentialism will have to be jettisoned.
2 4
The list .s taken from N. Salmon (1981, p. 42n„ p. 70), who is careful todiscriminate between these and natural kind words. We have seen Putnam sodistinguish too (Putnam 1975c, p. 204; see also I975d, p. 246; cf„ however his
wavering in 1983b, p. 71). See also S. Kripke (e.g., 1980, p. 123n.) for
suggestions along similar lines.
It seems many kinds of things commonly recognized are thus causally
restricted. A perfectly acceptable answer to the question “What kind of
trousers do you favor?’ would apparently be “Levi’s 501’ s”. Ghiselin (1981 p304) apparently bites the bullet here and refuses to recognize this sort of kind.
Here and elsewhere (see also his 1980) his characterization of what things are
kinds falls afoul of our traditional kind concept. At times, he and Hull appear
to accept this, and to claim that they are offering a new, technical vocabulary
(see esp. Hull s 1981). But if their use of the term ‘kind’ departs from
conventional use, then it is not clear they are even taking issue with the
thesis that taxa are kinds, in the original sense of the word ‘kind’, even if taxa
are not “kinds” in the technical sense of Ghiselin and Hull.
Kitcher actually frames the debate in terms of individuals vs. sets, but
the applicability of his reasoning about sets to kinds is clear. The divide over
the ontological status of taxa characteristically splits those who take declare
them to be individuals or historical entities but not abstract objects of any sort,
and those who take them to be abstract objects (e.g., kinds, sets, classes).
Note that I have no intention here of precluding the reduction of talk
about abstract objects to less ontologically toxic terms, though no such
reduction will be carried out here. Kitcher favors just this course, though he
remarks that his position that species are sets does not depend upon the
success of his proposal to rewrite set theory in order to avoid any ontological
commitment to abstract objects (1987, p. 1 9 1 n. ).
In fact, despite the growing agreement on the historical nature of species,
the view that they are individuals seems to be on the decline. Thus, K.
Sterelny: “It is now widely recognized that the contrast between kinds and
individuals is not the best way of expressing the fundamental insight behind
[the Ghiselin-Hull] suggestion.... We should think of Hull and Ghiselin as
having shown that species are historical objects,” even if historical kinds
(Sterelny 1994, p. 10). Thus, if the growing consensus is right, the popular
philosophical view of taxa as kinds is in little trouble even if, as noted above,
the view that they have microstructural essences is wrong.
It is interesting that philosophers supporting the microstructural
essence view generally indicate scant awareness of biological savants’
rejection of their view, or of other relevant discussions in the scientific
literature. This ignorance has elicited scorn from prominent philosophers of
biology. Hull (1981, p. 290) complains that philosophers spend too much time
talking about Twin Earth and not enough time listening to what biologists say
about Real Earth. M. Ruse similarly puzzles over the biological theses of well
known essentialists he locates “somewhere to the right of Aristotle,” including
Kripke, Putnam, and D. Wiggins. “Frankly,” says Ruse, “I am not sure how far
these modern thinkers really intend their ideas to apply to biology, since they
generally do not bother to refer to the works of practising taxonomists, and at
times show an almost proud ignorance of the organic world” (1987, p. 227n.).
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In fact, in the.r more speculative moods, biolog ls ts sometimes discuss suchfanciful scenarios. Thus, the cladist M. Ridley discusses what would happen ifsome chordates such as chimpanzees, were to develop six legs and a jointed
exoskeleton. He remarks that they “would not suddenly have been catapultedinto the insects. Rather, they would still be chordates; “only certain
^noa°
miSt
n
S ' ldeas ab0Ut hoW t0 rec°gnize a chordate would have altered”
(.1959, p. 2).
It is also questionable whether Khalidi’s examples should be recognized asgenuine taxa (as Henmg 1966, p. 6 suggests), and hence whether they
undermine MET’. If they are taxa, the essentialist might still accept MET’ after
adding to it the qualification that the relevant taxa must be of a category at
least as high as, say, the species level. This qualification would not create
trouble for any of the essentialist’s favorite examples: humans, oaks and so
o n
.
Though a biologist, Mayr has frequently written in opposition to
philosophical “essentialism” (see, e.g., his 1982). He seems to be attacking not
the version in question but rather something like the doctrine that the
members of each taxon are characterized by exceptionless intrinsic
characteristics sharply divergent from the characteristics of other taxa.
Mayr s proposals for delimiting taxa contravene the essentialism presently at
issue, as well, as will be shown.
It should be noted that not all of Hennig’s followers endorse his claim that a
species must go extinct when it splits; nevertheless, less strict cladistic
concepts are subject to arguments similar to the arguments given above (see
Kitcher 1989, pp. 222-202, on Wiley 1981), as well as to the more general
argument given below.
As a pluralist, Kitcher (1984b) argues that non-historical concepts should
take their place beside coexisting historical ones. But the essentialist is
committed to the exclusive reign of the non-historical concept. If Kitcher’s
pluralistic view succeeds, then members of at least some species (the historical
ones) would be so contingently.
1
This example assumes that evolution proceeds gradually enough so that the
dividing line between ancestral and derived taxon marks no stark, uniform
contrast. Even proponents of the theory of punctuated equilibria grant this,
since they do typically accept some instances of Darwinian gradual evolution
(e.g. Gould and Eldredge, 1977, pp. 125-9), and since, furthermore, even by the
rapid evolution they defend, speciation requires thousands of generations to
occur; it is rapid only compared with the longevity of species (Eldredge 1985,
p. 128; Jones 1982, p. 168).
CHAPTER 2
RIGIDITY AND THE DISCOVERY THEORY
The theory of essential membership is apparently wrong. As I have pointed out
earlier, the failure of the above theory does not imply that kinds have no essences. Of
course, in explaining the errors of TEM, I pointed out that the impression, common enough
among philosophers, that natural kinds have microstructural essences, cannot be right. At
least it cannot be right in the case of biological kinds, so it cannot be correct as a general
characterization of natural kinds. The microstructural view has widely fallen from favor in
biological circles. It obviously follows from the falsity of the view that natural kinds have
microstructural essences that the general view that scientists can discover microstructural
essences for our natural kinds is false, too.
Nevertheless, it may be that scientists do identify our kinds with theoretically
significant essences of some sort or other. We may, for example, find that the essence of a
particular species is that it forms a particular clade in the tree of life, or that it is interfertile
with some ostensively identified sample members. Moreover, for all that has been said,
chemical kinds may yet be identified with microstructural compositions waiting to be
discovered. None of this is precluded by the downfall of TEM or by observations from the
last chapter.
Discovering the truth of ‘Water = H2O’ is supposed to be analogous in important
respects to discovering the truth of ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ (see Kripke 1980, pp. 100-
105). ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are both names for the planet Venus. The ancients
named Venus twice, not realizing they had done so. They associated ‘Hesperus’ with the
body when they observed it in the evening, and ‘Phosphorus’ with the same body when
they observed it at a different location in the morning, supposing this to be a different
body. So they would have agreed to sentences like ‘Hesperus is the object over yonder’
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and 'Phosphorus never appears in the sky when Hesperus does'. They would noi have
agreed to the sentence ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’.
Nevertheless, astronomers later came to realize that ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’
name the same body, so that Hesperus is Phosphorus. This was an empirical discovery. It
was an empirical discovery of a necessary truth. It is not necessary that ‘Hesperus’ and
‘Phosphorus’ should name the same object, of course. But given our use of the terms,
‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is necessarily true if true at all.
Why is this sentence necessarily true if true at all? After all, not all true identity
statements are necessarily true. Consider the sentence
H. Hesperus = the brightest celestial object, apart from the moon, in the evening
sky.’ b
This sentence is true. But it is only contingently true, because Hesperus might have been
overshadowed by some other still brighter object, had our solar system had more planets,
including one brighter than Hesperus. Or, some other actual planet, Neptune, perhaps,
might have been closer to us than it is, and so brighter than Venus. Indeed, Hesperus’
brightness might have been obscured by cosmic dust so that Neptune could outshine it
from where it is. So the above identity statement (H) might have been false.
Kripke’s well-known response to this difficulty is that even if sentences like (H) are
contingent, ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ is necessarily true, because ‘Hesperus’ and
‘Phosphorus’ are both names for an object, and thus rigid designators : roughly, that is to
say that each designates the same object in every possible world. Thus, ‘Hesperus’ is
different from the description ‘the brightest celestial object, apart from the moon, in the
evening sky’; this description designates Hesperus, but not rigidly, since it does not
designate Hesperus in all possible worlds. There are possible worlds in which Neptune ,
and not Hesperus, satisfies that description. Neptune might have been the brightest such
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object seen in the evening, in which case it, and not Hesperus, would have satisfied the
description in question.
But even though some other object, like Neptune, could have been the brightest
heavenly body in the evening sky, no other object could have been Hesperus. In
describing worlds in which Neptune enjoys this distinction now accorded Hesperus, we do
not say that Neptune is Hesperus. In describing such situations, we still use ‘Hesperus’
for Hesperus. ‘Hesperus’ names Hesperus in all possible worlds.
Now, since a rigid designator picks out the same object in all possible worlds, an
identity statement in which the identity sign is flanked by two rigid designators must be
necessarily true if it is true at all. For if, say, the identity statement ‘Hesperus =
Phosphorus’ is true, then ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ must name the same object.
Moreover, each names just the object it actually names in all possible worlds in which it
names anything. In that case, each names Venus in all possible worlds. Since Venus is
Venus in all worlds, the statement is necessarily true.
This familiar argument for the necessity of identity statements involving proper
names is supposed to extend to theoretical identity statements like ‘Water = H2O’ and ‘The
tiger = the X DNA species’. These statements about kinds are supposed to be necessary if
true, as a result of containing two rigid designators. Thus Kripke: ‘Theoretical identities,
according to the conception I advocate, are generally identities involving two rigid
designators and therefore are examples of the necessary a posteriori” (1980, p. 140).
3
The
truth of ‘Water = H2O’ is supposed to be discoverable, since it is discoverable that ‘water’
names the H2O kind just as ‘H2O’ does, and so on for similar sentences.
Unfortunately, the extension of arguments for the necessity of sentences like
‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’, which involves object designators, to the case of identity
statements involving kind designators is hardly straightforward. A considerable number of
questions, problems, criticisms, and complications concerning the extension have been
raised in the literature. At the center of these difficulties rests rigidity. The crucial question
is whether an appropriate understanding can be provided for the rigidity of designators for
kinds. If it can not, then the view that we discover the necessary truth of statements of
essence will be in some trouble; it will turn out to have been largely motivated by a false
analogy. Fortunately, I will argue, this threat does not materialize. Though Kripke and his
ilk have left a number of details for others to work out, the idea that kind terms are rigid can
be coherently spelled out. The attribution of rigidity to kind terms is tenable.
This positive conclusion with respect to the rigidity of kind terms removes only one
problem for the proposal that we discover the necessary truth of statements of essence.
Other problems are more telling. I will close the chapter by introducing these more
recalcitrant problems.
I
One ot the first puzzles that was ever addressed concerning the rigidity of kind
terms pertains to what they could possibly rigidly designate. Rigidity would seem to be
more straightforwardly applied to object designators. ‘Bill Clinton’ rigidly designates the
man Bill Clinton because it designates Clinton in each possible world (that contains him).
‘The first two-term democrat to follow Franklin D. Roosevelt’, by contrast, designates Bill
Clinton non-rigidly, since it designates him in fact, but there are possible worlds in which it
designates, say, Jimmy Carter. Carter might have prevailed against Ronald Reagan, and in
possible worlds in which he does, ‘the first two-term democrat to follow Franklin D.
Roosevelt’ designates Carter, and not Clinton.
So far so good. But if vernacular terms like ‘water’ and ‘whale’ and theoretical
terms like ‘H2O’ (for more examples, see Kripke 1980, p. 134) are supposed to be rigid as
well as names like ‘Bill Clinton’, what are these kind terms supposed to rigidly designate?
At first blush, it would seem that they don’t rigidly designate anything at all; rather, it
would seem, ‘water’ and ‘whale’ designate different entities in different possible worlds,
and so are non-rigid. A term like ‘whale’ designates in this world, it is natural to suppose,
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Its extension: the thing or set of things to which it applies, which is, in this case, the set of
actual whales out there in the ocean, including Gigi and Flipper. But there are worlds in
which Gigi and Flipper never come into existence, but other whales, who haven’t in fact
come into existence, do. ‘Whale’ has a different extension in such worlds. Similarly, in
the case of water, there are possible worlds in which the water that actually exists doesn’t
exist: ‘water’ has an extension in (some of) those worlds, however. Its extension in those
worlds consists of water particles that as a matter of fact don’t exist, but might have.
So apparently if kind designators designate their extensions, they aren’t rigid.
Fortunately, there is another proposal concerning what these terms designate. Steven Boer
(1985, pp. 129-135), Keith Donnellan (1983, pp. 90f.), and Fabrizio Mondadori (1978)
have all urged that kind designators be taken to designate abstract entities. This is to think
of the terms, as Donnellan puts it, following Mill, as “abstract nouns” (1983, p. 90).
Now, it is easy to see how the “abstract designator” account allows for kind
designators’ rigidity. The problem of what could be designated in all possible worlds is
settled thus: a kind designator designates the same abstract kind in every possible world
(though see, again, the final paragraph of note 2, chap. 1), even if the concrete individuals
instantiating the respective kind, and comprising the term’s extension, vary from world to
world. So here is an account that allows it to be seen how rigidity might be applicable to
kind designators.
II
Of course, that the account at issue can show how rigidity might be applicable to
kind designators does not assure its acceptability. If it is to be satisfactory, the account
must allow for terms relevantly like ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ to come out rigid. And,
presumably, it must make other expressions designating kinds come out non-rigid. A
number of writers have expressed misgivings over whether the account offered can apply
to the appropriate designators in this way. Some have cast more general doubts over
whether any account of rigidity apply,ng to kind designators can apply to the right
designators. Criticisms fall into two camps: first, it is common to charge that the above
account (or any account) of rigidity for kind terms makes too many expressions rigid. And
second, it is commonly charged that on the account in question, too few express,ons come
out rigid. It is my aim to show that these charges do not tell against the account put
forward above: the account withstands criticisms from both directions. Criticisms of the
former variety will be examined in the present section, and those of the latter type will be
examined in the following section.
One reason for supposing that any account of rigidity like the one characterized here
applies to too many expressions is rooted in the conviction that artificial kind terms should
not be counted rigid. For on the proposal in question, a natural-kind term such as ‘whale’
is rigid on account of designating the whale kind across all possible worlds. But observe
that non-natural kind designators designate abstract entities (artificial kinds, in their case)
across all possible worlds too, so rigidity must be extended to them, too, if the account
advanced here is right. For example, ‘pencil’, taken as an abstract noun, refers in every
possible world to the pencil kind, or to pencilhood. Since Putnam is only too ready to
extend his semantics for natural-kind terms to artifact terms such as ‘pencil’ (see Putnam
1975d, pp. 242ff.; cf. Wiggins 1994, p. 204), the similarity might at first be thought only
to confirm this connection. In fact, it does not. Putnam himself refuses to extend his
semantics for natural-kind terms to so-called “one-criterion” words, which he takes to be
analytically defined (see Putnam 1983c, p. 89). ‘Hunter’ is an example. Putnam holds
this word to possess a traditional, analytic definition: ‘hunter’ is defined one who hunts .
Yet, taken as an abstract noun, ‘hunter’ refers to hunterhood in all possible worlds, while
individuals instantiating hunterhood vary from world to world. ‘Bachelor’, another strong
candidate for having one-criterion, analytically defined status, similarly refers to the
bachelor-kind, or to bachelorhood, in all possible worlds. Hence, ‘bachelor’ and ‘hunter’
are rigid if ‘water’ and ‘whale’ are. This is commonly perceived to be unacceptable, and
hence, as Schwartz calls it, a “glaring problem” for the account discussed above (Schwartz
1980, p. 190; see also his 1977, pp. 37ff.).
Shall we conclude from these observations that the account at issue is no good, that
it applies to too many kind terms, on account of applying to artificial kind terms? This
course might be more tempting than it is, or at least more initially tempting, were there an
abundance of feasible offers on the market purporting to allow for the extension of rigidity
to natural-kind terms while withholding similar status from kind terms designating artificial
kinds. But such alternatives are not plentiful. The only prominent one on offer is Monte
Cook’s frequently cited (1980) account. Cook balks at the idea of according rigid status to
terms like ’bachelor’, and his ingenious account for the rigidity of kind terms purports to be
selective enough that only natural-kind terms come out rigid. Cook accounts for the
rigidity of, say, cat
,
thus: cats are essentially cats. That is, no cat is such that it could
have been a non-cat. But, it is urged, that suggests an analogy to rigid terms for
individuals, like ‘Nixon’, that refer to the same individual in any world in which that
individual exists. Terms like ‘cat’ refer to individual cats in any world in which they exist:
‘Cat’, while not designating the same objects in all possible worlds, does designate
the same objects wherever those objects exist ..
..
[A] cat cannot exist without being
a cat any more than Nixon can exist without being Nixon. In contrast, ‘bachelor’
varies its designation apart from questions of existence (p. 63).
This is said to make both ‘cat’ and ‘Nixon’ rigid. As Cook indicates, it succeeds in
withholding rigid status from terms like ‘bachelor’ and ‘hunter’, for it is clear that
bachelors and hunters are not essentially bachelors or hunters. They might instead have
taken spouses and shunned hunting, becoming farmers, or something else, instead.
Unfortunately, Cook’s proposal seems to stumble with a false essentialist premise:
namely that a member of any natural kind is essentially a member of that kind. The main
problem with this essentialist thesis is that, in the case of kinds like cat, at any rate, whose
distinguishing features are determined by biological systematists (the relevant experts in
Putnam’s division of linguistic labor: Putnam 1975d, pp. 227ff.) the kinds are not
delimited on the basis of characteristics that seem at all likely to be essential to organisms
belonging to those kinds. Scientists classify by history, ecological role, and other factors
that may contingently, rather than essentially, place an organism into one taxonomic camp
or another. I have argued this point at length in the previous chapter.
Since biological taxa such as bird, cat, and human
, are not distinguished on the
basis of characteristics essential to members of those taxa. Cook’s account of the rigidity of
natural-kind terms, which rests on this essentialist premise, cannot succeed. Better
suggestions for doing the same work are not easy to come up with, and the literature can
provide little help: other prominent accounts professing to extend rigidity to natural-kind
terms but not to artificial kind terms are not to be found. So there may be some grounds
for skepticism about any prospects of being able to grant rigidity to natural kind designators
while at the same time withholding it from artificial kind designators. It is certainly not
easy to see how this might be done.
However, it is not easy to see why we should want to withhold rigid status from
artificial kind designators such as ‘bachelor’, either (see also Boer 1985, pp. 130-1). It
seems to me that no good reason has been offered for why rigidity should have to be
restricted to natural, as opposed to artificial kind terms.
One reason it might be supposed that artificial kind terms cannot be counted rigid is
that to count them rigid would trivialize rigidity by counting every kind designator rigid.
Surely some designators for kinds are intended to be non-rigid, or else there would
apparently be no reason to take special note of the rigidity of certain kind designators, as if
to distinguish them. Since, on the preferred account of rigidity above, every kind
designator comes out rigid, something would appear to be wrong.
Something like this criticism seems to be what worries a number of authors about
proposals like the above. Schwartz asserts that “Just as with singular terms there is a
contrast between proper names and definite descriptions, in that the former are rigid
whereas the latter are non-rigid, with general nouns there is a contrast between those that
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are natural kind terms and those that are not” (1980, p. 196). He thus objects to proposals
that extend rigidity to non-natural-kind tenns. Danielle Macbeth seems to have something
like this concern in mind also, when she criticizes accounts like the above on the grounds
that they render rigidity trivial: “in this trivial sense, every predicate, whether or not it is a
natural kind term, is rigid” (1995, p. 263; see also pp. 266, 268-71, 276-77) ^
How does this general criticism fare? Not well. My preferred account does not
trivialize rigidity. It is simply not the case that every kind designator rigidly designates its
kind on my preferred account. ‘Honeybee’ (or, alternatively, ‘the honeybee' 5 ), which
names a species of bee, seems to pick out the honeybee kind rigidly. But other kind
designators pick out this kind by way of the kind’s fitting a particular accidental
description. The insect species that is typically farmed for honey’ is an example: this
expression designates the honeybee, since the honeybee is typically farmed for honey and
no other insect is. But it is not a designator that picks out its kind in every other possible
world. Rather, it picks out that kind by means of the honeybee’s happening to satisfy a
particular description, one that fails to apply to the honeybee in various other possible
worlds. It might, for example, have been typical to farm bumblebees for honey, rather
than any other species of bee. Had that been so, ‘the insect species that is typically farmed
for honey’ would have designated the bumblebee, not the honeybee. ‘The insect species
that is typically farmed for honey’ happens to designate the honeybee, but it does not
rigidly designate the honeybee.
The rigidity of ‘the honeybee’ would seem, then, to find a contrast in certain
descriptions, just as the rigidity of names, such as ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Ben Franklin’ do. It
would not seem to be a “trivial” matter at all that expressions like ‘the honeybee’ are rigid;
on the contrary, it is significant that such expressions are rigid, and that others, such as ‘the
insect species that is typically farmed for honey’, are not. It is significant because it is
necessary to distinguish these types of expressions for the purposes of determining
whether certain identity statements are necessarily true. The differences between these two
types of expressions for kinds is significant for the very reason that the differences between
expressions like ‘Ben Franklin’ and ‘The inventor of bifocals’ is significant.
Let me elaborate. Like Hesperus, the honeybee has more than one name. It has the
vernacular ‘the honeybee’ and the scientific ‘Apis mellifera’. If Kripke’s arguments for the
necessity (in case of truth) of identity statements involving two rigid (concrete-)object
designators, such as ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’ are successful, then those arguments ought
to work also for identity statements involving two rigid kind designators, such as ‘The
honeybee = Apis mellifera’. The line of reasoning is the same: if ‘the honeybee’ and ‘Apis
mellifera’ both rigidly designate the same particular (abstract) object, then each designates
that object with respect to every possible world (containing it). But in that case there is no
world for which (using our language) ‘The honeybee = Apis mellifera’ can possibly be
lalse: in every world, ‘the honeybee’ and ‘Apis mellifera’ designate the same thing: the
honeybee.
Now, clearly no parallel argument can support the necessity of a statement like ‘The
honeybee = the insect species that is typically farmed for honey’, any more than a parallel
argument could support the necessity of ‘Hesperus = the brightest celestial object, apart
from the moon, in the evening sky’, or, to use Kripke’s favorite example of a contingent
identity statement, Ben Franklin = the inventor of bifocals’. This is fortunate, since, just
as the familiar latter statements involving objects are only contingently true, so the former
statement involving kinds is, for similar reasons, true but not necessarily true. With
respect to those worlds in which the bumblebee is the usual creature to farm for honey, the
sentence ‘The honeybee = the insect species that is typically farmed for honey’ comes out
false: for in those worlds, the species that is typically farmed is the bumblebee, and
obviously the honeybee is not identical to that .
The reason that no argument parallel to that supporting the necessity of ‘The
honeybee = Apis mellifera’ can support the necessity of a statement like ‘The honeybee =
the insect species that is typically farmed for honey’ is that, as we have seen, the second
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designator in the latter statement doesn’t pick out the honeybee kind in every possible
world, but rather picks it out in some worlds and not in others, so it isn’t rigid. Since one
of the designators in the identity statement does not rigidly designate its kind, there is no
reason to take the statement to be necessary, even if it is true.
Having drawn a parallel between ‘the honeybee’ and ‘Ben Franklin’, on the one
hand, and ‘The insect usually farmed for honey’ and ‘The inventor of bifocals’ on the
other, we are in a better position to see whether artificial kind terms allow such a contrast.
It will be noticed that the ngid/non-rigid distinction found above in natural kind designators
seems readily applicable to designators of artificial kinds. The bachelor kind is apparently
rigidjy picked out by ‘bachelor’ but non-rigidly picked out by the expression ‘the kind most
commonly broached in discussions about analyticity’. The bachelor kind, or
bachelorhood, couldn t have failed to be the bachelor kind, or bachelorhood. But the
bachelor kind could have failed to be the kind most commonly broached in discussions
about analyticity. Philosophers might have preferred to appeal to ‘spinster’ and
spinsterhood in illustrating (or trying to illustrate) analyticity. If philosophers had done so,
the kind most commonly broached in discussions about analyticity’ would not have
designated the bachelor kind, though it happens to do so as things are. There are worlds,
then, with respect to which ‘the kind most commonly broached in discussions about
analyticity’ designates the bachelor kind, and others, such as the spinsterhood-preferring
world, in which the expression designates some other kind. Thus, that expression does
not rigidly designate the bachelor kind. ‘Bachelor’, by contrast, does. Similarly, ‘soda
pop’, ‘soda’, and ‘pop’ all rigidly designate the soda pop kind; but ‘the most popular party
beverage’ only contingently designates the kind.
The connection to necessity is straightforward. ‘Soda = the most popular party
beverage’ is true but not necessarily true, since the second designator is not rigid; it refers
to milk, or juice in some worlds, and in those worlds, the sentence is false. ‘Soda = pop’
is, on the other hand, necessarily true, since it is true and both designators rigidly designate
soda pop.
I cannot agree with various suggestions, then, that non-natural, or nominal kind
terms stand in contrast to natural-kind terms over rigidity, just as descriptions like ‘the
inventor ot bifocals’ contrast as non-rigid designators with names, such as ‘Ben
Franklin’
6
The proper contrast over rigidity is that between non-rigid descriptions for
kinds, either natural or artificial, on the one hand, and rigid descriptions and names for
kinds, either natural or artificial, on the other.
There is yet another common suggestion for why artificial kind designators cannot
be rigid. According to that suggestion, rigidity is what does the work of putting meanings
out of the head, to use Putnam’s phrase, and as such rigidity secures the reference of a
kind term to a particular real, as opposed to a nominal, kind: hence, artificial kind terms
like ‘bachelor’ cannot be rigid, as they designate nominal kinds.^ This account of
rigidity’s work seems to be fairly widespread. Thus, Schwartz discusses the new theory
according to which “natural kind terms like ‘gold’, ‘tiger’, and ‘water’, are indexical or
rigid. This means that contrary to traditional theories, the meaning of such a term is not
given by a conjunction or cluster of properties semantically associated with the term”
g
(1978, p. 566). Ronald de Sousa suggests agreement, calling attention to the recent
restoration of Aristotelianism and rejection of the empiricist doctrine that natural kinds have
conventionally fixed intensions,” or “nominal definitions”, remarking that “the crucial
prop for this restoration is the notion of rigid designators applied to natural kind names.
Rigid designators allow us to believe in essences without having to know what they are”
(de Sousa 1984, pp. 566-7). If rigidity is indeed distinctive of kind terms that designate
real kinds, setting them apart from those that refer by way of nominal definitions, then
‘pencil’ and ‘bachelor’ cannot be rigid, at least assuming they name nominal kinds: so the
above account of rigidity, according to which artificial kind terms are rigid, is
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unsuccessful. (See, in addition to the above, Putnam 1975d, p. 234, discussed below;
Schwartz 1980, pp. 196f.; 1977, pp. 37ff.; Macbeth 1995, esp. pp. 265-6).
This objection can be effective only if a proponent of the view that kind terms
rigidly designate abstract objects is unable to distinguish the way artifact terms secure their
referents from the way natural-kind terms secure their referents. That is, on the proposal in
question, rigidity applies to all kind terms, those naming real kinds as well as those naming
nominal kinds, but the objection is that rigidity is precisely the device that distinguishes
some of those terms, those naming real and hence natural kinds, from those naming
nominal and hence artificial kinds: the former are distinguished by their rigidity. A
proponent of the challenged view of rigidity is thus under obligation to show that she still
has the resources to account tor some kind terms’ referring to real essences and others to
nominal essences, even though all are rigid. A proponent must answer the question: If
rigidity is not what secures a natural-kind term’s reference to a kind with an unknown
underlying real essence, what does?
Fortunately, this challenging question admits a ready answer. What secures a
term s reference to a kind with an unknown underlying essence is not rigidity, but rather
the mechanism marked by the causal theory of reference .0 According to the causal theory
of reference (CTR), sample items are used to “anchor” a term. A term is used to refer to
whatever underlying essence a paradigmatic sample has.
10
It may help to imagine a kind’s
baptism taking place under artificially ideal circumstances. In Kripke’s words, “If we
imagine a hypothetical ... baptism of the substance, we must imagine it picked out as by
some such ‘definition’ as, ‘[X] is the substance instantiated by the items over there, or at
any rate, by almost all of them’” (p. 135). The “almost all” qualification is there to ensure
that the foreign matter (dust, other chemicals perhaps resembling the paradigms, etc.) that
will typically be found in a sample representing a kind, is discounted.
So on the causal theory, a term like ‘whale’ is linked to its referent by causal contact
with individual whales. ‘Whale’ was baptized by a (probably informal) dubbing act: “the
term is to refer to that k.nd of thing” (the dubber points to some whales). I, is thus the
causal theory that allows ‘whale’ to des.gnate a hidden essence. On the causal theory what
makes a thing belong to the extension of ‘whale’ will not be properties like having a fi,h-
like appearance or exhaling a large, visible snout of vanor that a speaker associates with
whales, but rather underlying properties and relations that guarantee sameness of kind (to
paradigm samples). The essence of whalehood will not be nominal. As one writer
explains, “CTR
... allow[s] the element on which reference depends to be unknown....
We do not stabilize a term’s reference by associating certain properties with continued use
of the term” (Leplin 1988, p. 497).
This stands in contrast to a term like ‘bachelor’, which is not causally grounded in
sample bachelors. The reference of ‘bachelor’ is determined, rather, by conditions
established a priori to mark bachelor status: unmarried malehood, and so on. These
conditions amount to something like a nominal essence for bachelorhood. 1
1
Natural-kind
terms can get by without analytic definitions of this traditional type because “actual things
... have played a certain causal role in our acquisition and use of the terms,” thereby
grounding our reference (Putnam 1983b, p. 73).
It is the causal theory that explains how a term like ‘whale’ is different from a term
like bachelor
. There is no reason both terms cannot be rigid, referring to the same kind
across all possible worlds, though only the former term has its reference determined by
causal contact with paradigm samples of the relevant kind. No appeal to a discrepancy over
rigidity is needed to distinguish the two cases. The differences are certainly respected on
my preferred account of rigidity above. It seems to be a running together of different
elements of the Kripke-Putnam theory of reference, in particular the running together of
rigidity with the causal theory, that has led to the belief that rigidity is what causes terms to
refer to real, and not nominal, kinds.
Putnam seems to have compounded the confusion noted here by supposing that
causally grounded terms are indexical, because, he says, their reference depends upon what
sample .terns aroundhem turn out to be like. Th.s attr.but.on of mdexical.ty seems to have
been a mistake, for reasons Burge (1982, pp. 102-7) spec.f.es at some length, but it is not
necessary to discuss the mistake here. I mention it only to point out that the above
confusion of the causal theory with rigidity can also take the form of a confusion of
“indexicality” with rigidity. This was evidenced above in Schwartz’s claim that natural-
kind terms are “indexical or rigid” (see note 8 and accompanying text). Putnam falls into
the same confusion. “It should be clear
... that Kripke’s doctrine that natural-kind words
are rigid designators and our doctrine that they are indexical are but two ways of making
the same point” ( 1975d, p. 234). Actually these do not at all seem to be two ways of
making the same point. Rigidity has little to do with how a term gets hooked up to its
referent, whether this is by way of samples, as with “indexical” terms, or by description,
etc., rather, rigidity has to do with whether the term refers to the same entity in all possible
worlds. There is apparently no reason that kind terms Putnam takes to be non-indexical,
such as ‘hunter’ and ‘bachelor’, cannot refer to the same thing in all possible worlds just as
well as terms he takes for indexical, like ‘water’ and ‘tiger’. 12
It seems apt to hold rigidity applicable to artificial kind terms like ‘bachelor’ as well
as to natural-kind terms. That the account of rigidity under consideration extends rigidity to
artificial kind terms is certainly no strike against it. It does not appear that the account
makes for too much rigidity.
Ill
A hurdle has been passed. On the proposed account, rigidity does not seem to
extend to inappropriate kind designators. The fear that too many designators might count
as rigid is allayed. However, a threat from the other direction must also be addressed: the
account must not be such that too few expressions are counted as rigid designators.
Kripke’s argument for the necessity (in case of truth) of theoretical identities such as ‘water
= H2O’ rests, of course, on the terms ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ being rigid . Yet a number of
writers have, in recent years, independently cast doubts on whether natural-kind terms
and/or theoretical expressions typically come out rigid on any account of rigidity that
extends to kinds. It is worth investigating these doubts.
One prominent skeptic, Helen Steward (1990, pp, 390ff.), describes a situation in
which H20 is drastically affected in its superficial properties: it becomes opaque, pink,
and solid. Now, she says, this opaque, pink, solid stuff would not be the same substance
that H20 composes in the actual world. So ‘H2CT is not rigid: it doesn’t refer to the same
substance in all possible worlds, because it refers to an opaque, pink, solid substance in
some worlds, while referring to the quite different substance H20 actually composes in
other worlds such as our own.
Steward does not offer much in the way of criteria for distinguishing substances.
Not having much of an idea how to delimit them myself, I am not in a position to dispute
her claim that ‘H2CT would name, in the world described above, stuff of a different
substance than the substance composed of H2O in the actual world. So ‘H2O’ does not,
for all I know, name the same substance in all possible worlds.
But should that make it non-rigid? That a term fails to rigidly designate a substance
does not indicate that it fails to rigidly designate some other sort of entity. Some names
(‘water', for example, if Steward is right) might pick out the same substance in every
possible world. These would rigidly refer to a substance (taken as an abstract entity). But
other names might rigidly refer to a chemical composition , say H2O, even if, as Steward
believes of ‘H2O’, they do not rigidly refer to a substance (whatever that might be). Others
might rigidly refer to a species, an occupation, a marital status, and so on. In each case,
the objects that instantiate the kind vary from world to world. But the kind itself is the
same, from world to world. Unless some reason can be adduced for saying that
substances can be referred to rigidly, but that other kinds can’t, it seems unprincipled to
discriminate on that basis. And Steward offers no such reason. Hence, her claim that
‘H 2O’ is not rigid seems to be an unpromising one.
Another animadversion that merits attention is launched by C. J. Bolton (1996, p.
148). Bolton argues that theoretical expressions like ‘H2O’ look more like descriptions
than like proper names. And descriptions aren’t always rigid. Some descriptions happen
to be rigid, such as ‘the positive square root of 81’. But others, such as ‘the celebrated
Irish wit of findesiede London’ are not. Names, on the other hand, are always rigid.
Kripke claims that rigid descriptions are rigid de facto
, while names are rigid by stipulation,
or dejure (1980, p. 2 In.). Since some descriptions are not rigid, Bolton continues, some
argument is needed to show that ‘H2O’ is rigid, if its rigidity is to be established. But no
argument is given in Kripke’ s work. So the claim is moot.
Bolton wants an argument that ‘H2O’ is rigid. Now, Kripke does offer an
“intuitive test’’ for discriminating between rigid and non-rigid designators (Kripke 1980,
pp. 48-9, see also Sidelle 1989, p. 65). Kripke, of course, focuses primarily on object
designators, leaving it up to the reader to apply his treatment to kind designators. The
rigidity of ‘Bill Clinton’ is evinced by the negative answer to the question “Could Bill
Clinton have failed to be Bill Clinton?” The non-rigiditv of ‘the first two-term democrat
since Franklin D. Roosevelt is, on the other hand, revealed by the positive answer to (the
true reading of) “Could the first two-term democrat since Franklin D. Roosevelt have failed
to be the first two-term democrat since Franklin D. Roosevelt?”
Consider, now, two kind designators, one rigid and one non-rigid: ‘the honeybee’
and ‘the insect species that is typically farmed for honey’. “Could the insect species that is
typically farmed for honey have failed to be the insect species that is typically farmed for
honey?” receives an affirmative answer: of course it could have failed to be the insect
typically farmed for honey, since bumblebees could have been farmed for honey instead.
But “Could the honeybee have failed to be the honeybee?” receives a negative answer.
Surely the honeybee kind could not have been some other kind, such as the bumblebee
kind, any more than the property redness could have been the property blueness instead.
If, in any possible world, there exists a kind that isn't the honeybee kind (in that world),
then we would say it is not what we discuss as "the honeybee kind" at all. 13
To apply this test to the theoretical kind term ‘H2O’ we must answer: could H20
(the kind) have failed to be H20? It is hard to see how anyone could imagine an
affirmative answer to be true. So ‘H20’ seems rigid. We might run a similar inquiry for
'water'. Could the water kind have failed to be the water kind? It seems not. So 'water'
would seem to be rigid.
A complication arises: is ‘H2O’ rigid de facto or de jure? De facto rigidity is
supported by essentialist intuitions, which may be what Bolton and others want an
argument for. Moreover, even if ‘H20’ is rigid de jure,
14
there are other expressions that
Kripke takes for rigid that certainly seem rigid de facto if they are to be counted rigid at all:
the species with X DNA’ is an example. Suppose tigers have X DNA structure. Whether
the above description is rigid may seem to depend on whether tigers possess their DNA
structure essentially. If DNA structure is contingent, just as stripedness is, then the above
description would seem no more rigid than The large, striped feline species’. Is Kripke’s
claim that a theoretical identity statement like The tiger = the species with X DNA’ contains
two rigid designators undone simply by the apparent fact that DNA structure is not an
essential trait of species?
No. The description is intended to rigidly designate a particular object, a structure,
in all possible worlds. II it fails to grasp such a single referent in all possible worlds, some
other expression will have to replace it. Kripke discusses a similar complication involving
the description ‘C-fibers’, dismissing it as a non-problem: “the point is unimportant; if C-
fibers’ is not a rigid designator, simply replace it by one which is, or suppose it used as a
rigid designator in the present context” (1980, p. 149). We can invent an expression to
rigidly designate, de jure, the X DNA structure: ‘the X-DNA kind’ would suffice, or just
the description above, used in a special sense. So when such a description is counted rigid
de jure, this will admit of no interesting dispute. Of course, I have indicated that The tiger
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= the X-DNA kind' would, even if it involves two rigid designators, be false, and therefore
not necessary. Biological taxa are not microstructural kinds. Still, the sentence would be
necessary if true, which is what rigidity is supposed to guarantee.
Neither Steward nor Bolton has given us reason to doubt the rigidity of the terms
they discuss. A final argument we shall consider is raised by Ghiselin. According to
Ghiselin,
We scientists do not attach a name to a class, then discover the defining properties
which are its essence, but rather redefine our terms as knowledge advances.
Therefore the view of Kripke (1980) and his followers (see Schwartz, 1977) that
natural kind terms are, like proper names, “rigid designators,” should’be dismissed
as nugatory, and with it the accompanying essentialism
(Ghiselin 1987, p. 135). Ghiselin is apparently right to place the above proponents of the
rigidity view in the camp ol those who hold the discovery view described. Kripke strongly
suggests the discovery view when he urges that “scientific discoveries of species essence
do not constitute a change of meaning’” (1980, p. 138). Schwartz, whom Ghiselin also
mentions, suggests sympathy for that view as well: “In the philosophy of science,
adherents of the new theory of reference oppose the ... view that new discoveries become
part of new definitions of terms” (1977, p. 35).
But, though proponents of the view that natural-kind terms are rigid happen to be
proponents of the discovery thesis, the two doctrines must be distinguished. Let’s assume
that the discovery thesis is false, and that our natural-kind terms are constantly being
redefined, so that the precise kind is referred to continues to change as the terms’ meanings
continually change. In that case, we should not expect a kind term to rigidly designate the
same kind before the rise of modem science as it designates after the rise of science. But at
any given time it could still rigidly designate a single kind: that is, at any given time in the
history of the English language, a kind term might designate, in each possible world, the
same kind, though the term may not at other times designate that kind since its meaning
varies from time to time. Indeed, Thomas Kuhn develops just this position in his (1990).
So the mere evolution of meaning does not destroy the rigidity thesis. A tern, need not
keep its meaning over time in order to be rigid at a time. Glnselin's objection to rigidity
does not tell against the present account of rigidity, according to which a kind term is rigid
by virtue of designating the same kind in every possible world.
IV
Although the above objection presents no difficulties for the doctrine that kind
designators rigidly designate their kinds, Ghiselin’s rejection of the discovery view he
describes seems well motivated. Unfortunately, he offers scant substantiation for his
disagreement. To be fair, Ghiselin’s primary aim in the above paper is not with the
discovery view, and a convincing animadversion would hardly have been possible within
the confines of his paper. But the discovery view will not be refuted in the absence of a
close examination, which it will receive in the following two chapters.
It is time to take a closer look at the doctrine, broached above, that I shall oppose.
According to that doctrine our vernacular natural-kind terms name kinds whose essences
are scientifically interesting structures. It is scientists’ job to discover what the essences of
kinds are. The necessary truth of statements identifying kinds with theoretically interesting
structures or other entities is thus empirically demonstrated.
Like Putnam (cf. 1992a, p. 441), I am more interested in natural kinds than objects,
but it may be helpful to turn once again to analogous sentences involving concrete objects,
such as ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’. This sentence certainly seems to have been discovered
to be true. That is not just, of course, because ‘Hesperus’ and ‘Phosphorus’ are rigid, but
also because we determined that each names Venus not by a meaning stipulation but rather
by an empirical discovery. The discovery of the necessity of ‘Hesperus = Phosphorus’
involves the rigid designators’ having kept stable reference for a period of time extending
from before our conclusion through the moment we concluded that the sentence is true.
The sentence did not become necessarily true as a result of a decision to change the
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meanings of 'Hesperus' and 'Phosphorus' in order to make them refer to the same object:
that would not mark any kind of discovery that the sentence is true. In the same way,
accord,ng to the view that we dtscover the truth of necessary statements tdentifymg a kind
with its essence, the kind terms in question do not change in meaning as science
progresses. On the contrary, the speakers in 1750 meant just what we do by 'water' and
whale
,
even if they used them in sentences that we claim to be false. We simply know
more about the essences of the kinds associated with these terms. Speakers in 1750
commonly said that whales are fish, for example, but we now know they were wrong,
since we know enough about the DNA structure of whales to know that they belong to the
more general mammal kind, not to the fish kind. Similarly, early speakers may have erred
in taking certain superficially similar kinds of things to be salt, or sapphire, or water, being
ignorant of the chemical essences of these things.
This general picture of discovery is widely associated, naturally enough, with
Kripke (1971, 1980) and Putnam (esp. 1975b, d). Kripke offers support for the view in a
number of passages, including the following:
In general, science attempts, by investigating basic structural traits, to find the
nature, and thus the essence (in the philosophical sense) of the kind.... Note that
on the present view, scientific discoveries of species essence do not constitute a
change of meaning’; the possibility of such discoveries was part of the original
enterprise.
Kiipke follows up the passage with an example: ‘fish’. A biologist who determines that
whales are not fish does not mean something different by ‘fish’ than a lay speaker: “he
simply corrects the layman, discovering that ‘whales are mammals, not fish’ is a necessary
truth” (1980, p. 138).
Putnam’s (1975d) favorite example is water. If we were to visit a planet just like
Earth except that the clear, drinkable liquid called ‘water’ there by natives were not H2O
but rather some compound with a long formula abbreviated ‘XYZ’, we would not call it
‘water’, even if it looked, felt and tasted like water. Putnam emphasizes that if explorers
from 1750 were to visit Twin Earth, they would not know that the Twin Earth I,quid is not
H20 and thus not water, but nevertheless the liquid would not belong to the extension of
their word ‘water’ because it is not H2O.
Now, I do not know whether XYZ would be water. Perhaps Putnam is right that it
would not be. Popular intuition suggests that this is the correct answer. According to a
substantial minority, Putnam is wrong about this, as XYZ would be a kind of water
(Zemach 1976, pp. 1 19ff.; Mellor 1977, pp. 302-3; see also Unger 1983). Some
philosophers distance themselves from the whole debate over intuitions, harboring a
general suspicion about the very idea of drawing any conclusions of consequence about
such fanciful scenarios (Dupre 1981, p. 71; Devitt 1994, p. 545). In any case, it will be no
part of the present treatise to argue that XYZ is water. The aim here is to examine not this
particular claim but rather the more general view that we discover the truth of statements of
essence. Putnam clearly takes his fanciful examples to support this view. He urges that
scientists discover the truth of statements like ‘Water is H2O’ (1975d p. 233, for example),
statements identifying a natural kind with some theoretical structure.^
This picture ot the discovery of the truth of statements of essence is widely accepted
and widely discussed, as a brief scan of the literature reveals. De Sousa discusses it as the
modern view,” according to which ‘‘although we may remain ignorant of the essential
natures ot natural kinds, the point of science ... is to discover them” (1984, p. 164). For
Devitt and Sterelny “we discover the property that makes it the case that something is the
same kind as [another] by empirical investigation” (1987, p. 70). Sidelle’s view about
natural kinds is that “we discover, not stipulate, the essences of the things we talk about”
(1989, p. 139). According to Macbeth “in the case of a natural kind term, the boundaries
are fixed by how things are. They are found, as it were, not made” (1995, p. 271).
Wilson observes that for the realist “natural kinds are individuated by essences” which are
“necessary and sufficient for an entity’s being a member of that kind.... Science discovers
essences; this explains its theoretical and practical success” (1996, p. 304). Despite her
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plea for further substantiation, Bolton sympathizes with the view that identity statements
like 'Water = H20' and The tiger = the X-DNA species’ express “empirical discoveries
about the structure of these subjects” ( 1996, p. 146). Many others share the view (see also
discussions by Zemach 1976, p. 1 17; Wiggins 1980, e.g. p. 83n.; Linsky 1982, e.g., p.
375; Boer 1985, esp. pp. 105f., 1 14f.; Maddy 1990, p. 39; Li 1993; Dennett 1994, pp.
534-7).
Now, I have already noted that for Kripke and Putnam, the essence a vernacular
natural-kind term grasps is apparently microstructural: it is some atomic structure or
chemical composition for terms naming inanimate substances, e.g, minerals (see, e.g,
Kripke 1980, pp. 123ff„ 128ff.; Putnam 1975d, e.g., p. 231), and some chromosome
structure for terms for biological kinds, e.g. species (Putnam 1975b, pp. 140-2; 1975d,
239-40; Kripke is actually less specific here, framing a highly suggestive contrast between
non-essential observable properties on the one hand and “internal structure” on the other:
1980, e.g. pp. 120-1). This position does not accord with scientific research, at least with
respect to biological kinds. I will suggest that even terms from chemistry resist this
picture, to some extent. The discovery view must be restated in such a way that the
essence said to be discovered need not be microstructural. A suitable alternative to
microstructure will have to do in at least many cases. What is to be involved with a suitable
alternative? Well, it seems, at a minimum, that if statements identifying kinds with
theoretical essences are to be discovered true, the essences must be theoretically significant
structures or entities. Moreover, if the discovery picture is to hold up, then an essence
cannot be identical to a family or cluster of properties that is unspecifiable, except trivially,
for theoretical or practical reasons. For example, it has already been observed that
pheneticists classify by overall similarity. If pheneticists prove to be right, then we might
conclude that taxa have “cluster” essences, or “family-resemblance” essences. But then
there will be no discovery of the truth of non-trivial statements of the form
X (kind) = Y (theoretical essence).
For one just cannot specify an essence of overall resemblance for, say, the prtmates except
perhaps trivially: the family of primate Iraits
, Brimate-characlermny tr.ii, „
n
My principal objection to the view that we discover the truth of sentences
identifying vernacular kinds and their essences is this: our natural-kind terms are
associated not with a single structure (or other theoretical criterion) of the sort scientists
recognize and name but with any number of such criteria. As science advances, some
criteria are dissociated from the term, but this is by fiat, not discovery: stipulation
continuously takes place as science advances. It seems likely that our ordinary terms may
never be hooked up to a specifiable theoretical essence, that they will always be hooked up
instead to unruly clusters. In any case, without speculating about the future, it seems our
vernacular terms for kinds are and have been associated with such clusters of criteria.
Before elaborating in detail in the following sections, it is important to head off a
likely misunderstanding: I am not urging that the reference of our kind terms is determined
entirely by properties that speakers believe belong to the kind. Classic “cluster theorists”
such as Searle take this position. I will not argue that samples play no causal role in the
reference ol substances. The reference of our natural-kind terms is, I agree, determined at
least in part (and how much I will not dispute) by likeness relations to paradigms. It is just
that our language and world are too untidy to associate single likeness relations of a sort
scientists recognize with each term.
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' At least the Kripke-Putnam view that essences are nothine more thanmtcrostmctttres
,s false. Some headway might be made in the direction of ay nd view, according to which essences are historical plus microstructural
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first
’
a ri g»d designator designates the same object in allpossible worlds as it is used in the actual world , not as it is used in other
possible worlds in which the object gets picked out: for although we identify
objects in other worlds by our own names, natives of some of these worlds us^other names.
Second, ‘Hesperus’ is rigid because it picks out Hesperus in all worlds
at c ontain Hesperus. In worlds not containing Hesperus, it suffices here to
say that the designator fails to name anything other than Hesperus. Salmon(iy«U, pp. 32ff.) distinguishes between more than one understanding of a rigiddesignator that conforms to that requirement, but it is not necessary to
further specify here.
Finally, even if (H) is not necessary, it will nevertheless be necessarily
true of the object that is the brightest in the evening sky, Venus, that it is
identical to Hesperus. Thus, Kripke’s limited claim: “If ‘a’ and ‘b’ are rigid
designators, it follows that ‘a = b’, if true, is a necessary truth. If ‘a’ and ‘b’ are
n_ot_ rigid designators, no such conclusion follows about the statement ‘a = h’”
(1980, p. 3, Kripke’s emphasis).
It should be noted that on some accounts, ‘Hesperus = the brightest
celestial object, apart from the moon, in the evening sky’ would be ambiguous
as a result of ‘the brightest celestial object, apart from the moon, in the
evening sky’ being ambiguous: on these accounts such descriptions
sometimes rigidly designate and sometimes non-rigidly designate. An
ambiguity of this sort in the contained description would give the sentence in
question two readings, one necessarily true and one contingently true. Kripke
rejects this alleged ambiguity in (1980, pp. 59-60n.), but even if the ambiguity
exists, identity statements involving just rigid designators are distinguished
from those involving designators that are at least sometimes used non-rigidly
in that the former have no contingently true reading, while the latter do.
Putnam (1975d, p. 234) follows Kripke in affirming that kind terms are rigid.
Putnam’s explicit discussion of rigidity is brief, as he claims to express the
same point at length in different terms (see also Putnam 1983a, pp. 57-8).
Both Schwartz and Macbeth discuss natural-kind terms as predicates here,
rather than as singular terms. The intent of both is apparently to discuss
natural-kind terms in general, however, so it appears that there is no
intention to exclude from their observations kind terms used as singular
terms. In any case, the issue here is natural kind designators, so I will discuss
the criticism that my proposal for kind term rigidity makes all kind
designators rigid, which destroys any contrast between rigid and non-rigid
kind terms,
particular.
Replies related to this apply to the claim about predicates in
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Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1975b, 1975d) are, of course, the leading
champions of this theory. Devitt and Sterelny (1987, pp. 70-5) offer
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also Dev itt (1 , pp. 167ff.). It is because the causal theory is what doeshe work in moving essences out of the head that it has come under fire onhat score from various quarters: see, e.g., Douven and van Brakel(forthcoming), Nersessian (1984), and Shapere (1982).
There is also a second component of the causal theory: the second
component explains not how a term gets hooked up to its referent, but how the
name gets passed on, and used by those with no contact with the referent. The
first component alone guarantees that reference is not determined by
properties associated by speakers with the kind, so discussion of the second
component is not required here.
This has occasionally been disputed in the case of ‘bachelor’, but for the
sake of sparing the popular foil we can assume that tradition is right about
this.
1 9
Perhaps it should be noted, to quell any doubts about the matter, that Putnam
intends to apply ‘rigid’, following Kripke, to any term that “refers to the same
individual in every possible world ( 1 97 5d, p. 231); he is not introducing a
novel use for the term. Simple confusion about the relation between rigidity
and the causal theory seems to explain why he believes that terms whose
meaning is “in the head,” like ‘hunter’, are not rigid, though causally
grounded terms like water are (see, besides the references immediately
above, 1975d, p. 265).
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Other examples Putnam considers include ‘aluminum’, ‘lemon’ and ‘tieer’H's conclusion in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” that water has been discovered
to be H20 is repeated frequently elsewhere. Thus, summarizing
retrospectively in 1992 his earlier position, Putnam writes tha^ chemists havediscovered that water is H2 0,” continuing: “Philosophers of science who
reject this account have a notorious tendency to describe the discovery as a
meaning stipulation!” (1992a, p. 454n; see also, e.g., 1975b, p. 117; 1983a, p. 58).
It should be noted that Putnam has come to have second thoughts, in later
papers, about the discovery view he has popularized and is generally
associated with. His less celebrated later views will receive little attention
here.
CHAPTER 3
BIOLOGICAL KIND TERM REFERENCE AND THE DISCOVERY OF ESSENCE
It is time for a more detailed look at the discovery picture. The general picture,
when divorced from the error that biological kinds have microstructural essences, is not
initially implausible. Consider a familiar example, the rodent. You might think you know
one of these gnawing, furry little beasts when you see one. If so, you should think again.
Recently, a team of European scientists has presented molecular data to support its
conclusion that guinea-pigs, long counted rodents, have an evolutionary history that
excludes them from the rodent camp. 1 Though any young pet owner can confirm the
striking morphological and behavioral similarities between the animals traditionally counted
rodents, empirical investigation appears to have discovered the presence of impostors in
that group.
This story of the rodent certainly suggests the familiar view that it is scientists’ job
to discover the essences of our biological natural kinds, or, as Penelope Maddy has put it,
“to discover the underlying traits that make these things what they are.” (Maddy 1990, p.
39). In so doing, scientists don t replace an older usage of a term by a newer, more
sophisticated one: rather, they shed light on the way we’ve all along been using the term.
Not infrequently, this results in the discovery that, though past speakers thought that
certain objects belonged, or didn t belong, to the extension of a term, they were just
mistaken. Another example, a quite popular one that has already been mentioned in earlier
chapters, is the whale. Supposedly, whales were simply found not to be fish, and the once
common claim that they are fish has been empirically refuted by advances in the
physiological study of whales and fish. I intend to examine this picture here, in the light
of contemporary systematics.
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IThe most important single figure standing in opposition to this picture of terms for
groups of biological organisms has undoubtedly been John Dupre. Dupre has exposed
w.th many plausible examples the wtde gulf that separates ordmary language classification
from scientific taxonomy. Confronted by his examples, opponents have been forced to
temper substantially their enthusiastic estimates of correlation.^
Furthermore, Dupre has defended, via arguments that have evolved over time, the
claim that even where entities recognized by taxonomy do seem to have vernacular
correlates, biological theory uncovers no discoverable real nature underlying the kinds.
The battle to show this is supposed to rest with higher taxa, as vernacular terms tend to
name these, rather than species. (Higher taxa are, again, groups of species, like the
mammals, and the canines, as opposed to the domestic dog, which is a species.)
Unfortunately, we read in Dupre’s classic 1981 article “Natural Kinds and Biological
Taxa, there is, in the case of a higher taxon, no “discoverable relation that constitutes the
real nature of the kind, since higher taxa are assumed to be arbitrarily distinguished and
do not reflect the existence of real kinds” (p. 78).
That was 1981. Even so short a time ago, it was pardonable to put all of one’s
eggs in a phenetic basket when it comes to higher level classification, as Dupre did, on the
supposition that phylogeny, or evolutionary history, can’t provide the bedrock of a system
of classification, since it is too hard to discover. In the past few years, however, the role
of phylogeny has made dramatic strides in systematics, supplanting phenetics; and with the
increase in phylogenetic standards have come repeated claims to objectivity in grouping that
undermine the above, well known case against discovery. Thus, Mark Ridley, one of the
more philosophically savvy biologists of the cladistic school, which classifies according to
order of phylogenetic branching, observes that the world provides an “unambiguous
reference point” for classification, since “phylogenetic relations undoubtedly do exist,
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uniquely, objectively, unambiguously” ( 1989, p. 2). Fellow cladist P. E. Griffiths
suggests that clad,Stic taxa “might have been invented as a philosopher's example to
support the causal theory of natural kind terms,” explaining that past systematists have but
dimly seen nature's real divisions, yet “the exact boundaries and the real basis of these
divisions is revealed by evolutionary theory” (1994, p. 210) ^
Even so-called “evolutionary taxonomists,” such as Ernst Mayr, who have
maintained a long tradition of combining phenetic considerations with phylogenetic ones,
consider that by throwing evolutionary descent into the picture, “Darwin changed the whole
basis of classification. The taxonomist no longer ‘makes’ taxa, he becomes a ‘discoverer’
of groups made by evolution.” On this picture, in contrast to the phenetic one, “characters
are downgraded to serve as evidence for something known by the biologist to have an
independent existence in nature” (1969, p. 76; original emphasis).
Dupre hasn’t ignored the current of taxonomic thought. Recently he has adjusted
his earlier arguments to accommodate phylogeny, offering a dilemma: either phylogeny
gives way to phenetics, in which case the older arguments stand, since there is “no
theoretical importance to higher taxa” ( 1993, pp. 33-34) or else phenetics loses to
phylogeny, as the growing number of systematists embracing cladism would have it. But
in the second case, it is urged, ordinary language is removed from scientific considerations.
From a cladistic point of view it may well turn out that, in accordance with the latest
evolutionary doctrine, a lily that would be perfectly appropriate for a funeral
bouquet turns out not to be a lily at all. There may be a case for such linguistic
revisions in professional systematics, but there can be no possible case for holding
ordinary language hostage to such quirks of evolutionary history ( ibid.
, p. 33).^
Actually, there can be. Ordinary language is something of a hostage to evolutionary
history, and to scientific discovery in general. Influence from this direction on the proper
use of vernacular terms (including ones introduced by science, like ‘rodent’, perhaps) is
powerful and widespread. As the scientific journal Nature published the above findings
about the rodents, so did The New York Times (Angier 1996); and the latter front page
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announcement was not about scientific terminology, either, or technical uses for ‘rodent':
it was simply about rodents and guinea-pigs. “People may think they recognize a rodent
when they see it scurry by in the park,” the paper announced, cautioning that recent
scientific work has undermined the importance of popular operational criteria.
Another telling example from the recent popular literature is the tuatara. “It looks
LIKE A LIZARD,” National Geographic tells us, offering a photograph of what could easily
pass for a convent.onal lizard, “but the tuatara has occupied its own branch of the reptilian
family tree for 225 million years" (“New Hope,” 1996: original capitalization). Examples
could be multiplied.
None of this tells against Dupre’s claim that the terms of ordinary classification very
often lack scientific correlates. But despite the great plausibility of this claim, it seems
much less plausible that ordinary language is generally insulated from the effects of
empirical discovery, that science is a “largely autonomous activity” (1993, p. 23)
Now, despite the close tie between science and ordinary common words for
biological organisms, the familiar picture of scientific findings serving to correct past
mistakes of use is, I 11 argue, misguided. Entrenched judgments about what belongs in the
extension of a vernacular term generally aren’t subject to empirical refutation. Rather,
revisions in our conception ol what belongs in the extension of common words mark the
replacement of older, less precise uses with newer, more sophisticated ones. More
generally, I will argue that, phylogeny notwithstanding, we don’t discover what makes
members of the extensions of our vernacular terms members of the extensions. We do
come to new conclusions frequently enough, but our conclusions reflect a substantial
measure of fiat, following a strain to shape the use of old terms in the light of new
findings.
I shall split into three sections the task of showing that policy shapes revision in our
use of underlying trait terms as scientists learn more about the world. In the following
section, I will urge that it is a matter of policy as to which of several competing standards
for measuring relevant affinit.es should be used to carve the world into units for labeling.
In the third section. I’ll show that even if one of the likely phylogenetic standards is given
there is much room for a systematist’s discretion in the employment of it. And finally, in
section IV, I will argue that even given that the world is fully carved along scientifically
relevant lines, the mapping of vernacular terms to it is fraught with personal decision, and
that this seems bound to scotch any given case for the retrospective spotting of past
mistakes in the general use of a term.
II
One of the most recalcitrant problems with the view that the reference of grounded
terms stays the same over time is that the samples used to baptize an extension might serve
as paradigms for many nested groups. Dennett offers a helpful example to make this clear.
I’ll borrow the example, though it relies on a story that probably isn’t true; in any case, it
should have been. The story involves Siamese cats, which are really a domestic breed of
cat. But let s ignore that, and suppose that the Siamese were a wild variety that ancient
speakers found and baptized. There are plenty of examples in nature like this, which
would do better to illustrate, if not to explain, the point at issue; the three-toed woodpecker,
lor example, is a biological species that spans from Europe eastward to America, dividing
into no less than twelve subspecies. Now, to return to our cats: suppose the only cats
early Siamese speakers were familiar with were Siamese cats. In that case, it is hard to see
how there could be any fact of the matter as to whether the Siamese word used to designate
“things ol that kind” referred to ail members of the biological species Felis catus . or just
those of the Siamese variety (Dennett 1995, p. 410).
It might appear that this problem would disappear if the speakers baptized their
referent “things of that species” (as opposed to that kind ). There are still deep problems.
First, as Dennett notes, this escape won’t be possible if the speakers haven’t developed a
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proper grasp of the notion specie s. Perhaps this objection can be surmounted: a
respectable case might be made that the speakers would have had a working knowledge of
what a species is. According to Mayr, primitive people don’t need a modem taxonomist to
help them to identify species: according to his first hand testimony, “the Stone Age natives
in the mountains of New Guinea recognize as species exactly the same entities of nature as
a western scientist” (1987, p. 146; see also Mayr 1982, p. 252).
Let’s suppose, then, that our Siamese speakers should have had an intuitive grasp
of what a species is, and had baptized their term ‘kat\ using Siamese cats for paradigms,
as “things of that species”. Now is it established that empirical investigation would settle
the question of whether non-Siamese cats, such as Persians, are kats? The answer is still
no.
The problem is that, as we have already seen, there are any number of different
professional conceptions of what a species is, that there doesn’t seem to be any fact of the
matter about which is the keeper, and that furthermore, which of the different proposals
wins will make very conspicuous differences about what things are conspecific. Similar
observations were made by Darwin nearly a century and a half ago. “It is really laughable
to see what different ideas are prominent in various naturalists’ minds, when they speak of
‘species’,” Darwin wrote in an 1856 letter to the botanist Joseph Hooker. “It all comes, I
believe, from trying to define the indefinable” (Darwin 1888, vol. 1, p. 446). Darwin
would still be laughing. The recent literature offers dozens of distinct definitions of the
species category. How different are they? Though various eclectics (e.g., Michael Ruse
1987, p. 238) claim otherwise, the different conceptions partition the world quite
differently. For example, Mayr’s so-called biological species concept (BSC), according to
which species are “groups of interbreeding natural populations that are reproductively
isolated from other such groups” (Mayr 1969, 26; 1970, 12; 1976a, 518) divides the birds
into an established 10,000 species. Joel Cracraft’s increasingly popular phylogenetic
species concept (PSC), according to which “A species is the smallest diagnosable cluster of
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individual organ,sms within wh.ch there is a parental pattern of ancestry and descent”
(1983, p. 170) would double that number to 20,000 spectes (see Grahm Martin 1996).
Because the PSC is much more fine grained than the BSC, Persians and Siamese
nught not end up in the same species according to the former, as they do by the latter.
Depending on taxononusts’ decisions, the Siamese might end up in a narrower species than
we re accustomed to seeing them in.
Or, they might end up in both the narrower and the larger species: faced with
attractive offers from myriad concepts on the market, some theorists, including Kitcher,
Dupre, and Ereshefsky, have endorsed a win-win solution to the resulting dilemma in the
form of pluralism about species (Kitcher 1984b; Dupre 1993, pp. 44 ff.; Ereshefsky
1992a). Dupre, who takes his battle with Putnam to ride on higher taxa, rather than
species, has nevertheless appealed to species pluralism to undermine the possibility of
finding any ‘privileged sameness relation” uniting members of a species: an organism
might be a member of many species of different, coexisting conceptions, owing to the
many interesting relations it might bear to other organisms.
It is worth mentioning, however, that some forms of pluralism actually reinforce
the idea that each species is bonded by a “privileged” relation. Brent Mishler, Michael
Donoghue, and Robert Brandon have all endorsed a pluralism according to which there is
just one species that any given organism belongs to (Mishler and Donoghue 1982; Mishler
and Brandon 1987). Their view is pluralist on account of allowing that different species
may be delimited variously: some by reproductive forces, others by ecological forces, still
others by homeostatic inertia, and so on. But this pluralist conception grants that each
species is characterized by a privileged relation of some sort or other appropriate to it.
Furthermore, it seems clear enough that whether or not pluralism prevails (and its
effect has been to add more competition to the market, rather than to settle the chaos), the
idea that scientists might discover what makes one species concept (pluralistic or monistic)
the one to adopt seems exceedingly dim. The problem is, of course, all of the discord.
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OW, the presence of disagreement in the sctent.fic community isn’t itself reason to say that
an answer is up for grabs. A generation ago scientists were shinply split over whether
polywater” was an artifact. Empirical investigation showed that it was.
But, despite glorious analogies (one biologist compares efforts to capture the nature
of species to the search for a unified field theory in physics [H. Smith 1990, p. 123]) and
despite the many claims that this or that concept is the “correct" one,6 the species debate
seems largely to come down to a matter of personal preference. The competing proposals
do have to measure up to the empirical world, and the choice between them is not
completely arbitraiy. Nevertheless, the selection has as much to do with the classifier as
With the classified. Points counted in favor of a concept include, for example, its ease of
use, its tidiness, and its correspondence to systematists’ vision of their field.
A clear instance of the pull of convenience is manifest in the promotion of the BSC
on the basis of the “considerable simplification of taxonomy” that Theodosius Dobzansky,
along with others, has found it to bring: because the BSC accords reproductive units
species status, it allows for the recognition of polytypic species (or species broken into
subspecies), rather than “assigning species names to every local race” (1970, p. 356).
Mayr has counted the resulting simplification of classification at the species level “the
greatest benefit derived from the recognition of polytypic species” (1969, p. 38; see also
1982, p. 290. Cf. Cracraft 1983, pp. 162-5).
At the other end of the spectrum, pluralism is often maligned for promoting a
babble of confusion and ambiguity (by, e.g., Ghiselin 1987, pp. 135ff.; Hull 1987, p.
181). Naturally, pluralists are concerned to deflect these charges in promoting their views
(Dupre 1993, p. 52; Mishler and Brandon 1987, pp. 403-4; Kitcher 1987).
Tidiness also plays a prominent role in taxonomists’ thinking. Nowhere is this as
evident, perhaps, as the aversion many taxonomists feel for definitions, however well
suited for sexual organisms, that fail to place every organism into a slot, by failing to
recognize asexual species. As Hull remarks, “just as every library book must be placed on
some shelf somewhere in the library,
.here is a slrong compulsion among systematic to
insist that every organism must belong to some species or other” (1987, p. 179)
Systemattsts' vis,on of their field has important effects on their conclus.ons. As
was brought out at a celebrated meeting of ornithologists recently, differences between
proponents of the PSC and the BSC hinge largely on whether the discipline is seen “as a
science dominated by field work or by laboratory investigation” (Martin 1996, p. 667) 7
This, in turn, depends on what and whom taxonomy is for, and about this there is conflict.
Some see classification as a tool for the wider scientific and general ornithological
community; others don’t.8 Again, a victory for the latter would result in double sized field
guides.
Just as views about how to characterize species is fraught with discord, so, of
course, are decisions about the basis of higher level classification. Recall that at present,
there are three main schools: pheneticism, evolutionary taxonomy, and cladism.
Pheneticism and cladism represent polar extremes. The former, whose outstanding
proponents are Peter Sneath and Robert Sokal (Sneath and Sokal 1973; Sokal and Sneath
1963) classifies entirely on the basis of observable characteristics, taking no account of
genealogy. Cladism, on the other hand, which finds its source in the influential work of
Willi Hennig (1966), classifies entirely on the basis of genealogy. Each cladistic taxon is
composed of a “stem” species together with all of its descendant species. Evolutionary
taxonomy, championed by Simpson, Mayr, E. G. Linsley, R. L. Usinger, and P. Ashlock
(Simpson 1961; Mayr, Linsley, and Usinger 1953; Mayr 1969; Mayr and Ashlock, 1991),
tries to weave a middle ground, employing both phenetic and phylogenetic considerations
in dividing the world.
The struggle between phenetic and phylogenetic taxonomy has a long history.
Systematists have been moved in one direction or the other on various grounds, including
the desire to provide a classification system broadly useful to workers in diverse fields
(e.g., forestry, horticulture, physiology, etc.), desire for scientific respectability, desire to
cut speculat.cn to a minimum and to maximize certa.nty in taxonomy placement, des.re to
avoid upsetting traditional class,ficat.ons, and an abundance of other such grounds 9 Many
biolog, sts are reluctant to enter the fray: Gould is no, alone in complaining tha, the disputes
are marked by “issues of style, mores, and methodology more than demonstrable
substance” (1983, p. 364).
That, again, is not to say that there aren't important considerations to be taken into
account in choosing to favor one school over another. Naturally, worthy costs and benefits
must be weighed in the selection. But in the end it comes down to what, in the
taxonomist’s mind, is a good buy.
Pheneticism casts aside uncertainty and speculation pertaining to the reconstruction
of phylogeny; on the downside, its failure to incorporate phylogenetic information has
made it less than satisfying for workers interested in evolutionary relationships. This
drawback, along with its failure to deliver on promises of objectivity and repeatability, have
accounted for its waning popularity. ^
Evolutionary taxonomy enjoys the ability to reflect phylogeny without admitting
unnatural-seeming taxa like the group including just the birds and crocodilia; the cladist
recognizes this group as a legitimate taxon, since it is “monophyletic,” which means, again,
(for cladists, others use the term differently) that it includes a common ancestor along with
all of its descendants, cladists recognize all such groups (and no others) as legitimate taxa.
Since the birds rapidly evolved after taking to an avian life, thereby leaving their crocodile
sisters behind looking more like the lizards, evolutionary taxonomists lump the crocodiles
with the lizards rather than the birds. So evolutionary taxonomy represents an element of
phylogeny that cladistics fails to capture: evolutionary change, like the change the birds
achieved after a split with their reptilian sister group. Cladistics, on the other hand,
incorporates only the other element of phylogeny: genealogy. As a result, Mayr
emphasizes, “the number of evolutionary statements and predictions that can be made for
many [cladistic] groups (like birds and crocodiles) is often quite minimal” (1976b, p. 436).
On (he other hand, cladists accept this implication as pan of the consequences of
throw,
„g off phene,ic shacUes. Evolutionary change deserves study, ,, is admitted: i, is
just not part of class, ficat,on (see Ridley 1986, p, 60). And whatever the cost of
abandon,ng phenettcs, the cos, of retatntng phenettc elements is no, negligtble. In add, t,on
to the many charges of arbitrariness that it brings (see, e.g, Donn E. Rosen 1974), there is
the problem of amb,gutty. As Hull records, both pheneticists and cladists have decried
evolutionary systematists' habit of interspersing grades and clades in their classifications
in such a way that no one can tell which taxa are which” (1988, p. 141).
It seems clear from the nature of the disagreements that there isn’t a fact of the
matter about which standards to be used for carving up the world are the right ones to
adopt. It depends on your aims. And the world doesn’t come furnished with answers
about which competing aims are the right ones. There are a number of legitimate angles
from which to view the world, as there are a number of legitimate maps for a given
location, each representing certain features of the represented location at the expense of
others (see Robert O’Hara 1993 for an extended and helpful development of the analogy
between taxonomy and cartography). We would not call a map wrong if it didn’t include,
say, a subway system. No map can include everything of value for every purpose (unless,
as Lewis Caroll suggested, a map were made to life-sized scale, in which case the region
mapped would serve as well as its own map!). I point all of this out not to counsel
pluralism, but to suggest that, if the dust of systematists’ struggles ever settles, the
resulting favor for phenetics, phylogeny, a combination, or some other alternative will have
to reflect systematists’ particular interests and aims, along with, no doubt, a good measure
of compromise. To urge that one system or other might be discovered to be the right one
and the others wrong would seem to be laughable indeed.
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I have claimed that there is no right or wrong choice between competing
.species
concepts, or between the competing taxonormc schools. But it is quite another thing to
claim that the use of any given school to dtvtde the world into taxonomic groups calls for a
substantial measure of fiat. The second claim is the one presently at issue. I will argue that
both of the above phylogenetic systems, and the prominent species concepts discussed
above as well, allow a role, in the recognition of taxa, for the discretion of the taxonomist.
This is not a claim about our having to guess at whether certain specimens belong together
on account of our having inadequate information about them (though that is common
enough). It is a claim about the need for decisions, however much is known about the
specimens and their evolutionary placement.
Consider, first, evolutionary taxonomy. That phenetic principles have arbitrary
application is well known. But evolutionary taxonomy, it will be recalled, mixes phenetic
with phylogenetic principles. In this way, it inherits the arbitrariness of the phenetic
school. When a group takes on a different adaptive zone from a “sister group” (a group
that shares a more recent common ancestor with it than with any other group), it may
evolve to such an extent that the evolutionary taxonomist removes it from a larger taxon
containing the sister. But decisions about how much evolutionary change is sufficient to
break a clade (an ancestral group and all of its descendants) is by no means
straightforward. Thus Rosen: ‘ Must a descendant take to the air, return to the sea, come
out on land before we choose to confer high rank upon it? Or is it enough that some organ
in the mouth or a part of a root system has evolved...?” (1974, p. 448).
Moreover, when there is a cutoff point, locating where it is to be is a matter of
personal judgment. Like the pheneticist, whose taxa are cut off in time with “no sharp
division between [them], other than an arbitrary one” (Sneath and Sokal 1973, p. 61), the
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evolutionary taxonomist must do her best
456-7).
on a judgment call (see
,
e.g., Mayr, 1976b, pp.
But evolutionary taxonomy is a hybrid. Cladists, who cast off the phenettc yoke
for a purely phylogenettc system, must be given a separate hearing, particularly in the light
of them ubiquitous boasts of objective taxa. Hence, for Griffiths “systematics is . .. an
attempt to discover an underlying real structure in nature. Cladists maintain that there exists
a unique, correct ordering of all organisms” (1994, p. 207; added emphasis). This is
supposed to follow from there being just one tree of life. That there is just one tree is often
insisted upon. Scotland considers it an “axiom” of cladistics that “nature’s hierarchy is
discoverable and effectively represented by a branching diagram” (1992, p. 3). Ridley
insists that the branching “phylogenetic hierarchy exists independently of the methods we
use to discover it, and it is unique and unambiguous in form” (1993, p. 365). Now, if
there exists just one branching phylogenetic tree, then, since the cladist turns the branching
diagram representing it (a cladogram) directly into a classification system, cladistic
classification must be objective too. This is where cladists claim to triumph over
pheneticism. Representing the cladistic sentiment, Ridley declares that pheneticism is
plagued by an array ol ‘classifications, the choice among which is subjective. Hennigian
cladism is designed to avoid that fate. Its philosophy allows only one classification: the
classification defined by the hierarchy of phylogenetic branching” (1986, p. 46).
In fact, however, there is no single hierarchy of phylogenetic branching. The
unambiguous reference point claimed by Ridley, along with others, for cladistic
classification, is a chimera. Actually, a multiplicity of legitimate hierarchies, and
cladograms representing them, may conflict with respect to what belongs in a clade to the
exclusion of what else. The problems I’ll raise pertain not to the well known, possibly
serious but probably not devastating complications involving reticulation (merging),
horizontal gene transfer, and the like (for a brief discussion, see Elliott Sober 1988, pp. 6-
7); rather, the problems to be ratsed pertatn to the identification of the base of any clade: its
ancestral species.
Any taxon, for the cladist, includes a stem species along with all of the stem's
descendant species (1966, pp. 71-2). A lot, therefore, rests on demarcating the stem
species. But here we run into problems, since, as we have seen, there is no single species
concept, but rather a variety of alternatives.
The observation that a variety of species concepts undermines objectivity does not
conflict with Ridley’s contention (however implausible) that Hennig’s definition of species
is the only valid one. According to that definition, as it is slightly extended by Ridley to
allow for cases of extinction and living species, a species is “that set of organisms between
two spectation events, or between one speciation event and one extinction event, or that are
descended from a speciation event” (Ridley 1989, p. 3). (A speciation event is a branching
off ot a new species.) Each species begins with a forking event and ends by being wiped
out, or when it itself forks into separate species.
A moment s glance reveals, however, that the above definition is incomplete. We
need some account of speciation, of what counts as a splitting of species lineages. It is at
this point that the cladistic definition is forced, as Ridley acknowledges, to appeal to other
species concepts to explain, for any given time , what counts as a species. Then it will be
understood what counts as the birth of a species. For example, interbreeding might fill the
bill. In that case, a species at any given time is a group of interbreeding or potentially
interbreeding organisms, but its end points are determined by branching. It is clear, then,
that the cladistic concept does not escape the subjectivity of choosing between the many
other species concepts on the market, in selecting which it is to subordinate for its own
completion.
Now let’s return to higher taxa and the assertion that cladism allows just one
classification: the one that is defined by the hierarchy of phylogenetic branching. The
basis of this claim, declares Ridley, who articulates the common idea more clearly than
others, is that phylogenetic relationsh.ps are “unambiguous” on account of ,t being the case
that for any group of species, the members
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is also made in Ridley’s 1985, pp. 81-2).
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Unfortunately, claims to a common ancestral species are not as matter of fact as that.
To see that the appearance of an unambiguous, nature-made branching hierarchy is
Illusory, consider the common situation in which a controversial lineage qualifies,
according to the BSC, as a species divided into two subspecies (see Figure 3.1), while for
the PSC it counts as two different species. (Two other concepts would have done as well;
Ridley’s preferred concepts are the BSC and the ecological species concept; here again, the
members of this pair do conflict about whether to accord certain lineages species status: for
examples, see Alan Templeton 1992) Already we need two different branching diagrams to
represent the two options, at least if we want all distinct species to be depicted; one diagram
will have two branches, the other just one.
But such incongruity doesn’t stop here at the species level. Assume that the two
sides of the lineage (two lineages?) begin as one incontrovertible species lineage and
eventually separate by any standard into two species. In the interim, each side buds forth a
branch species. (This again isn t unlikely, since most speciation events start with small,
isolated founder populations: see Mayr 1982, p. 229, and Mayr and Ashlock 1991, p.
225) Now, the resulting order of branching varies dramatically depending upon your
preferred species concept. This can be seen in Figure 3. 1 , which depicts, first, a lineage
that divides, and the descendants of each side after that division. If the division occurring
prior to t is only into subspecies, so that the trunk of the tree is still to be counted as one
species (at any time between branching and before f) then the last two branches, (C) and
(D), with their ancestral species and all of their descendants, compose one exclusive taxon.
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A wider taxon tncludes branch (B) and a still wider taxon includes all branches. This
possibility is represented by Cladogratn (A). (Note that a cladogram tells nothtng except
order of branching. Unlike the tree representing a dividing lineage, the cladograms do not
tell, for example, from which side of the lineage a branch buds off, or at what time.)
BRANCHING LINEAGE CLADOGRAM (A) CLADOGRAM (B)
Figure 3.1. A branching lineage and two interpretations of the order of branching.
On the other hand, if the division prior to t is a speciation event, then Cladogram
(B) is the proper one for representing the world. Now (C) and (D) are no longer sister
groups; rather, (C) is now a sister of (A), and (D) is now a sister of (B). No taxon
containing three of the branches is any longer recognized, so that (B) is no longer a sister to
a branch culminating in (C) and (D). And (A) is no longer a sister to the clade culminating
in all of the other branches. Of course, the situation can be compounded still further by
inserting additional controversial lineages.
The problem, then, with cladists’ “objective” classification is clear: the branching
structure has clay feet. On account of it not being a matter of discovery about which
species concept is correct, it likewise cannot be a matter of discovery as to which
cladogram, (A) or (B), is correct, either. 1
1
69
In fact, the problem is still more deep rooted than this. Suppose, even, that one of
Ihe going spectes concepts could be called the one accurate spectes concept. Still, there
would be room for doubtful lineages like that shown by the tree in Figure 3. 1 to cause
different posstble tntetpretations. Suppose, for example, that the BSC were the ruling
concept. Ridley does a fine job showing how, unless it is subordinated to the clad, Stic
concept, the BSC makes for arbitrarily delimited species. That is because Mayr’s concept,
unqualified, dictates endpomts that are determined no, by branching, bu, rather by potential
interbreeding. Obviously the ancestors and descendants of a particular lineage are
precluded by temporal barriers from breeding with its present members, but what matters
for determining conspecifictty is that they would be capable of interbreeding were they
contemporaries. This standard, however, allows room for subjectivity in drawing the
boundaries of species: for if you start a species at some time t, there may indeed be
something of an objective time in the future after which interbreeding would be impossible.
But there is no landmark indicating that the species starts at t. If you take the start of the
species to be some later time f, so that the other end changes, too, then the included
members ot the species will still all be potentially interfertile. So the boundaries of the
species depend upon your chosen baseline.
It is easy to see how, when it is subordinated to the cladistic concept, the BSC
evades the above source of arbitrariness. The cladistic concept would have it that any
species starts at a branching event, not at the time appointed by a systematist. And the
species ends either with the lineage’s extinction or with another split. Thus, even if earlier
members of a lineage would be incapable of breeding with later members, they are
conspecific so long as no speciation event severs them. The endpoint is set by splitting.
It is not, therefore, hard to see why Ridley finds the unqualified BSC to define
“arbitrarily limited, rather than cladistic, branch units” (1989, p. 12). There are reasons,
though, for tempering his estimate of the cladistic concept’s objectivity. He claims that “the
virtue of the cladistic definition is its perfect objectivity. Species are defined
unambiguously as branches or... chunks of the phylogenetic nexus" (ibid, p. 4). Any
problems delimiting species are operational, not theoretical: “The only problems will be
practical questions of whether we can recogntze them” (ibid, p. 5). This is not so. Even
at a given time, there are calls for arbitrary decisions about whether there is enough
introgression between two populations to consider them species. This has been noted by
many authors, (e.g„ Johnson [1970, p. 231] and Templeton [1992, p. 165]) usually the
course of highlighting the BSC’s shortcomings, and it has been admitted by Dobzansky
(1970, p. 359) and Mayr (1982, p. 282). As M,shier and Donoghue observe, “vanatton in
the ability to interbreed [involves] discontinuities of many different degrees and kinds.
Groups of organisms range from completely interfertile to completely reproductively
isolated” (1982, p. 495).
Therefore even if we restrict our attention to the BSC embedded within a cladistic
account of species’ endpoints, we are bound to find cases of questionable lineages at a
given time, concerning which fiat will have to settle whether there are two species present
or just one species divided into two subspecies. And we are back to the drawing board,
where we still find Figure 3.1 sketched.
What about other species concepts? Do they allow for personal decision in the
sorting of questionable species? It seems clear that they do. The other concept most
discussed above is the PSC, which defines species as “smallest diagnosable clusters”.
But, as Mishler and Brandon note, “some judgment of the significance of discontinuities is
needed” (1987, p. 408).
The ecological concept, endorsed by L. Van Valen (1976) and L. Andersson
(1990), characterizes a species as a lineage with a unique adaptive zone, or ecological
niche. But again, adaptive zones vary gradually, as well as being very difficult to specify,
so that the systematist will find herself splitting here and bonding there where she might
have done otherwise (see Rosen 1974, p. 448).
Another popular concept is the evolu.tonaty concept, orig.nally proposed by
Simpson (1961, pp. 152ff.) and slightly modified by E. O. Wiley (1978). According to
•he latter, “a species is a single lineage
... which maintains its identity from other such
lineages and which has its own evolutionary tendenc.es and historical fate” (ML, p. 18).
Again, the taxonomist is hardly left wtth cut and dr.ed species waiting to be discovered.
Jus, when a lineage can be said to have its own “evolutionary tendencies” and “historical
fate” calls for judgment.
It seems hard to believe that there should be any concept that obviates the need for
systematists’ discretion. On the contrary, as Simpson has observed, there are bound to
“remain numerous doubtful cases where decision depends on the personal judgment of
each practitioner of the art of classification. To insist on an absolute objective criterion
would be to deny the facts of life, especially the inescapable fact of evolution” (1961, p.
152).
IV
The past two sections have offered arguments to the effect that we can’t say, in
general, even if we are cladists, that what is determined to belong to a taxon to the
exclusion of what else has been discovered to do so. A good deal of fiat goes into deciding
such matters. But suppose there were some principled way to determine what organisms
belong together with what other organisms in the various common taxa, to the exclusion of
all else. In the present section it will be argued that even if this were so, it would still be far
from the case that our vernacular terms generally have discoverable extensions. Difficulties
mapping vernacular terms to the world are pronounced, and I will argue that they scotch the
popular opinion that empirical discoveries sometimes correct established folk beliefs about
the referents of vernacular terms.
The problem ot mapping might be introduced by the interesting story of the
monotremes, whose living representatives include just the platypus and the echidna. The
first European natural, sts to encounter the beasts were thrown into confusion. Thomas
Bewick’s reflections on the platypus are typical: “it appears to possess a three fold nature,
that of a fish, a bird, and a quadruped, and is related to nothing we have hitherto seen"
(Bewick 1824, p. 523.) Reactions to the echidna were similar (see J. Gruber 1982 and
also H. Ritvo 1993, pp. 249-50). These two curiosities, along with the other monotremes,
are now seen as mammals. They have some features associated with mammals: they have
mammary glands for nursing their young, like the mammals recognized before their
discovery. But, unlike previously known mammals, the monotremes are egg layers rather
than live bearers, and they exhibit a number of other reptilian features. It is easy to see
how cases like this could present problems for systematists, who might be tom between
placing them with the mammals or in some other group, perhaps their own. No principled
decision might be available.
It may seem that cladistics can restore principle, that if cladistics has it right, all we
have to do is to locate the monotremes’ place on the genealogical tree of life. If they are
part of the mammal clade, then they’re mammals. Otherwise, they aren’t.
But, interestingly, the problem for cladists is one of a kind with that of the
pheneticists. Just as there are intermediates in terms of similarity, there are intermediate
locales on the genealogical tree. There is a clade including all mammals except the
monotremes, and this is embedded in another, larger clade that extends just as far as the
monotremes (see Figure 3.2 below). So the dilemma returns in a different form. The
Monotremes Marsupials Placental Mammals
Figure 3.2. The mammals
paradigm mammals without the monotremes form a taxon. The paradtgm mammals with
the monotremes form a taxon. Is there any fact of the matter about which of these two
legitimate taxa is to be identified with the mammals? It's going to have to come down to
just how mammal-like these thtngs are, according to a phenettc measuring tape. Laying
eggs is a strike against. Nursing is a point in favor. But whether the mammalian
characters outweigh the non-mammalian ones in importance is going to come down to
artistic taste, and so, therefore, is the decision about whether the monotremes are
mammals. ^
Mapping is no straightforward affair. Problems become even worse when
empirical findings cast doubt on the adequacy of earlier groupings. It is such findings that
are supposed to allow for the discovery that speakers have been incorrect in their
application of a term.
But this idea of entrenched use being found erroneous is a dubious one. When the
early use of a term involves its application to things that turn out to be unrelated, the
informed community is left with a choice, not nature’s answer concerning placement. The
guinea-pigs discussed above may be used to illustrate the choices left after phylogenetic
disruption. Take cladism as the preferred system. (The choices will be similar whatever
system is adopted.) Now, guinea-pigs have (assuming the validity of the conclusions
drawn from the study mentioned above) been found not to belong to any exclusive clade
with the other formerly called “rodents”. The narrowest clade containing guinea-pigs as
well as the mice and rats includes, for example, horses, seals, and primates.
What to do? Well, one thing that could be done is to decide that ‘rodent’ names a
group that isn’t a genuine taxon. The cladist is used to surrendering the taxonomic status
of various terms in the light of phylogenetic evidence about the extension. Thus, ‘Algae’
has been acknowledged to have no taxonomic correlate, since algae are supposed to share
their closest common ancestor with, for example, horsetails and clubmosses. ^ ‘Reptile’
15 " te™ 'hat keeps COming ln,° and goin8 out of cludistic recognition, depending in part on
the latest evoluttonary hypotheses. There are questionable terms whose fate is to be
determined by further research. An example of one of these is 'zebra’. There is some
reason to think that closest common ancestor of the zebras might be an ancestor of Old
Dobbin; if so, then, as Gould notes, striped horses may merit the popular vernacular term
'zebra’ in virtue of their sinking similarities, but they are not a clad, Stic taxon (1983, p.
358).
Just as 'zebra' might be released from taxonomic duty, so could ‘rodent’. One
interpretation of the discovered non-monophyly of the things that we have been calling
rodents’ is that the rodents are just non-monophyletic. A rodent is the sort of furry,
gnawing creature sporting those traits that used to (mis)lead systematists into placing them
in a common mammalian order, period. So the conclusion that guinea-pigs aren’t rodents
could certainly have been avoided.
But suppose we want to keep a name like ‘rodent’ tied to a scientifically respectable
group, even after things called by the name are found not to comprise an exclusive clade.
Even then, our options are generally two. We can pare the unacceptable taxon down or we
can extend it. We can either say that some things we had thought belonged to the extension
don’t, since to include them in the extension we would also have to include their hitherto
unsuspected relatives X, which are understood non-members; or we can keep all things
formerly thought to belong to the group in its confines by extending the term’s use to
embrace X as well. The camp that threatens to split the group needn’t do so.
Scientists who have urged that the traditionally recognized rodents are not
monophyletic have suggested that guinea-pigs be ousted from the rodent camp. But
extending is another option. We could urge that in fact the rodents are far more inclusive
than was previously realized, and include horses, seals, and primates.
This may seem incredible. But it is not uncommon for the extension of a term to be
so drastically expanded beyond the paradigms originally used to anchor it. For
paradigmatic dinosaurs we turn to the likes of Tyrannosaurus Rev Brontosaurus
Nevertheless, cladis.tc systematists are now count,ng penguins and ducks as less
frightening models of the dinosaurs. Since buds evolved from the dinosaurs, they are
dinosaurs. Dtnosaurs aren't extinct after all!
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Jus, so, we nugh, conclude on the basis of
the guinea-pig study that early rodents split, and evolved along different lines; but all of the
products are evolved rodents, just as birds are evolved dinosaurs.
Other examples of extension abound. Some years ago Simpson (1961, pp. 121 -3 )
supposed the mammals to have arisen from more than one reptilian ancestor, but urged
that, rather than to declare the mammals non-monophyletic, the systematist might group
formerly supposed reptiles into Mammalia. In this way the first common ancestor of the
would-be reptile lineages that separately gave rise to the mammals, would be the first
mammal.
A term like ‘rodent’ might meet a variety of fates after phylogenetic disruption.
Which fate attends it is for the working taxonomist to choose.
It must be noted that some official rules of nomenclature (see, e.g., International
Commission on Zoological Nomenclature 1985, and International Botanical Congress
1988) do put constraints on conclusions about certain terms (though not all terms are
governed by the rules: ‘rodent’ isn’t, since rodents are assigned the rank of an order, and
the zoological code governs only taxa that are of family rank and lower). However, the
code itself indirectly gives the individual taxonomist a say in the fate of taxonomic terms,
since the individual taxonomist decides the rank of named taxa, which in turn determines
the fate of terms after disruption, according to the code. For example, the extensions of the
names agamid and chameleon’ have recently been called into question by changes in
views about the phylogenetic relationship between the organisms named by the terms (see
de Queiroz and Gauthier 1994). There is more than one way to handle the disruption. If
the taxonomist decides that the organisms that have been called ‘agamids’, together with
those that have been called ‘chameleons’ are to comprise a single family, then ‘chameleon’
must be extended, according to the code, to refer to the entire
to be chameleons. But if the taxonomrst decides to count the
group, agamids will turn out
group as more than one
family, then •chameleon’ will not be extended. The decision concerning whether a single
family should be recognized, or a group of families, is not determined by the code or any
other matter of fact: ranking is largely arbitrary by anyone’s account. 15 Therefore, it can’t
be a matter of discovery whether agamids have turned out to be chameleons, despite the
code s determining what is to happen under certain circumstances.
More importantly, it is even a matter of decision, though not of any individual
systematist, that the extension of ‘chameleon’ should be, say, expanded under the
circumstances in which the code requires it. For the code is itself just a body of laws that is
decided upon by vote. Systematists choose whether to preserve it or not. Presently there
is a growing movement to overthrow the code, the underlying basis of which is largely
inherited from Linnaeus, and to start again from scratch. The current system, as de
Queiroz and Gauthier note, “causes nomenclatural ambiguity, parochialism and instability”
(1994, p. 27). De Queiroz and Gauthier recommend the adoption of a system without
ranking, which attaches the importance that is now given to rank instead to evolutionary
relationships (de Queiroz and Gauthier [1990, 1992, 1994]; the proposal of de Queiroz and
Gauthier is discussed favorably in, e.g., Judd, Sanders, and Donoghue [1994, p. 42], and
in a recent outgoing presidential address delivered by Michael Donoghue to the Society of
Systematic Biologists: see Pennisi [1996, p. 181]).
Under the system proposed by de Queiroz and Gauthier, the fate of ‘chameleon’
would be quite different than it is under the current system: its extension could not be
forced, or even allowed. It is clear, then, that the fate of ‘chameleon’ is as much a matter
of decision as the ratification of the current nomenclatural code is. Just because a code is
adopted to force awkward cases uniformly doesn’t make the mapping of terms to a newly
conceived world any less forced, or any less a matter of decision.
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The idea of entrenched convictions about (he proper extension of a term being
empirically refuted seems, for the above reasons, doubtful. Its populartty ean be credited
to a few intuitive stones from mother's knee that have recetved a great deal of ctrculatton:
tomatoes are fruits, we are told, contrary to what we may have been inclined to think. And
whales are not fish, though they look like fish and people used to think they were fish.
These hackneyed examples don’t hold much water. A very few have noticed this.
Dennett (1994, p. 535) offers the intuition that if tomatoes are fruits, there must be two
definitions of ‘fruit', a scientific one and a vernacular one. Those of Dennett's readers who
may balk should be made aware that peas, beans, and squash all qualify as fruits by the
botanical definition. But few, I suppose, would want to defend the claim that they belong
in the extension of the vernacular ‘fruit'. ‘Fruit’ can be added to Dupre’s store of examples
that sunder science from the vernacular.^
Perhaps whales will do better. According to Devitt and Sterelny, among many
others, Whales provide a good example of error. Central to what most people used to
associate with ‘whale’ was the description ‘fish’. This description is false of whales”
(1987, p. 69). Sensing a challenge here to his conviction that scientific research is
irrelevant for determining membership in vernacular kinds, Dupre has responded with the
proposal that perhaps whales really are fish (1993 pp. 29-30). But whales aren’t fish.
And they provide a fine example of the bond that links science and ordinary language.
The issue of error is a different matter. Were earlier speakers’ statements that
whales are fish wrong? Have we just learned better? On the contrary, it seems much more
likely that earlier speakers meant something different by ‘fish’. Indeed, just what ‘fish’
should refer to was a question earlier authorities explicitly addressed. In the eighteenth
century Oliver Goldsmith pondered that groups recognized by the folk had been shown to
have little significance for naturalists. This raised the question, for a writer of natural
history such as himself, as to whether they were to be kept intact, or shaped to suit the
naturalist’s agenda. Was the whale a non-fish that the general public misclassified, for
example, or a bona fide member of the heterogeneous extension of 'fish'? After reflect,on.
Goldsmith concluded that whales are a lofty type of fish, “many degrees raised above other
fishes in their nature” (1791, vol. 6, p. 167). The obvtous stmtlartfies between whales and
other finned creatures supplied reason enough for people to go about doing as they did, in
referring to both by a common term. In fact, Goldsmtth observed that there was room in
the extenston of the vernacular ‘fish’ even for creatures outside the “finny tribe”, and he felt
that naturalists ought to respect this:
No two animals are more unlike each other than the whale and the limpet thetortoise and the oyster. Yet... it is best to let them rest in the station where thegenerality ot mankind have assigned them; and as they have been willing to <dve
loTY
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Naturalists’ use of ‘fish’ did end up narrowing, in spite of Goldsmith’s case for
conservatism, and common use changed to mirror it. Still, Goldsmith’s conformity to the
popular use of ‘fish’ in his time seems sensible enough. Many vernacular terms have kept
referring to extensions that are uninteresting from a naturalist’s point of view, as Dupre’s
examples make clear. ‘Fish’ might have done so as well.
V
It is time to take stock, address some possible criticisms, and conclude. The
previous section tells against the general misconception according to which scientific
findings are used to correct past speakers. This section offers a more general lesson about
the view that scientists discover our vernacular kinds’ essences. If a particular placement in
a kind is not discovered to be right but is instead determined by fiat, then the kind’s essence
is also not discovered. For example, if our having determined that whales should not be
placed in the kind we called fish was a matter of choice, then we cannot claim after
assigning a whale-excluding essence to what we call ‘fish’ that this is the discovered
essence of what we have all along called ‘fish’. On the contrary, it is not a fact about what
earner speakers called T.sh' that the corresponding essence excludes whales; but i, is a fact
about wha, we presently call ‘fish’ that the essence excludes whales from the kind. Cases
of “correction” have typically been employed to
.llustrate emptrtcal discovers about
essence. In reality, they underm,ne the dtscovery account by provtding examples of
stipulated change in the use of our terms.
Section III further highlighted the role of fiat in determining the boundaries of taxa.
Section II discussed competing systems. The compel, t,on on the market suggests a further
reason fiat is needed in asstgning essences to vernacular kinds: there are too many
candidates for types of essences that might be assigned to the kinds. Systematists generally
prefer, for ease of use, something a good deal more wieldy than some combination system,
though pluralists have pleaded for this option. In any case, whatever the resolution to the
dispute between systems may turn out to look like, whether some particular monistic
conception wins out or some form of pluralism, it will have to involve a healthy measure of
fiat.
All of this bodes ill lor the idea that scientists discover the essences of our
biological kinds. Recall the claim of the essentialist: that scientists empirically discover the
truth of theoretical identity statements, statements involving a pair of rigid designators, one
ot which is a vernacular kind designator and the other a term of science openly designating
a theoretical entity. It is the job of scientists to determine what theoretical structure oak ,
say, is identical to. This sort of discovery seems unlikely to occur, since some system
would have to be agreed upon for there to be an agreed essence. And that agreement about
systems would have to reflect a discovery about how things are for the theoretical essence
to have been discovered. But this requirement cannot be met. One scientists puts the point
I have defended rather starkly:
Having whatever information and methods one wants, what criteria should be used
to incorporate the results into a classification? This question lacks an objective
answer.... Only power can arbitrate genuinely basic questions of taste, and that is
why there has been war in systematics (Van Valen 1989, p. 100).
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Let us take a step baek, and examine a more limited claim: It might be granted that
the settling upon one system or another marks a change in the use of our biolog,cal ktnd
terms, but nevertheless urged that the essences of our presctentific terms have been
discovered (whether our terms take on new uses thereafter or not). For it might be held
that some vague, unttdy essence has been discovered to belong to the prescientific
designation of 'tiger'. It is not clear whether ecological niche, phytogeny, evoluttonary
tendencies, morphology, and so on is necessary for betng "tiger” (a member of the kind
prescientific speakers called 'tiger'), perhaps. But satisfaction of the conjunction 0f all
plausible criteria can be said to form a sufficient condttion for being a “tiger," accord,ng to
any taxonomic school. Mere satisfaction of the disjunction of these criteria may yield
vague cases, while satisfaction of none of the criteria yields non-“tigers”. This might be
said to amount to a vague essence for “tigerhood”.^
Can this sort of maneuver save the discovery picture? Before the question is
answered, it should be noted that this move obviously represents a violent departure from
the spirit of the usual Kripke-Putnam view. First, no discovery theorist has anything like
this sort of cluster-essence in mind. And second, this compromise surrenders, as noted,
the idea that the post-scientific theoretical identity statements that scientists supposedly do
or will recognize convey discoveries about kinds that we have all along recognized and
discussed and tried to discern the essences of. Rather, we will have to concede that such
sentences are presently true because the meanings of the words have been suitably altered
in the light of scientific findings.
We might nonetheless explore the suggestion as an option for revision of the
discovery picture. Unfortunately, the suggestion will not salvage much of the discovery
picture even if the above concessions are not taken into account. For the search for true
theoretical identity statements becomes a lost cause. We can see the problem by
considering just phenetics, which classifies by overall similarity. Suppose that this were
the correct system. No nature-made phenetic essence seems to be specifiable. Pheneticists
cannot agree among themselves even about the placement of actual cases, and there is
general agreement that the disputes have no principled resolutton. Surely finding a
principled placement for real-life cases is a trifling task compared to that of specifying a
non-trivial essence good in all metaphysically possible worlds for any gtven taxon. The
family resemblance” essence for any phenetic taxon is just not something anyone has
found and named with a rigid designator.
Nottce that the problem is not just that the expression would be vague. So long as
the vagueness of the expression were to match the vagueness of, say, the prescientific
tiger', all would be well. We could agree that there are penumbral cases, actual and/or
possible. The problem is rather that no suitable vague expression for the essence of “tiger’
seems forthcoming, except perhaps a trivial one: ‘family of “tiger”-characteristics\ or
some such expression.
The philosophical attempt to state the essence of a concept like knowledge is in
some respect analogous to the task of specifying a phenetic essence for tigerhood. First,
there is an analogy with respect to the role of vagueness in a proposed essence. Proposed
analyses of knowledge tend to be vague (they usually appeal to belief , for example, which
is vague), but vagueness is no fault of the analysis if the original concept itself is
correspondingly vague; it is just that the vagueness in the analysis must match that of the
original concept. Another respect in which the two cases are analogous is in their
difficulty. Dozens of analyses have been offered for knowledge. If this task is herculean,
a proper rendering of the essence of tigerhood
,
even after all the facts concerning the
world are in, is out of sight. The phenetic resemblance relation would take into account
everything from hair color to ear shape, immunoglobulin concentration, and limb length,
and it would have to capture precisely the definite cases and the vague ones of our “tiger”
concept.
Now, if the task were not insurmountable when limited to phenetics, a proper job
for English would require going beyond phenetics. A rigid designator specifying the
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essence of a kind mendoned in the vernacular mus, involve no, only phene,ic criteria bu,
those criteria employed by other systematists.
Needless ,o say, no one has ever proposed a candidate analysis for any presc.ent.f.c
biological term. No one is even looking for this sort of thing. ‘“The tiger” = T theoretical
entity' will, it seems safe to say, never be completed, and certainly not by a scientist.
Specifying cluster essences for prescientifie terms is just not the sort of work scientists do
for a living.
So scientific investigation does not result in the discovery of the essences of our
vernacular kinds. And, as I have urged, scientific discovery that disrupts traditional
classifications does not result in the correction of mistakes in naming. It might at this time
be questioned, what can science tell us about the use of our terms? By way of bringing
things to a conclusion, I would like to address this topic, by saying something about how
science can inform us about the extension of our terms. It seems to me that scientific
findings do have a limited use in this regard because they can confirm that a particular
placement is correct. If a term is used by prescientifie speakers to refer to certain
specimens taken for a species, say, and scientific investigation reveals that the group is
indeed marked by a uniform phylogeny, morphology, ecological niche, evolutionary
tendencies, and so on, then those speakers have done a good job. The extension of the
term has been confirmed, and the decision to count the group a species is vindicated.
Again, when we get such confirmation, there isn’t the discovery of the essence of
the named entity, or what it is that makes members of the extension members. The cladist
will tell you phylogeny holds the group together, and the morphologist, morphology.
Moreover, we are unfortunately not denizens of Gould’s (1983, p. 364-5) ideal
world, which yields the same taxa regardless of the criteria used; so we certainly can’t
count on confirmation being the rule. We’ll have to contend with plenty of tension and
disruption, and with the concomitant task of redefining. As Gould has well said, the world
is much more interesting than it is ideal.
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and more are recorded in P. F. Stevens (1984; see esp.
°For classic criticisms, see L. A. S. Johnson (1970). See also Ridley (1986).
The claim that different and inconsistent cladograms can represent a
population has also been made recently by Robert O’Hara (1993, pp. 240ff.); see
also his (1994, pp. 1 7 ff. ). But there are profound differences between my claim
and O Hara s. First, O Hara doesn’t try to show that a lineage’s sister group may
be up in the air, as is done above; he rather tries to show that a population
might be split at different locations into distinct species . Furthermore, the
competition between O’Hara’s varying ways to split a population will see a
principled settlement in the future: O’Hara argues that for all we can tell from
ffui—temporal standpoint a population might be one species or it might be more.
So different judgments are possible about how to split a population into
species, on account of the systematist being forced to make decisions on the
basis of guesses about the future. Only the future will tell which of O'Hara’s
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See, e.g., Mayr (1982, p. 208). It is important to understand that the
arbitrariness that is present in r anking a taxon (is it a family? a superfamily?
a tribe?) is unrelated to whether the taxon is arbitrarily delimited.
You may still want to hold that tomatoes are fruits by either definition, the
vernacular or the scientific. I won’t try to talk you out of it. But we couldn’t
d iscovered that the vernacular term ‘fruit’ includes tomatoes in its
extension on account of their satisfying the requirements for belonging to the
extension of the scientific term: otherwise we would also have to say that we
have discovered that the vernacular term refers to peas and beans - and
that’s far fetched.
’’Moreover, with respect to at least some cases, like ‘whale’, it is clear that
everyday speakers criteria must figure into the cluster of contending criteria
employed in prescientific times.
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CHAPTER 4
CHEMICAL KIND TERM REFERENCE AND THE DISCOVERY OF ESSENCE
I hope lo have shown in the last chapter that biological kind terms from the
vernacular arc attended by any number of criteria for membcrsh.p, and that where these
enter,a disagree over particular organisms or groups of them, there is no fact of the matter
that such organisms or groups belong to the named kind. Some of the criteria attending a
kind term are dissociated from it as scientific inquiry progresses, because people refine the
term's use. But this is not a matter of discovery. The abandoned criteria are not
discovered not to characterize the kind named.
In this chapter I will urge that something similar holds for the case of chemical
kinds, including liquids, minerals, and so on. Paradigmatic instances of a chemical kind
share many properties, macro- and micro-; these form a cluster of criteria for belonging to
the kind. As we discover more about the objects in question, we narrow down the list of
properties we associate with the chemical kind, but this is a matter of choice, not discovery.
Again, I accept that a prescientific term like ‘water’ or ‘diamond’ refers to things
like these (samples). But, of course, there are many likeness relations between the
samples, some broader, some narrower, some pertaining to underlying structure, others
pertaining to observable features. If I am right, then many of these properties matter to
what belongs to the kind. Now, the range of candidate relations is not unrestricted. A
newly discovered substance that is completely unlike diamonds in underlying structure and
observable traits is not going to belong in the extension of ‘diamond’, or even in the
penumbra of that extension. Neither is anything that has to date not been called a
diamond’ in lull knowledge that it has many similarities to diamonds, unless, perhaps,
enough weighty and undiscovered similarities exist. But there is a vast range of traits
attached to any vernacular kind term. These will be seen to thwart the discovery of the
truth of identity statements like those touted by discovery theorists.
87
In the following four sections, I will attempt to demonstrate the role Hat plays in
determining even the post-scientific extensions of our terms. Such cases show the
pervasiveness of stipulation in determining, at least to a healthy extent, the essences our
terms are attached to. They show the tendency of our terms to shift in meaning, taktng on
more sophisticated meanings as science advances. Such meaning shifts undermine the
discovery position. 1 In the final section I will present doubts about our discovering
essences even should extensions remain the same over time.
The following section shows how competing microstructures can lead to stipulation
concerning extensions. In the three sections thereafter, the role of superficial properties in
extension stipulation will be addressed. In the last section I will leave behind observations
about terms’ extensions, addressing further problems for the view that we discover the
truth of theoretical identity statements that reveal the metaphysical essences of kinds.
I
In the present section I assume, with the discovery theorist, that a kind term refers
to the stuff it refers to in virtue of that stuffs possessing a particular microstructural
composition. I take for granted what I will later reject, that any substance found to bear the
same microstructural kind relation to samples of water, or jade, or some other kind, is
water or jade, or whatever kind, respectively, and nothing else is. Even granted this
assumption, I argue, the claim that the defining structures of natural kinds from the
vernacular are typically discovered seems wrong. A good example to use in showing this
is water, since it is so popular with the discovery theorists. ‘Water’ was a term in English
long before the rise of modern chemistry. Did we discover that what we prescientifically
referred to as ‘water’ is identical to H20? Kripke (1980, 128) speaks for many discovery
theorists when he unhesitatingly asserts “It certainly represents a discovery that water is
H20”.
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I think that, far from being certain, it is wrong to say that th.s was a discovery. In
fact, I think that we could have concluded after the arrival of modem chemistry that ‘water'
and ‘H 20- have different extensions. Not only could we have so concluded, but this
conclusion would not have accorded any less well with speakers’ prior use of ‘water’ than
did the conclusion that water is H2O.
According to the discovery account, we learned that the extension of ‘water’ is the
compound H20 by investigating samples of what we referred to as ‘water’. We looked for
lhe
—
st ‘n£uishing microstnrctural characteristics of the majority of the liquid we called
water’. Liquid bearing these characteristtcs of the majority of what we called ‘water’ was
really found to be water. The rest of what we may have called ‘water’ was revealed to be
some different kind of matter which we formerly mistook for water because of its apparent
similarity.
Here is one reason I think that we could have “discovered” that water is not
identical to the H20 compound: the majority of what we prescientificallv railed ‘wa tPr ’ ho,
more than one imcrostructural feature that we could have concluded distinguishes the mie
from the spurious samples believed to be water
. A feature other than being H20, perhaps
one that overlaps with being H20, might have been taken to characterize what was to be
called water
,
and it would have been no more right or wrong to draw the conclusion that
some other feature characterizes the what is called ‘water’ than to draw the conclusion that
being H20 does the job.
To illustrate this claim, I offer the following story. In the story two groups of
English speakers conduct exploration into whether a certain sample of liquid is really water,
really bears the relation same microstructural kind to what English speakers call ‘water’.
They come to different conclusions. My example involves something broadly similar to
Putnam s famous Twin Earth device (Putnam, 1 97 5d, pp. 223-27), though there are
important differences.
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The time on Earth is just after the turn of the twentieth century. Scientists have
learned a good deal about the phystcal universe by this time. Many elements have been
discovered, as have been many compounds. It is held within the scientific community that
the most basic matter in the world is the elements. Elements are distinguished by each
having a different atomic number. Gold, for example, is the element of atomic number 79.
It is also held that any two atoms of the same atomic number are type identical. So two
hydrogen atoms will be indistinguishable, as will two oxygen atoms, etc. And it is held
that water is H2O. All these conditions did obtain in fact.
Now at this time history is broken. A message reaches Earth from outer space.
Intelligent inhabitants of the distant and undiscovered planet Pluton invite a party of up to a
thousand Earthlings to visit Pluton. A rare opportunity for one way travel through space-
time has chanced upon the cosmos. An opportunity to return will arise in thirty years or
so.
So leaders on Earth decide to send a team of scientists on the journey. English is
agreed to be the official language of the expedition. The voyagers prepare samples of many
known kinds Irom the natural world to take to Pluton in order to compare them with
material to be found there. A veritable Noah’s ark is prepared with land and water animals
and plants, as well as many chemical samples.
The journey takes place in 1905. We will focus on just one Plutonian kind that the
scientists explore after their arrival: the stuff on Pluton that resembles water.
The water-like liquid on Pluton comes down in the form of rain, as water does on
Earth. It tills oceans, lakes, and rivers, and is drunk by Plutonians. Soon after their
arrival, Earthlings begin examining the water-like liquid to see if it is really water, i.e. to
see if it bears the relation same microstructural kind to stuff Earthlings call ‘water’. The
two liquids look and behave very much alike when compared. But differences are soon
noticed, even before molecular testing can be started. The first clue to the liquids’ different
structures comes when the goldfish tank from Earth is cleaned and the water is replaced
W‘th the Pluton The goldfish subsequently dte. Other aquatic anintals are tested for
their react,on to the Pluton liquid. Both saltwater and freshwater animals find survtval m
the liquid impossible, though the liquid is not polluted. Crabs, shrimp, clams, and many
fish types are tested and die. Aquatic plants die in the liquid as well. Not a single case of
acclimatization is found. It is decided not to try to drink the liquid.
The next difference found is that Earth water and the Pluton liquid boil and melt at
notably different temperatures. One cold day ice sculptures of world leaders of Earth and
of Pluton are carved out of ice from Earth water and Pluton liquid, respectively. A slight
warming trend brings temperatures a little over 32 degrees F. The sculptures made of
water brought from Earth begin to bead with water, while those made of Pluton liquid hold
firm. The temperature rises to 36 degrees and above. The water sculptures melt entirely
over time but the Pluton statues do not even begin disintegrating. Even when the
temperature is almost 39 degrees the Pluton liquid sculptures resist forming droplets. It
begins to snow. Despite the warm temperature, Pluton snow sticks and piles high,
showing no sign of melting. At last the temperature rises again. It surpasses 40 degrees F
and the frozen Pluton liquid begins to slowly melt.
Upon more in depth investigation it is found that when Pluton liquid is mixed with
water samples from Earth the two liquids can be separated with sophisticated scientific
treatment. The scientists are puzzled; surely this stuff is microstructurally of a different
kind than most ot what we call ‘water’. The mysterious structure making up Pluton liquid
is dubbed PQR’. Although it is at first believed that PQR is not found at all in the water
samples brought from Earth, this turns out not to be so. Very small traces of PQR are later
found in the scientists water samples; ocean water samples, for example, are found to
contain about 0.015% PQR. (This is not tremendously surprising, since Earth water
contains many foreign substances. Ocean water also contains small traces of gold, for
example.)
Eventually, through sophisticated testing, it is learned that the Pluton liquid is, like
the bulk of water samples brought from Earth, composed of an oxygen atom combined
wtth two atoms which have, like Earthian hydrogen, atomic number one. But the
Plutonian atoms of atomic number one are very different from most atoms called
‘hydrogen’ on Earth.
On Earth the great bulk of what is called ‘hydrogen' has a nucleus with one proton
or positively charged particle, making it atomic number one. Here on Pluton the same is
true. But the stuff from Pluton has a neutrally charged particle (neutron) in the nucleus as
well as a proton. So it has extra mass. At the atomic level it is structurally different from
most Earthian hydrogen. Contrary to previous beliefs, not all atoms of any given element,
or atomic number, are type identical.
The scientists call the element which is without a neutron ‘protium’ and that with a
neutron ‘deuterium.’ Protium is found to be quite unlike deuterium in various respects.
Some differences are small. Deuterium reacts chemically more slowly than protium. For
example, deuterium reacts with chlorine at 32 degrees F more than thirteen times slower
than protium does.
Big differences between protium and deuterium become apparent as soon as more
serious communication can be achieved with the Plutonians. Earthlings are informed of an
explosive weapon created with deuterium extracted from the Pluton liquid it largely
composes. This weapon was used once at sea. The explosion caused a whole island to
vanish. A hole was created 175 feet deep and one mile in diameter where the island had
stood. No such bomb had ever been known on Earth. This deuterium monster could not
be made with Earth water’s protium. So there are big differences between the two kinds of
atoms that, with oxygen, make up the respective liquids.
In the light of this information the question is posed to the scientists: is POR
(D2O) water? Does it bear the same microstructural kind relation to the majority of what
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we call
-water’? Suppose in anctent Greece Archtmedes had had a glass of D20 and called
it water (in Greek). Would he have been right?
In the light of molecular deferences between what is normally called
-water’ on
Earth and D20, the scient.sts conclude that D20 is not true water. It does not bear the
relaUon Same microslructural kind to the majority of what Earthlings call ‘water.' The
scientists dub it ‘pwater’.
Are the scientists right to say that D20 is not water? Putnam has something to say
about a similar case. He supposes at one point in “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” that
Archimedes has a piece of metal X which he takes for gold, but which is not gold, since it
does not bear the proper microstructural relation to the bulk of what we would call ‘gold.’
How could this absence of relation be determined? Here is what Putnam has to say:
Perhaps X would have separated into two different metals when melted, or wouldhave had different conductivity properties, or would have vaporized at a different
emperature, or whatever. If we had performed the experiments with Archimedes
watchmg, he might not have known the theory, but he would have been able to
check the empirical regularity that ‘X behaves differently from the rest of the stuff I
classify as (gold) in several respects’.... This may not prove that it isn’t gold, but it
puts the hypothesis that it may not be gold in the running, even in the absence of
theory. If, now, we had gone on to inform Archimedes that gold had such and
u
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a ™?lecular structure (except for X), and that X behaved differently because ithad a different molecular structure, is there any doubt that he would have agreed
with us that X isn’t gold? 6
(Putnam, 1975d, pp. 237-8). It seems that if we use the model Putnam has informally set
before us, we should agree with our scientists that D20 is not water. It diverges in
behavior from the bulk of what we call ‘water’ on a number of accounts: DoO cannot
support aquatic life, while water does. The two liquids have different melting and boiling
points. They can be separated with proper scientific treatment. D20 can be used to build a
mega-bomb that cannot be made from our ordinary Earth water; etc. And the reason for
DoO's deviant behavior is its distinct molecular structure.
To return to the story, the thirty years on Pluton pass. It is time for the scientists to
return to Earth. They take with them a tank of D20 back to Earth when they depart. Back
on Earth in 1935 the returning pioneers are bombarded by the public with questions about
Pluton. When the topic of liquids arises the adventurers cede the tank of D20 to the
resident scientists, explaining that the tank does not contain true water as it appears to, but
rather this is a newly discovered liquid whtch serves on Pluton the role water does on
Earth. The resident scientists, upon examining the tank, respond disappointedly that this is
not a new liquid at all. The explorers have merely discovered an uncommon variety of
water. It is composed not of ordinary hydrogen but of a hydrogen isotope called
(coincidentally) ‘deuterium’.
This concludes the story. All of the information about natural kinds such as
deuterium and deuterium oxide is factual. It is true that deuterium was discovered in 1931
on Earth. The weapon composed of it is the hydrogen bomb. It is also true that D20 is in
fact considered water. A standard encyclopedia’s entry for “water” will confirm this.
Often D2O is called “heavy water” and normal water “light water”.
What do I think that this story shows? I think it shows that we did not discover
that deuterium oxide is water. Hence we did not discover that water is identical to HoO.
We could have “discovered” that some H2O (the variety which is D2O) is not what we had
been calling ‘water’, as our space travelers concluded. I think that the decision that just
H2O made with protium bears the relation same microstructural kind to the majority of
what we called ‘water’ would have been no less acceptable a conclusion than that H9O
bears the key relation. We cannot say that our space travelers were just flat wrong in
concluding that D2O is not what they had been calling ‘water’ and that we are just plain
right in concluding that it is.
It might be suggested, on the contrary, that one community is right and the other
wrong, and that it is up to “final science to determine which community has drawn the
correct conclusion about the reference of ‘water’. Final science has, at any rate, sometimes
been urged to offer a principled settlement on disagreements over reference (see, e.g. Boer
1985, pp. 106, 114-116). Unfortunately, it cannot help here. The reason it cannot is that
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the two communities agree on the phystcal facts about the world. Had the communities
remained isolated, each could have independently reached this final science without either
having overturned its decision about the proper reference of ‘water’. Indeed, it would be
obvious to one from our common,ty in the Final Science Age that the other community had
arrived at the same scienttfic truths we had, if the other community were to present ours
with a book of their ultimate science, along with the translator note (in Earth English) that
when ‘water’ appears in the book, the authors are not really talking about water , but
protium oxide.
The Pluton story shows how more than one microstructural kind may compete to be
identified with a post-scientific natural-kind term from the vernacular. In the story, isotope
kinds and element kinds compete. It should be noted that the moral of my story does not
depend on both competing kinds being equally fundamental :2 the red wolf , wolf, and
canine kinds vary in significance and priority, but all three are salient natural kinds 3 So if
a scientist were to point to a pack of red wolves interspersed by one or two wolves of
another species, and call attention to “the kind instantiated by those things, or the majority
of them if there is not just one kind there,” she has not established determinate reference to
any of the above kinds. In the Pluton story, H2O and D2O were seen to present a similar
situation. Ostension to matter containing much of one and a little of the other, failed to
single out either the H2O kind, or the protium oxide kind. Given that both of these related,
authentic, salient natural kinds were instantiated by the samples, no kind was seen to have
an overpowering claim to have been the referent of ‘water’.
If it was open to us to draw the conclusion that D2O is water, it was also open to
us to draw the conclusion that it is not. Given that the choice between these two
conclusions (or perhaps more) about water’s defining structure was not constrained by a
right and wrong way, I do not think that our selection can be called a true discovery. No
doubt it was a discovery that most of what we called ‘water’ is H2O. But it could not have
been a discovery that water is identical to that compound.
H20 could not have been discovered to be the essence of what we have all along
called 'water' because there was another candidate, an overlapping but distinct kind that
might as well have been said to be identical to what we called 'water', in virtue of being
relevantly like the majority of the samples of matter representing the kind. The natural
world is full of such closely related kinds. To name just a few more cases: somettmes a
substance of one chemical composition will be molded into different shapes and forms at
the microstructural level. This may affect surface properties such as color or hardness, as
in the case of opal, some of which is arranged at the submicroscopic level into uniform,
ordered spheres packed together and some of which is not. Suppose the former is
baptized, say, “opal”. Should the latter belong to this baptized kind? We could say yes.
'Opal' was determined to embrace both. But we could say no. We have said no, in like
4
cases. Overlapping kinds can be found at more fundamental levels. In addition to the
obvious same-kind relations between substances composed of the same elements, there are
also some between substances composed of different elements. Tourmaline
(XY3Z6B3Si6027(OH)4), for example, contains various combinations of elements in the
first three places of its formula. Each combination is a distinct kind. But the varieties form
a collective kind as well. Different isotopes present us with just one example of
microstructures that are related but distinct and which might or might not be lumped into a
kind anchored by samples. The world invites a lot of decision in determining whether this
or that bit of matter bears the same structural kind relation to a sample group. So much the
worse for the discovery model.
II
Many of the natural-kind terms that are commonly cited in the literature name
minerals recognized since antiquity for their beauty: ‘diamond’ (Donnellan 1983, p. 86;
Sterelny 1994, p. 10), ‘emerald’ (Teller 1977, p. 174), ‘jade’ (Putnam 1975d, p. 241;
Boer 1985, pp. 1 14ff.) and so on. We have a fair amount of historical data on these sorts
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of terms, which will be used to illustrate the lesson of the following two sections, as their
referents' charm captured the attention of early speakers who named ihem, discussed them
in their literature, and so on. 6
The preceding section presents an example in which the essence of a kind is not
discovered. In the example presented, a problem arises in determining whether the
microstructure of one substance is sufficiently similar to the microstructure of a different
but related substance for the two to bear the relation same microstmrinmi UnH t0 one
another. Conclusions about the defining traits of a kind differ according to how this
question is resolved.
In the present section and the one following it, I will present another two general
case types in which defining criteria of kinds are not determined without caprice. In the
following cases there will be no careful weighing of microstructures to see whether one
substance has microfeatures that are sufficiently similar to those of another substance for
the two substances to be of the same kind. Rather, in these cases the microstructnres of
compared substances will be given to be sufficiently similar to cause the substances to
belong to the same microstructural kind or else the microstructures of the substances will be
given to be sufficiently different to cause them not to be members of the same
microstructural kind. But the presence of surface features in the substance(s) called by a
term make it possible for a substance term’s use to be settled in more than one way.
We begin with the first case.6 I present to the reader a couple of choices similar to
those which face speakers of a language after the rise of science throws light on the kinds
their terms refer to:
Choice number one: a particular mineral term T’ is used to refer to a mineral
which, unknown to users, is composed of the chemical compound AbSi04(F,0H)9. The
extension of T’ is picked out by its superficial properties. One of those surface properties
is its brilliant yellow color . Indeed the original meaning of ‘T’ was “fire.” Nothing which
is not yellow is called ‘T’. With technical advances, however, comes the knowledge that
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some known blue minerals have basically the same microstructural composition as what
called T; among other similarities, the blue minerals' chemical composition is also
AI2Si04(F,0H)2. Structural deferences causing color variation in the material are of
minimal importance.
is
Second choice: a particular mineral term R' is used to refer to a mineral which,
unknown to users, is composed of the chemical compound Al203 . The extension of %'
,s
picked out by its superficial properties. One of those surface properties is its red color
The original meaning of R' was “red.” Nothing non-red is called ‘R'. With the rise of
modem science, though, it is discovered that some known blue minerals do have the same
basic microstructural composition as what is called ‘R’; the blue minerals also have the
chemical composition Al203 . The structural differences which cause color variation in the
material are of minimal importance.
Consider the blue minerals found to share the fundamental structure of T and R.
Are the blue minerals 1 and R respectively? The reader inclined to essentialism will
probably suppose that the blue minerals are T and R respectively, in virtue of their chemical
compositions, etc. A more Lockean reader may be inclined to say that the blue minerals are
not T and R.
Neither answer accords with the verdict of modem mineralogists. Cases one and
two about T and R are factual stories about topaz and ruby, respectively. Blue minerals of
the material composing topaz have been concluded to be topaz. Blue minerals of the
material composing ruby have been concluded not to be ruby. In fact, both substances
come in other colors as well. Topaz’ has been concluded to refer to minerals of all colors
ol its composing material. But ‘ruby refers to only red minerals of its composing material,
corundum.
Did we discover that, while ruby must be red, topaz need not be yellow? It seems
not. It seems we could as well have concluded that ruby need not be red but that topaz
must be yellow. Before the microstructure of topaz was explored, people knew that they
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US£d ' tOPaZ ' ,0 refer ‘° mmerals ° f the same“ *> ‘he yellow ones Ihey had picked ou,
Bu, wheiher yellowness was a defintng cr,tenon of “topaz” was, I think, no, worked out.
After the structure of yellow topaz was ascertatned, people could have tested samples of the
blue rock presently called ‘topaz’. Finding it had the same molecular structure as what they
had been calling ‘topaz’, people could have concluded that “topaz” had turned out to be just
one vartety of a multi-colored mineral. 7 This decision would not have been any less
legitimate than the decision that was made.
In just this fashion ruby turned out to be one variety of a mineral. Ruby was not
known to belong to the same mineral species as the blue and other non-red minerals sharing
its composition until almost 1800. The greatest of eighteenth century mineralogists failed
to note the conspecificity prior to this date (Hughes, 1990, pp. Iff., 15). When it was
eventually realized that the things called ‘ruby’, all of them red, were composed of a
material that comes in many colors, people nonetheless continued to reserve ‘ruby’ for the
red of that material.
Color was determined to be defining of the extension of ‘ruby’. The same, it
seems, could have befallen ‘topaz’. It might be objected that ruby is unfit to serve as a
comparison case for topaz and other natural kinds. Perhaps ruby is exceptional. Maybe it
is because of ruby’s high profile as a decorative stone that its famous color has come to be
seen as defining of it. Few other mineral kinds might be thought to be defined by
superficial traits like this. Could the arguments above fail because ruby is unique in this
respect? They do not. Ruby is not, in fact, thus unique. Myriad kinds distinguished by
superficial features have similarly been named. Terms that name kinds demarcated by
color, habit, or other such characteristics are common. These are recognized by both
specialists and lay speakers (see, e.g., Clark, 1993).
That ‘topaz’ refers to all of one chemical compound and ‘ruby’ to only the red of
another seems to represent decision, not discovery. If such conclusions were discoveries.
then, as our discovery theorists hold, we would be in a position to correct past speakers
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Who differed with us about whether this or that thing belongs to the extenston of a kind
term. In faet, retrospect generally gtves us no sueh authority. Perhaps Galileo once
supposed that the mater.al called ‘topaz’ comes in a ratnbow of hues, while Gassendi
ms,sted that it is all yellow. It seems plainly wrong to say that investigation has revealed
Gahleo to be correct and Gassendi incorrect. At the time there was no answer. And the
subsequent decision could have gone either way.
It might be argued that terms like ‘ruby’ and ‘topaz’ are not natural-kind terms, so
that the discovery account cannot be expected to apply to them. But this is false. At least
some such terms are natural-kind terms, ‘topaz’ being an uncontroversial example.
Perhaps ‘ruby’ isn't. Although ruby is a kind of mineral, perhaps it is not a natural kind,
since it is a color-restricted kind. But this does not threaten the significance of the above.
If ruby isn’t natural (being color-restricted), the question remains: what was to prevent
speakers from concluding that “topaz” was just such a non-natural kind, at a time when
‘topaz’ had only been used for referring to yellow minerals? Apparently the answer is, not
much. At the time, it was not a fact that non-yellow matter fails to belong to the extension
of ‘topaz’.
^
III
We saw in the last section that before the advent of science it was not decided
whether substance terms referred to all stuff with the microstructure of their extensions, or
just some of it. In this section it will be illustrated how before science it may not have been
decided whether or not a natural-kind term extended reference to stuff without the
microstructure of its present day extension.
Again I will use topaz as my example. Topaz all has the chemical structure
Al2Si04(F,0H)2 . Some types of mineral without this structure share many superficial
features with topaz. But they are not topaz. My contention is (surprise) that there was no
discovery that ‘topaz’ does not include these other mineral types in its extension. One
mineral, citrine, for example, fairly closely resembles topaz, though its chemical
composttion is completely different. The resemblance is such that citrtne has often been
sold as topaz. I think 'topaz' could have come to refer to c, trine as well as to topaz, and
that the conclusion that i, was would no more have violated the origmal usage of 'topaz'
than the conclusion that citrine is not topaz.
It was once thought that all yellow stones were topaz. Obviously the word is not
now used to refer to all yellow stones. As people gradually noticed differences between the
yellow matter they called 'topaz' they deeded that some of it was of a different kind.
Therefore speakers restricted 'topaz' for reference to fewer minerals. Eventually only topaz
itself, as we use the term, was left under the extension of 'topaz'.
But it is not at all clear that the whittling down of the extension had to stop after
citrine had been excluded. Why couldn't 'topaz' have come eventually to refer to just
citrine and topaz? It seems to me that this would have accorded with the prescientific use of
‘topaz’ as well as our current use of the term does.
It might be objected that citrine does not have the same chemical structure as topaz
and so had to be excluded. ‘Topaz’ referred when the whittling began to whatever bore the
relation same mineral to the majority of what was called ‘topaz’. Citrine didn’t bear that
relation. Hence it had to be ousted.
This answer is riddled with difficulties. For starters, it is unlikely that topaz was
the majority mineral which people called ‘topaz’ at a time when people referred to all yellow
stones as topaz, perhaps thinking they bore the same mineral relation to one another. If
one mineral had to be chosen of many to keep the name exclusively, it could have been any
of them. So there would seem to be something fortuitous in the fact that what we call
topaz has been crowned with the term instead of some other mineral which, like topaz,
was formerly called topaz
. In fact, the stones first called ‘topaz’ or “fire” were probably
yellow stones of a different mineral type: olivine. (Indeed some suggest that ‘olivine’
should be abandoned since there is still a danger that some will interchange it with ‘topaz’!)
is no reason we should have
But the main point I want to establish here is that there
concluded that ‘topaz’ refers to jus. one mineral. Not all kind terms like ‘topaz’ have come
to settle upon just one mtneral type. The philosophtcal literature itself provides an example
Of a natural-kind term which has come to refer to more than one mineral: ‘jade’. ‘Jade’
refers to two completely different mineral types. It once referred to many whtch were
alike, but other mrneral types were gradually excluded from the extension. Two mineral
types remain in the extension.
Why couldn’t two mineral types have remained in the extension of ‘topaz’? They
almost did. Citrine is often called ‘topaz’ to this day, although apply,ng this name to it is
dlegal now in many countries. The reason is that such terminology causes people to
confuse citrine with the other mineral called ‘topaz’, and citrine is not as precious a mineral
Citrine has come close to being part of the extension of ’topaz.’ The fact that it is prized
less than the other mineral has caused some influential people to discourage this form of
reference, deeming it misleading. Perhaps it is because jadeite and nephrite are, on the
other hand, closer in value, that speakers have not felt the need to distinguish them. But if
this is why topaz’ has come to refer to one mineral type rather than two, like ‘jade’, no one
can claim that any scientific discovery taught us that two mineral types do not fall under the
extension of ‘topaz’.
Nor do I think it was a discovery that ‘jade’ refers to two types of mineral. Upon
discovering that some of what was called ‘jade’ does not bear the relation same mineral to
the rest of what was called ‘jade’, the “aberrant” kind could have been concluded not to fall
under the extension of jade’. It seems that this almost happened. In the year 191 1, a
standard general reference source had this to say about jade:
Jade, a name commonly applied to certain ornamental stones... belonging to at
least two distinct species, one termed nephrite and the other jadeite. Whilst the term
jade is popularly used in this sense, it is now usually restricted by mineralogists to
nephrite
(Rudler, 1911, 122; emphasis mine).
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Recent sources on jade will talk about the term ‘jade’ berng loosely used to refer to
a variety of minerals, bu, will clarify that sophistrca.ed use is confined to jadeite and
nephrite. It seems that, m spite of present practices, ‘jade' was well on its way ,o referring
to only one mmeral, closer to the turn of the century. I do not think this restriction would
have been wrong. But by turn of consent it was no, applied. „ is wildly mrplaus.ble to say
that some discovery caused the term to be used to refer to two minerals instead of one. as it
was on its way to being limited to.^
Of course I have not presented any possible ctrcumstances in wh.ch jade as we use
the term would have been identical to nephrite, or in which the topaz we know would have
been topaz and citrine. I am claiming, rather, that we did not discover that what we had
known as “jade” was two different minerals, and what we had known as “topaz” was one.
We could have concluded othenvise. It cannot be said that such an alternative would have
been wrong, and our own decision right.
IV
The past two sections present double trouble for the discovery account. They
continue the general theme started in section I, that conclusions we have drawn about the
extensions of our terms, after learning more about the world, might have been different
than they are but no less right. But a new dimension is added in sections II and III. The
thesis that microstructure is all that matters to determining the extensions of our natural-
kind terms, which thesis we shall find to be of some importance to the discovery theory,
and which is anyway interesting in its own right as part of a theory about the reference of
certain terms, is shown to be false.
It might be thought that both prongs of the attack of the last two sections can be at
least blunted if it can be shown that terms like ‘topaz’ and ‘jade’ are atypical natural-kind
terms. It is clear that they are natural-kind terms, but they may be unusual in that before the
rise of science, they weren’t; the superficial features of their extensions are so prominent
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.ha, i, was no, dear wha, a„r,bu,es defined ,he kinds un,U post-sciemific decisions were
made: ihose attributes imporian, ,o merchants, iaymen, etc., or those .ha, would concern
scientists.
Bu, other terms may be different, it mrgh, be said. For other terms i, never mattered
wha, features merchants, aristocrats, or lay speakers held to be important about the kind
referred to; all that mattered was the scient.sts' concerns: i.e. micros,racture. So, i, might
be conceded, dtscovery theorists have overest,mated the influence scientists have had on
the semantics of natural-kind terms. But to the extent that scientists are or have been
serving as experts to detennrne the reference of the terms, micros,ructtne is all tha, counts.
Thts attempt to salvage the discovery theory fails. For one thing, all natural kinds
known before the rise of science were noticed because of their interestmg or useful
properties, not just a few, like topaz and jade: consider salt, or water.
Secondly, and more crucially, even to the extent that scientists influence semantics,
microstructure is not all that matters to reference. Scientists themselves consider other
features than microstructure to be relevant to determining membership in the extensions of
names they assign. Scientific investigation is still resulting in the discovery of new
minerals, and final decisions regarding the validity of their names is given to the
International Mineralogical Association. Each new species is named according to its
underlying structure, but sometimes varieties of a species are named on the basis of their
color or other characteristics.
Even if we ignore such varieties, the scientific classification of minerals into species
and so on, takes into account observable properties in other ways. There is more than one
possible way to classify minerals according to chemical composition. One method
distinguishes minerals according to dominant metal. This method has been abandoned in
favor of grouping by nonmetal (anion), because minerals with the same anion share many
more properties in common than, say, copper minerals or iron minerals.
In addition, minerals are not classified according to chemical composition alone.
The decision to classify on the bas.s of more than just chemical composition is dr.ven by
considerations about external properties. 10 Present classification relies on both chemical
compos,tion and cystal structure, because the physical properties of minerals largely
depend upon both.
All of this points to an error in the discovery account. According to discovery
theorists, scientists determine that a natural-kind term refers to stuff of some particular
microstructure, without regard to the observable properties of the extension. It is merely an
“empirical matter whether the characteristics originally associated with the kind apply to its
members universally," Kripke says (1980, 137). And it is true that scientists correlate
microstructures to natural-kind terms. But one must take care not to be misled: in their
matching of structures to kind terms, scientists pay close attention to the observable
properties of the matter in question, so that their division of the world into kinds reflects the
observable properties of what is named.
A well known claim of discovery theorists is that if something very different in
properties from what we have been calling ‘water’ were found to have the same chemical
composition, it would be water (see, e.g., Kripke, 1980, 128-9). History suggests
otherwise. The chemists who first discovered the chemical composition of the mineral
diamond evidently expected that this remarkable substance would be composed of rare
elements. They were surprised (Dietrich and Skinner, 1990, p. 1 ). Amazingly, diamond’s
chemical composition was found to be exactly the same as that of charcoal
. But it has not
been concluded that charcoal bricks are diamonds, or that diamonds are charcoal, or even
that these are two varieties of a single species. Rather, scientists have determined that
something besides chemical structure matters to what counts as a member of the diamond
11
species.
Naturally enough, external properties did figure into the considerations of movers
and shakers behind modem mineralogy as they considered cases like the above in their
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deliberations about whether minerals of the same eomposit.on could belong to different
species (see, e.g., Burke,
.966, ,30).
12
Of eourse, astde from the question of external
properties’ consequence, the diamond/charcoal story undermines the above claim,
illustrated by water, that anyth,ng that might be found to have the chemtcal compos,,,on of
one of our natural kinds would belong to it. On the contrary, i, seems that if stuff were
found that shared a given kind, say, water’s chemical composit.on while being as different
in relevant respects from water as diamond is from charcoal, we might say the stuff was
no, water, jus, as we decided that charcoal, diamond, and graphite are different kinds (see
note 1 1).
An interesting final observation about the taxonomy of minerals is that even clearly
external properties are relevant to classification. Just as biological taxa are commonly
classified according to origin, minerals are sometimes classified by origin: micas and
amphiboles are examples (Dietrich and Skinner, 1990, pp. 47-49).
So it is true that the role of microstructure in determining reference to natural kinds
has been overestimated in part because our vernacular mineral (or liquid, or whatever)
terms’ reference may be influenced by laymen, merchants, etc. But the exaggeration is also
due, in part, to a misunderstanding of scientists’ reference assigning practices.
The discovery theorist can evade these conclusions by distancing herself from
initially plausible examples ot natural kinds. She can insist that any kind that is or was
before science, open to being demarcated by anything but microstructure is not a natural
kind. This maneuver turns what appeared to be an interesting theory about a body of terms
selected by example, into mere stipulation about the meaning of 'natural-kind term'. What
is more, there is a worry that very few terms, maybe even none at all, will turn out to be
natural-kind terms, given these imposed restrictions. This is especially so if we limit our
attention to terms from the vernacular, which are the ones the discovery theory is meant to
apply to. For it is unlikely that the necessary and sufficient conditions for being many (or
any) substances discussed in the vernacular now or before science, involve only
microstructure.
V
Now, as in the previous chapter, I would like to address a possible attempt to repair
the discovery account. Recall the case of water. It might be conceded that the extension of
•water' has changed from prescient.fic times. D20 was not determined before the advent
of modern science to be water, but now it is. Conceding this involves surrendering the
idea that the post-scientific theoretical identity statements that scientists are supposed to
warrant, such as 'Water = H20\ convey discoveries about prescientific kinds; so it is no
small concession. Still, it might be said, even if the sentences we might now take to
express the essence of water do not express the essence that the prescientific term named,
we may yet have discovered the essence of the kind designated by the prescientific term. It
is a vague essence: protium oxide is straightforward “water,” D20 is borderline or vague
“water" and stuff that is neither protium oxide nor deuterium oxide is straightforward non-
“water.” Saying this sums up the essence of “water,” right?
Things are not so simple, even after much of the discovery picture is jettisoned as
suggested. For starters, we have not yet considered the microstructural range found in
water samples. Deuterium is not the only isotope of hydrogen, and oxygen has isotopes as
well. Moreover, just as two deuterium atoms can combine with an oxygen atom, it is
possible for, say, one deuterium atom and one protium atom to combine with an atom of
oxygen. Further, there are such molecules as H4O2 . Now, one could go about trying to
specify a more complicated vague cluster essence involving all of the above structures:
molecules involving such and such isotopes are borderline cases, while such and such
other isotopes make for clear cases, and so on. Would we capture “water s” essence with
such specifications?
It is hardly clear that we would, and for two reasons. First, the above shows the
complex,ty of teahzed poss.b, lit.es for substances that are related to our “water" samples,
but tha, are net,her clearly “water" nor clearly non-“water". Counterfactual worlds may add
any number of other similar cases, many of whtch we have no doubt never considered.
Oxygen mrght have had many more isotopes than it has. Each isotope might have come in
different varieties, some hardly differing from typical tnstances and others quite different.
Any explicit specification of the essence of “water” would have to account for this sort of
possibility, not just the actual varieties of water. More on this below.
Secondly, the exclusion of superficial properties from our kinds’ essences seems
suspect, for reasons offered in previous sections, particularly the last. But to try to add
these to a cluster essence will again multiply the complexity, rendering the essence too
difficult to specify with accuracy in a rigid designator, except trivially.
And, of course, what is said here about the essence of the prescientific ‘water’
would apparently apply to other chemical kind terms, including those that may, unlike
water, have all along had clear-cut extensions
. Related but distinct possible structures
make for complications in specifying the essence.
Difficulties in specifying essences of our prescientific terms carry over, moreover,
to the task of specifying the essences of post-scientific terms. Is the essence of what we
now call ‘water’ H20? There is much room for doubt. Consider a counterfactual world in
which, to adapt an example from the literature (Steward, 1990, 389 ff.), people discover
H20 with a special sort of proton in the hydrogen, causing the substance to be pink and
fluffy. Would we call this water? The author of this example thinks we would not. I think
we might go either way. I think that it will never be determined that the substance is
straightforward water, though it is H20, unless we find some, and the need arises to
1 3decide whether it is or not.
Take a situation in which we discover a close relative of H20. Suppose a few of
our northern lakes are found to contain something almost indistinguishable from H20, but
that does not contain true hydrogen, since
.he protons in the hydrogen atoms have been
replaced by a surrogate particle. We might cal, such a substance 'water-, though i, is
H2O. It is certainly not clear that the substance is straightforward non-water.
We do not know that such fancrful si,natrons are metaphysrcally possible. But nor
do we know they are not. So i, is moot, in any case, whether water is rdentical to H20.
even granted that all water is H2O in fact.
VI
I have argued in the present chapter and in the previous one that the popular view
according to which ‘Water = H20’ and The tiger = X DNA structure’ are necessarily true
statements that have been or will be discovered to be necessarily true, is mistaken. First,
such statements do not even seem to be true in post-scientific English. Second, even if
they were true, they would not have been discovered to be true, since prescientific use of
the vernacular terms would have been altered by stipulation to correspond to the theoretical
essences in question.
It seems that discovery theorists have overlooked a number of important
considerations in the philosophy of language and the philosophy of science. Fortunately,
despite its falsity, the discovery account retains some interest because the interest of certain
epistemological issues associated with it is not lost with the theory.
This epistemological interest is associated with our alleged knowledge of the a
posteriori necessity that is supposed to attend the theoretical identities. Most of the
philosophical community apparently believes that these theoretical identities are discovered
to be necessarily true. How has the community responded to our having empirically gained
knowledge of this sort of necessity? In large part, by reevaluating analyticity and the
epistemological weight it can carry. In the next chapters I will take up these issues.
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required to adequately refute that claim. Despite these drawbacks Donnellan'scase shows delightful perception and ingenuity. A kindred spirit to Donnellanand myself Chenyang Li (1993), attempts to illustrate his thesis that the
extension of ‘water’ is indeterminate by using Putnam’s XYZ example! (pp. 272am " ot convinced by his particular example, in part because it depends
on XYZ and water being microstructurally related, while Putnam clearlyintends the contrary. :
I assume here and elsewhere the highly plausible view that there are naturalkind hierarchies. For a defense of this view against certain difficulties, seeCrawford Elder (1994).
E.g. with jade (more precisely, nephrite jade): this shares exactly the same
chemical and mineralogical composition as the minerals actinolite and
t remolite
. ‘Jade’ refers not to all matter with the relevant
chemical/mineralogical composition, but only to that with a distinct fibrous
structure, which results in increased hardness.
"Much of the information on mineral kinds that has been included here was
obtained from the Natural History Museum in London.
The lesson to be drawn from this case should be particularly surprising to
many, since it runs contrary to assumptions made by even many critics of the
discovery account. For some reason, it is seen as disputable whether substance
terms refer only to matter that shares the paradigm samples' microstructure;
but it is taken for granted that such terms refer to a_M matter with the
paradigm's microstructure. Thus, McCulloch takes seriously the possibility
that XYZ is water, since perhaps "difference in microstructure does not suffice
for difference of substance"; still, he says, "sameness of microstructure is
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whether or not Kripke would take cases like that involving
J ade to represent discovered disjunctive essences, others of his tradition
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- PP H5f.), for example, sees discovery here, and Putnam(iy/Pd, p. 241) suggests agreement.
It is interesting to note that, as mineralogy was first coming to grips with
advances in modern chemistry, many scientists argued that classification
should be done entirely on the basis of chemical composition, which was held
to be a mineral’s inner “essence” (Laudan, 1987, 78ff.). Resistance to this
method was offered on account of its failure to respect a certain priority that
external characteristics were thought to deserve. By the latter part of the
nineteenth century, the renowned historian of science William Whewell was
declaring that classification on the basis of chemical composition alone had
been found to be “impossible”: such a system “separates widely substances
which are not distinguishable; joins together bodies the most dissimilar; and in
hardly any instance does it bring any truth into view” (1882, pp. 343-4).
Hence, a return to “mixed systems” (pp. 351 ff.).
For those who would prefer a different example to compare to charcoal,
graphite, the stuff in "lead" pencils would also have done the job. Like
diamond, graphite was found to have the same chemical composition as
charcoal. But 'graphite' and 'charcoal' have been concluded to refer to none
of the same entities (and neither has an extension that overlaps with that of
'diamond').
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of case can be developed to attack some types
natural kinds whose names are not from the vernacular,
scientific discourse: see, for example, Evan Fales’ (1986).’
apply only to kinds with vernacular names, however, and
account like Fales 1 is the essentialist’s best bet.
of essentialism about
but rather from
Most arguments here
thus suggest that an
CHAPTER 5
analyticity and the causal theory of natural-kind term
REFERENCE
It is widely recognized that the causal theory of reference has done much to detlate
philosophers' esteem for analyticity. Sidelle counts the theory, along with the a posteriori
necesstty attending it, as one of the few “basic sources for the scorn, suspicion, and smirks
with which talk about analyticity is commonly met in much of the contemporary
philosophical community" (1989, p. 136). W.ggins understands Kripke's and Putnam's
work to constitute a “more effective, second onslaught on the idea of analyticity” (1994,
pp. 205-6). Much the same idea is expressed by many others (see e.g., Hilary Komblith
1980, pp. 109f. for another particularly clear example).
The first onslaught on analyticity, that preceding the second one Wiggins calls
attention to, was W. V. Quine’s, of course. But Quine’s doubts about analyticity.
important and influential as they were, embraced necessity as well as analyticity (and also
the a priori). This left analyticity the conceivably eminent role of explaining any necessity
(and a prion knowledge) that might turn out to defy Quine’s skepticism. As Quine scholar
Christopher Hookway (1988, pp. 122-3) notes, Quine himself would reluctantly have
taken recourse to analyticity had he reckoned that there were any knowledge of necessity to
merit accounting.
It is because of what Quine did not do that Kripke found himself, in penning
Identity and Necessity,’ addressing a philosophical community that used ‘analytic’,
necessary’, and other purportedly equivalent terms interchangeably. Not everyone had
use for such terms. Some, Kripke reports, “are vociferous defenders of them, and others,
such as Quine, say they are all identically meaningless. But usually they’re not
distinguished’’ (1971, p. 149). Kripke showed convincingly that theoretical identity
statements involving two rigid designators are necessary if true. But they are not always a
cnon. So here would appear to be a clear case of non-analyttc necessity. Since necesstty
concern,ng natural kinds had formerly been presumed analytic, it appeared, in retrospect,
that analyticity’s usefulness had been overestimated (cf. Wiggtns 1994, p, 206). After the
causal theory had been elaborated, it seemed apparent that analyticity would be of little use
in explaining the necesstty attend,ng natural k.nds, such as water and horse (as Putnam has
repeatedly emphasized in a span of key papers: 1975a, 1975b, 1975d, 1983c; see also
Schwartz 1977, pp. 26ff.). Even if we should (like Putnam: 1975a, 1975b, p. 141) retain
belief in some analyticity, it seemed we would have to recognize its application to be limited
to such trivial statements as ‘A vixen is a female fox’.
Now, the nice thing about necessary truth that is analytic is that its analyticity
provides a ready explanation (at least a partial explanation) 1 for how we can have
knowledge of its necessity. Knowledge of necessity is something of a puzzle. It is clear
that we have faculties, for example vision, for detecting, e.g., whether there is a hat on the
table. But what sort ot faculties could inform us not only what is the case as a matter of
tact, but what had to be the case: for example that no circle could be square shaped, or,
what is more profound, that the circle can not be squared?
Historically, many answers have, of course, been forwarded on this score and it is
not my aim to investigate the plausibility of any comprehensive answer here, or even to set
out the problem to be accounted for in any great detail. It is enough for my purposes to
note that there is a phenomenon to be explained, viz. knowledge of necessity, and to note,
further, that when the necessary truth, knowledge of which is to be accounted for, is
analytic, then its analyticity provides much or all of the accounting. Our knowledge of
analytic truth is explained by appeal to our words’ meanings (and, perhaps, logical truth).
Few people have trouble conceiving how we might have knowledge, without appealing to
any sociological survey of individual bachelors for gender, that bachelors are all male. If
we do know that bachelors are male, indeed if we know that ‘bachelors are male’ expresses
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a necessary truth, it is because 'bachelor' just means something like unmarried, eligible
male .
Theoretical identities like ‘Water = H2O’ are supposed to be necessary, but not
analytic. If that is correct, then an account like the one above concerning bachelors will not
go far in explaining our knowledge. And the issue remains as to how we could ever have
such knowledge not only that water is H2O but that it had to be H2O.
Now, a theorist desiring to keep things tidy might hope to evade these
epistemological problems by denying that sentences like ‘Water = H2O’ are really
necessarily true. Such denials are not unheard of. A. J. Ayer, well known for his (1952)
attempt to give all necessary truth an explanation in terms of analyticity, has, not
unexpectedly, reacted rather sourly to the alleged theoretical identities of Kripke and
Putnam (Ayer 1982, pp. 269-70). I do not wish to discourage him in this. Indeed, he
should find support in the preceding chapters. If the arguments given above are any good,
we do not discover a posteriori the truths of such theoretical identities as ‘Water = H2O’.
But although those arguments shed light on interesting issues in the philosophy of science,
the philosophy of language, and related metaphysics, they will not relieve us of the
epistemological burden of finding a satisfactory account of a posteriori knowledge of
necessity.
The most important reason for this, at least for the purposes at hand, is that the
interesting epistemological issues behind our knowledge of necessity — the issues that, in
connection with the necessary a posteriori, have sounded an alarm for empiricists such as
J. L. Mackie (1974a; see also 1974b) and Sidelle (1989, 1992) — are issues of how we
could come to such knowledge. The aim of these thinkers (and others of various stripes) is
to understand what sort of knowledge we could have, given whatever faculties we
knowing agents are supposed to possess.
What I have argued is that purportedly discovered identities like ‘Water = H20'
and ‘the tiger = the beast with WXY chromosome structure,’ are as a matter of fact not
really discovered truths. Indeed, I have argued that they are not even true (and if they had
been true they would not have been discovered to be so). What I have not argued,
however, is that the Knpke-Putnam account of our having discovered the truth of this sort
of statement fails by way of describing something broadly logically impossible. Therefore,
for all that I have pointed our, our language and world might have been as Kripke and
Putnam describe it, in which case we would have come to discover theoretical identities like
the above. I will explain what I mean in more detail in a moment, in order to head off
confusions that lie threateningly close at hand. But to complete the thought, if we could
have come to a posteriori knowledge of the sort of necessarily true statement that ‘Water =
H20’ is supposed to be, then the epistemological problem of how to account for such
knowledge of a posteriori necessity is every bit as serious as if we actually did come to
such knowledge. For again, the crux of the relevant epistemological issue is how it is
possible, given our faculties, to arrive at this sort of necessary truth. Even if we don’t as a
matter of fact arrive at such knowledge, the issue remains.
To be more precise: I have argued that water is not identical to H2O.2 In view of
this, it seems that water could not have been identical to H2O. So the English sentence
‘Water = FbO’ expresses something that is not only false (if I am right that it is false) but
3
necessarily false. I am not saying that water might have been H2O.
Nevertheless, there might have been a community of human beings like ourselves
who spoke not English but a related language, call it KP English , or KP, for Kripke and
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Putnam. KP English is a language as tidy as you please, unlike our familiar English.
Perhaps there are only a few speakers, who happen to be extremely conscientious in their
efforts to establish firm, unambiguous conventions among themselves. To simplify
matters still further, we can suppose that the KP community lives in a very tidy physical
world. Chemical samples are, for example, pure in that world, as are isotopes. So a term-
dubber rather easily groups related but distinct kinds, or separates them, by way of
selecting the proper samples.
Now, KP speakers introduce ‘water’ by a ceremony, a formal one, or at least an
unambiguous tacit one: “by this term ‘water’ we shall denote the microstructural kind
exemplified in this sample.” There is no question of grouping by superficial properties,
phylogeny, etc. Further particulars may be desired. For example, fallback conditions (cf.
Putnam 1975d, pp. 225, 241; Knpke 1980, p. 136) may be arranged, though these will
not come into play, since terms like ‘water’ are, in the story, grounded in samples with
uniform, salient underlying structures: prior suspicions (Kripke 1980, p. 120f.) about the
uniformity of substances are confirmed.
Note that, by any account, Kripke and Putnam have offered only the outlines of a
theory of reference that can yield the desired necessary theoretical identity statements: more
will no doubt need to be said to assure that, for example, by the above dubbing ceremony
the structure that gets seized is not the structure FDO in the liquid state, (as opposed to the
gaseous or solid state), but rather HpO itself. Similarly, we don’t want any liquid that
contains hydrogen and oxygen to be picked out, still less the liquid kind.
It is not my aim to fill out the missing details. I believe that they can be filled out in
more than one way that allows ‘water’ to pick out H2O. For example, when water samples
are used to ground ‘water’, the community could explicitly or implicitly pick out stuff that
grounds non-water, stuff from which water is to be distinguished: examples would include
oils, wood, and so on. This would assure that, for example, ‘water’ didn’t pick out the
liquid kind. A possibly undesirable consequence of this picture is that it will come out
trivially necessary that trees are not made of water (even should they be found, like ice, to
consist of virtually all H2O). And Thales’ view of the composition of the world would be
out of the question. But it would be one set of conventions along generally Kripke-Putnam
lines.
Another way to go might be to baptize the least inclusive microstructural kind with
such-and-such significance that is instantiated by this sample. (For prima facie difficulties
attending this avenue, however, see Dennett 1994, pp. 536-7.)
If the skeptic is not convinced by the above suggestions for getting ‘water’ to refer
just to H20
,
there are quasi-Kripke-Putnam methods for picking out H2O that seem
difficult to reject. Consider, say, a community that has discovered all of the chemical
elements before it explores substances on a nearby planet. A newly discovered substance,
H20, is found. The community dubs it ‘water’ in this way: “by ‘water’ we denote that
chemical compound instantiated in this sample.” This isn’t quite the Kripke-Putnam
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picture, but it is close, and it would allow for the desired discovery that ‘Water = H^O’ in
the relevant language is a necessary truth, by hitting H20 on the head (assuming our
chemistry is right). It would assure, for example, that ‘water’ does not pick out the liquid
state of H20, nor substances that are at least partially composed of hydrogen and oxygen,
and so on.
Now, recall that our KP speakers (who might have adopted any of the above
refinements, or other acceptable ones, to the picture forwarded by Kripke and Putnam)
have the very same cognitive faculties we have, and observe that the KP English sentence
Water - H20 is necessarily true and a posteriori, even if the corresponding English
sentence is not. It is clear, then, that persons of our cognitive faculties can have knowledge
ot a posteriori necessity about kinds, which knowledge is lust like what we are supposed to
have (but, if I am right, don t have). So the objections to the necessary a posteriori offered
in the preceding chapters, pertinent as they are to other inquiries, provide us no shortcuts in
epistemological labor of the kind at issue. The empiricist, say, who might have wished to
account lor necessity in terms of analyticity would be ill advised to argue on grounds given
above that as language happens to be, there is no non-analytic necessity, while confessing
that there could have been some, had the conventions of language only been a little
different. Indeed, the worry would arise that non-analytic necessity might be knowable to
foreign speakers
It is the above epistemological concerns that motivate the investigation of the
present chapter. These issues are effectively raised by the work of Kripke and Putnam,
even if within the context of an unsuccessful picture of our language and world. Puttmg
aside the philosophy of science and attending observations about language and
metaphysics, all concerning our natural-kind terms and what they designate, I should like
to investigate the a poster,ori necessities that we are supposed to have discovered, for their
epistemological interest. So I intend to turn away from English and to examine interesting
corresponding identities that are discovered in KP English.
I
I have pointed out above that the causal theory of reference has been used to try to
discredit purportedly overblown claims of analyticity. In this respect it has served as an
instrument to undermine analyticity. But I do not think it has served as a very effective
instalment for this purpose. Far from undermining the importance of analyticity, I believe
that the causal theory reinforces it. I believe that identity statements between rigid
designators for kinds are analytic. And I believe that Putnam’s own work in semantics
helps to make this claim plausible.
The suggestion that identity statements involving natural kinds are analytic is likely
to provoke immediate uproar: there will be objections that analyticity is circular, that it is
infirm, and so on. These complaints hark back to the first, Quinean attack on analyticity.
Before addressing this din, however, it is appropriate to deal with the still more relevant
Qgwcr concerns that should supposedly be raised by applying analyticity to the natural-
kind-involving identity statements. After all, these very identity statements, and the theory
of reference that has ushered them in, are generally taken to present a whole new, non-
Quinean barrel of troubles for analyticity, a “second onslaught” on the notion. So these
new alleged troubles would seem more pressing for a proposal that these same statements
are analytic than the older, familiar Quinean troubles that are alleged to afflict even the usual
‘Bachelors are male’ -type examples. I will conclude the present chapter on the note that,
even if older Quinean silt still lingers, the causal theory poses no new problems for
analyticity. On the contrary, older Quinean troubles aside, it would seem that the best way
to understand the kind identities ushered in by the causal theoiy is to understand them to be
analytic.
But perhaps to set Quine aside is just to postpone facing the devastating truth about
this proposal to take the relevant identities for analytic. It might be supposed that Quine has
shown the untenability of any attempt to recognize a special class of analytic statements. In
that case, any attempt to assimilate the familiar a posteriori but necessary identities into a
supposed analytic camp would be futile (assuming that they are not to be discredited
together with analyticity). In the next chapter I will address this concern. I will urge that if
the necessary a posteriori identity statements are to be embraced, whether or not they are
held to be analytic, Quine’s arguments against Fregean analyticity must be wrongheaded.
We have a choice. We can accept the necessary a posteriori along with analyticity, or we
can reject both. Though the necessary a posteriori is very popular, while analyticity is
unpopular, the latter cannot be dismissed without surrendering the former, as well. So to
count the familiar identities analytic does not involve paying extra expenses for analyticity:
the price tag on the necessary a posteriori already includes the cost of analyticity. But
again, this is the topic of next chapter.
Now, I am not aware of anyone having yet claimed ‘Water = FQO’ and other such
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theoretical identities to be analytic. In view of the overwhelming tide of opinion holding
the identity statements in question to be synthetic, there must be some powerful prima facie
grounds for holding that view. And there are. Schwartz crisply expresses reasons found
scattered in myriad other writings. There are, according to his taxonomy of the issues, “at
least two very good reasons for supposing that ‘Water is H2O’ [is] not analytic” (1977. p.
30). The first reason is that we could find out that the statement is false. “We could
discover that there were certain fundamental errors in our chemical theories, or some such
thing, and that water was some other complicated chemical” (p. 30). And, of course,
metaphysical necessity is here distinguished from epistemological necessity. “When I say
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that we could discover that water is not H20, 1 mean 'could' in the epistemological sense
that it is consistent with our present experiences that such a discovery is possible” (p. 30).
Schwartz's second reason is similar to the first. “The second reason for supposing that
Water is H20' and other similar statements are not analytic is that they are matters of
scientific discovery, not of definition” (p. 3 1 ). Schwartz's two reasons might be summed
up into one: 'Water is H20' is a statement whose truth can be known only by recourse to
experience, or a posteriori; but a posteriori statements cannot be analytic.
Analytic necessity, if the above considerations are sound, is importantly related to
epistemic necessity. This accords with Putnam’s view. When discussing artifact terms in
The Meaning of ‘Meaning’”, for example, he argues that “it is epistemically possible that
pencils could turn out to be organisms ,” immediately adding: “It follows that pencils are
^lfacts is not epistemically necessary
... and, a fortiori , not analytic” (p. 242). Elsewhere
he remarks of empirically established necessary truth that “Epistemically it is ‘contingent’
( synthetic ’, in Kant’s terminology) even though it is metaphysically necessary” (1983a, p.
57, my emphasis on ‘synthetic’; see also, e.g., 1983b, pp. 73-4; 1975d, p. 243).
The idea expressed above and in numerous other writings (see, e.g., Mellor 1977,
pp. 30 If.; Goosens 1977, p. 144; Teller 1977, p. 184; Gorovitz et al. 1979, pp. 125ff.; de
Sousa 1984, p. 567; Boer 1985, p. 120; Gampel 1996, p. 191; Katz 1997, pp. 2, 6) is that
analytic sentences must be knowable a priori. If that is the case, then not only will
theoretical identity statements, such as ‘Water = H2O’, come out non-analytic, but so will
just about any sentence with a natural-kind term as subject. Thus, Schwartz: “except for
trivial analytic statements such as ‘gold is gold,’ there are no analytic statements with an
indexical term as subject” (1978, p. 566; as noted in chap. 2, Schwartz follows Putnam in
taking natural-kind terms to be indexical). Komblith (1980, p. 109), also excepting ‘gold
is gold’ and its ilk, similarly urges that “there are no nontrivial analytic sentences ... with
natural kind terms in subject position.”
But why is a priority supposed to be a requtrement for a sentence to qualify as
analy ttc? The answer has to do with the role the linguistic warnings of contamed words
play in analyttc sentences. Constder Frege's account of analyticity.8 For Frege an analyttc
statement is one that is transformable into a logical truth by the substitution of synonyms
for synonyms. Quine captures the core idea in what follows:
Statements which are analytic by general philosophical acclaim are not indeed far
sss^'tsr568 - Those of the fira ciass ' wh,ch may bc caiied
(1) No unmarried man is married.
The relevant feature of this example is that it not merely is true as it stands, but
remains true under any and all reinterpretations of ‘man’ and ‘married’. If we
suppose a prior inventory of logical particles
... then in general a logical truth is a
statement which is true and remains true under all reinterpretations of its
components other than the logical particles.
But there is also a second class of analytic statements, typified by
(2) No bachelor is married.
The characteristic of such a statement is that it can be turned into a logical truth by
putting synonyms for synonyms; thus (2) can be turned into (1) by putting
‘unmarried man’ for its synonym ‘bachelor’ (Quine 1961, pp. 22 -3 )
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Now to return to our question: why should analytic sentences be thought a priori?
The answer seems to be that an analytic sentence is necessarily true just in virtue of logical
truth and synonymy. 10 But in that case, it would seem that no appeal to empirical facts
should be necessary to confirm its truth. For aside from logical truth, which is commonly
presumed to be a priori (see note 13), only synonymy is involved in guaranteeing truth.
And, the line goes, synonymy is an a priori matter: roughly, the synonymy of two
expressions in a language is knowable a priori to a competent speaker with a command of
the words in question.
That synonymy is an a priori matter is a tacit assumption that extends back in
philosophical history to Locke and earlier. It seems to be a working assumption of
Putnam:
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ut when we said that to be water something has to be H2O we did not mean as“e 11 c
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that speaker has to know this. It is only by confusing
necessity with epistemological necessity that one can conclude that if
,
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taPhysically necessary) truth condition for being water is being HoO, then
water must be synonymous with H2O - in which case it is certainly a term of
-en
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nd similarly, even though the predominant sense of ‘lemon’ is one inwhich to be a lemon something has to have the genetic code of a lemon (I believe)
t does not follow that lemon’ is synonymous with a description which specifies
'
the genetic code explicitly or otherwise ( 1 975d, p. 240; emphasis added to
synonymous ).
The assumption is also found in Quine:
The terms ‘9 and ‘the number of the planets’ name one and the same abstract entitybut presumably must be regarded as unlike in meaning; for astronomical
observation was needed, and not mere reflection on meanings, to determine the
sameness of the entity in question (1961, p. 21).^
The assumption is widespread and of significant influence: indeed, the belief that
synonymy is knowable a priori may have contributed to the delay in recognizing the
necessity of identity statements in which the identity sign is flanked by different (types of)
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names. Arthur Smullyan (1947, 1948) and Fredrich Fitch (1949) both held before
Kripke that identity statements containing two genuine names are necessarily true if true at
all. Alonzo Church cast doubt upon the Smullyan-Fitch position in a review of Fitch, in
which Church complains that Fitch
holds (with Smullyan) that two proper names of the same individual must be
synonymous. It would seem ... that, as ordinarily used, ‘the Morning Star’ and
‘the Evening Star’ cannot be taken to be proper names in this sense; for it is
possible to understand the meaning of both phrases without knowing that the
Morning Star and the Evening Star are the same planet (1950, p. 63).
This view about synonymy, deep seated in the background tradition within which
Putnam was working in his crucial writings, suggests that analyticity is knowable a priori
1 ^
(at least if we waive troubles about the possible revisability of logic). And this, it would
seem, explains why philosophers have rejected the possibility of analytic sentences about
natural kinds (aside, of course, from trivial ones).
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Observe, however, that the suggestion that there should be a posteriori analytic
sentences should not appear troublesome to proponents of the view that synonymy or,
more generally, meaning, is not a priori in the above respects: i.e., the view according to
which a priori ratiocination just will not do for determining the synonymy or non-
synonymy of pairs of natural kind words. 14
So it is curious that this view about the non-a priority of knowledge about the
synonymy of natural kind words is not an uncommon one. Indeed, the view is quite
popular, and it has become so in large part on account of the work of Hilary Putnam
himself. Putnam has argued precisely that a speaker cannot tell, without examining the
world, just what her terms mean. Hence, his slogan, now a commonplace in philosophical
discourse, that “meanings ain’t in the head”.
In The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” Putnam attempts to make appreciated “two
contributions to the determination of extension — the contribution of society and the
contribution ol the real world (p. 245) — that “traditional semantic theory” fails to
recognize. The contribution of the world is present in virtue of the use of actual samples of
mattei as paradigms to causally ground reference. The contribution of society is explained
by Putnam’s doctrine of the division of linguistic labor. 15
That being able to determine whether a pair of terms in a speaker’s vocabulary are
synonymous is not an a priori matter is suggested by the division of linguistic labor. This
is the doctrine that there are “terms whose associated ‘criteria’ are known only to a subset
of speakers who acquire the terms, and whose use by the other speakers depends upon a
structured cooperation between them and the speakers in the relevant subsets” (1975d, p.
228). The idea is that you might be able to count ‘elm’ as a constituent of your vocabulary,
and be able refer to elms when you mention something about them in the course of a
discussion about common trees, leafy trees, or whatever, even if you aren’t informed of
anything that distinguishes elms from other deciduous trees, say, beeches, and even if you
could not produce a single example of an elm tree.
It seems plausible that the division of linguistic labor should apply to terms
traditionally held to be analytically defined. 16 For example, a speaker might be competent
with both ‘vixen’ and ‘female fox’ without knowing they are necessarily coextensive. She
might discuss the vixens that haunt her neighborhood and know that these are just the
female red foxes of her neighborhood, even if she is not certain whether there are (maybe
has0 1 even considered the possibility of there being) any other species of foxes anywhere
extant, and whether the females of any or all such species would be properly called
‘vixens’. Despite this blind spot in her knowledge of vixenhood, it seems she could claim
‘vixen’ as part of her vocabulary, provided at least that she employed the term with
deference to those above her in the linguistic pecking order. The speaker, aware of her
own limitations, might even consciously intend to use the term for whatever other
speakers, particularly experts, do. In such an event it seems plausible that she could be
unaware of whether ‘vixen’ and ‘female fox’ are synonyms, despite the place each holds in
her vocabulary. She might consider the matter at some point or other and ponder whether
vixen means female fox (as she deems likely), or something else close to that, instead. In
that case she would have to engage in a posteriori investigation to determine whether
vixen is synonymous with female fox’. She would have to consult an expert, or a
reference source written by one, such as a dictionary. And this seems to be a problem for
the view that a speaker must have introspective access to facts about synonymy between
terms in her vocabulary.
Perhaps it will be doubted whether our speaker really has mastery over ‘vixen’,
really understands that term, or can claim it as a full-fledged part of her vocabulary. It may
be objected that ‘vixen’ is so simply defined that it is a requirement for one who can be said
to understand the term that the speaker be aware that ‘vixen’ and ‘female fox’ are
synonymous. Whether or not there is any merit to this objection, the lesson of this type of
example is limited. The synonymy between ‘vixen’ and ‘female fox’ is a priori in a
broader way, since even if individuals can borrow the competence of others in the
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community, the buck stops somewhere, and for those with whom it does, the connection
between ‘vixen’ and female foxhood is a priori. While the division of linguistic labor may
allow the meaning of a term to reside outside any particular speaker’s head, it says nothing
about that meaning residing outside any head, experts included.
Let us turn, then, from the division of linguistic labor, or the contribution society
makes to the determination of extension, and to the contribution of the “real world”. The
thesis that terms are causally grounded establishes more than does the thesis that speakers
borrow expertise. Causal grounding ensures that the meaning of a term remains
inaccessible to the a priori analysis of even experts : hence, the common rubrics “hidden
trait term or underlying trait term” under which these terms are frequently discussed.
Putnam s Twin Earth experiment and other fanciful examples aim to establish that you
cannot tell on a priori grounds whether two of your natural-kind terms mean the same.
Whatever one s feelings about Twin Earth, it certainly seems plausible on grounds Putnam
has in mind that only a posteriori investigation might reveal synonymy. Early colonists
who settled the area of present-day Argentina might have attached the term ‘cougar’ to the
large species of cats the found roaming the area. Meanwhile, quite independently, another
colony of settlers in Nova Scotia may have noticed the very same feline species, and
labeled the animal puma . Intuitively, ‘cougar’ and ‘puma’ would be synonyms in such a
case, as they are in fact in English (each standing for what is also known as the mountain
lion, or catamount). The two terms stand for the same species. But it would take empirical
investigation to verify the synonymy, to show that the terms do indeed name the same
1
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species, rather than two different ones that look similar.
Putnam recognizes in places that his favored causal theory of reference fails to
harmonize with the broadly held conviction that the synonymy of terms in a speaker’s
vocabulary is knowable a priori to the speaker. In his 1979 commentary on Kripke’s “A
Puzzle about Belief’ Putnam extends Kripke’s discussion about proper names to general
names. After a brief review of his familiar theory of reference, Putnam remarks
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If this sort of semantics is right
... then it is possible for a speaker to have exactsynonyms in his total vocabulary or total collection of languages and not know thatthey are synonyms. Although the principle is evident on Fregean semantics that ifyou have two synonyms in your language or collection of languages, then you must
V
hey^ on a “referentialist” account like the one just
sketched, this is wrong (p. 286).
J
This observation provides reason to reject those suggestions scattered about Putnam’s
writings to the effect that this or that natural-kind term or theoretical term cannot be
synonymous with some other because we could discover that the two refer to different
entities. Such an argument could get going only if synonymy must be knowable a priori,
and thus could not be confirmed or disconfirmed by experience. But here Putnam
acknowledges that according to his own semantics, synonymy is not something a speaker
needs to be in a position to know about by mere reflection.
Now, it is true that Putnam only discusses above what a speaker knows about
synonymy, not what she could know by a priori reflection. Could his point be only that,
while the synonymy of two terms is knowable a priori, nevertheless it may not be known ?
Context rules out this weaker interpretation. “Saul’s problem affect just as much general
names as it does proper names. Saul’s example was of London and Londres, but one
could do it just as well with general names” (p. 285). “Saul’s problem” involves, of
course, a speaker, Pierre, who sincerely assents to both ‘London is not pretty’ and
Londres is pretty’, on account of failing to see that ‘London is Londres’ is true. But
1 O
clearly no a priori ratiocination would straighten out this matter. Similar a posteriori
investigation should be needed in the case of the synonyms Putnam says are affected “just
as much” as ‘London’ and ‘Londres’. Putnam’s examples include ‘beech’ and the German
‘Buche’, along with ‘gold’ and the ancient Greek ‘chrysos’, and his stories, reminiscent of
Pierre’s tale, confirm the inability of a bilingual speaker to assure himself by a priori means
that ‘beech’ and ‘Buche’ are synonymous.
In light of the above admission that a bilingual speaker with a command of two
natural-kind terms like ‘beech’ and ‘Buche’ cannot by introspection verify their synonymy.
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it is hard to know what to make of Putnam's earlier suggestions in "The Meaning of
Meaning”' that the synonymy of two terms must be knowable a priori, and that this is why
'water', say, can not be synonymous with 'H20' (p. 240; see also p. 242, and 1983b, p.
74). One can only conclude that old habits die hard, given Putnam's extensive efforts to
separate the semantic properties of a term from speakers’ information about the referent or
extension. Putnam is apparently slipping back into assumptions he has been working hard
to overcome.
Lest it be thought that the a posteriority of statements about synonymy is something
Putnam only later came to realize, note that he acknowledges this “paradox” in “The
Meaning of ‘Meaning’”.
But one paradox: suppose Oscar is a German-English bilingual. In our view, in
his total collection of dialects, the world ‘beech’ and Buche are exact synonyms
. ...
But he might very well not know that they are synonyms! A speaker can have two
synonyms in his vocabulary and not know that they are synonyms! (p. 270).
Putnam attributes this surprising state of affairs to the failure of an assumption of traditional
semantics, the assumption that knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a
certain psychological state” (p. 2 19).
19
Now, if the synonymy of two natural-kind terms is not a fact that can be established
by purely a priori means, then it should come as no surprise that the analyticity of a
sentence containing two such terms should not be a priori either. If we include *=’ (the
identity sign) in our stock of logical particles, as is customary,
-
^ we can count
A. 1 ) Beech = beech
a logical truth. Recalling Quine, we observe that the statement is true under all
interpretations of its components other than the logical particles: i.e., the statement is true
whether ‘beech’ means beech
,
pine , water . Bill Clinton , and so on.
128
Helping ourselves to a synonym for 'beech’ (with grateful acknowledgments to
Putnam's semantics), we see that nontrivial Fregean analyttcity is easy enough to conjure
up. Replacing 'beech' with the synonymous ‘Buche’ in (A.l), the resulting
A. 2) Beech = Buche
~analytlC ~ But lt 1Sm 3-Pliori- The speaker would need access to empirical research to
verify (A.2)’s truth: she would have to consult a German-English translation manual and
thus to make use of the scientific research of others, or do her own scientific research to
verify (A.2)’s truth.
So, given Putnam’s new semantics (and ignoring his tendency to backslide into
unofficial presuppositions), it just seems false that, as many have claimed, “there are no
nontrivial analytic sentences
... with natural kind terms in subject position” (Komblith
1980, p. 109). There are. They are just a posteriori.
Beech — Buche is Frege-analytic, if we are entitled to Putnamesque
assumptions.22 Observe that there is nothing particularly special about Frege-analyticity
in accommodating such examples; it was desirable to choose, for heuristic purposes, one or
another refinement of analyticity, and I chose Frege’s (for reasons mentioned in note 8).
But it would seem that just about any workable,^ traditional account of analyticity ought
to allow for ‘Beech = Buche’ to qualify as analytic, given the above semantics.24 For
example, it is sometimes said, in a Kantian vein, that an analytic sentence is one in which
what is expressed by the predicate is already contained in the subject. Weaknesses of this
characterization aside, if ‘beech’ and ‘Buche’ are synonyms, they express the same
semantic content, so ‘Beech = Buche’ would seem to satisfy this Kantian requirement.
Any other standard account would presumably likewise count an identity statement
involving two synonyms analytic: that is, any account that does not bar a posteriori
sentences as such from candidacy for analytic status. To be sure, some people are
apparently happy to stipulate that “analytic” truths must be a priori. In places this is what
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even Kripke at least appears to be doing.25 Rejecting one eandtdate for analytieity, Krtpke
at one point writes “I choose not to call it ‘analytic’, stipulattvely requtring analytic truths to
be both necessary and a priori” (p. 56n.).
If this sort of stipulation is what establishes the a priori character of the analytic,
then the objection to a posteriori analytieity isn’t very impressive. Russell (1993, p. 71)
once remarked of a similar philosophical maneuver that it “has many advantages; they are
the same as the advantages of theft over honest toil”. To carry the day for the a priority of
analytieity via stipulation would be to thieve what would otherwise be an interesting
conclusion.
One might have expected Putnam to say more about the possibility of analytieity
involving natural-kind terms, and at times his rejection of the idea seems to approach theft.
He is aware, of course, that if synonymy can be made sense of, then Quine’s
animadversion on analytieity is critically undermined. And of course, Putnam has not
shared Quine s doubts over synonymy."^ But his resuscitation of analytieity leaves the
notion interestingly vapid. One might have hoped for more. Consider “Two Dogmas’
Revisited, for example, where Putnam observes
Quine suggested that [analytieity] might be clarified, given the notion of
synonymy.... But, Quine argued, the notion of synonymy is hopelessly vague.
The only evidence that Quine produced to support this remarkable claim was that
he, Quine, could not clarify the notion in a few pages (p. 88).
In what follows, Putnam explains that while he is not “proposing to present a theory of
synonymy here,” he has already, in an earlier paper (“The Analytic and the Synthetic”),
outlined “a theory that does explain the analytieity of such statements as ‘All bachelors are
unmarried’, ‘All vixens are foxes’, etc.” (p. 89). More recently, he continues, in “The
Meaning of ‘Meaning’” he “presents] the beginnings of a theory of meaning ... which can,
I hope, provide an account of synonymy for the natural kind worlds, at least” (p. 89).
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It is curious that Putnam mentions nothing about analyticity involving, or not
involving, natural-kind terms. For his discussion takes off with a challenge for analyticity:
to show that synonymy can be profitably appealed to. Putnam proceeds to reassert the
“legitimacy and linguistic usefulness” of synonymy (p. 90), mentioning his work in
clarifying the nature of synonymy for two types of terms: “one-criterion” terms, like
‘bachelor’ and ‘vixen’, and natural-kind terms. Thus, he concludes, analyticity overcomes
the challenge, and is vindicated - with respect to the one-criterion terms. What happened
to the second group of terms cleared of Quinean synonymy-skepticism?
The only suggestion here about a reason for not applying analyticity to statements
about natural-kind terms is that this generous extension of analyticity would not conform to
Putnam’s own preferred use for the noise ‘analytic’, as offered in “The Analytic and the
Synthetic”, where ‘analytic’ is reserved for trivial, a priori sentences. The little he has to
say is offered in a note, where Putnam concedes to Quine that “most of the truths
philosophers class as ‘conceptually necessary’ will not be ‘analytic’ in the sense discussed
here” (p. 89n., my emphasis). Here and elsewhere (e.g. 1992b, p. 383) Putnam might
seem to accept his suggested use for ‘analytic’ as one possible proposal, perhaps one
among other viable possibilities. When he finds statements like ‘Beech = Buche’ not to
measure up, he counts them non-analytic.
Now, Putnam is surely free to propose anything he likes, but in this case it remains
a suggestion for how he would like to use ‘analytic’. It can tell little about whether ‘Beech
~ Buche measures up to the real
,
traditionally articulated analyticity. But perhaps there is
more implied in Putnam’s refusal. If there are problems for accounts that locate statements
like ‘Beech = Buche’ in the class of analytic statements, then its analyticity will be in some
doubt. In the above paper and in many other later papers, Putnam refers back to “The
Analytic and the Synthetic”, where he proposes his account of analyticity. In this earlier
paper adverted to, Putnam casts grave doubts on other hopeful versions of analyticity. His
main point in “The Analytic and the Synthetic”, which will be treated later at greater length,
IS that ‘Bachelors are unmarried males’ can be counted analytic because being an unm,m.H
male is the sole criterion, or way of certifying, that a thing is a bachelor, and because there
are no interesting laws concerning bachelors. What is the rationale behind these
constraints? Roughly, if there were more than one necessary and sufficient criterion for
determining whether something is a bachelor, then we could not analytically associate any
one of them with bachelorhood, since any one might be found not always to attend the
others, in which case there would be no semantic fact of the matter that ‘bachelor’ should
continue to be associated with that one rather than the others. Similarly, if bachelors
figured into interesting laws then any criterion that might be analytically identified with
‘bachelor’ would compete, in semantic significance, to the role ‘bachelor’ would play in
law statements.
But this rationale provides no justification for withholding analytic status from
Beech — Buche
. Consider the condition that the subject must not figure into objective
laws. ‘Beech = Buche’ arguably violates this condition, as beech figures into objective
laws, according to Putnam (1983b, p. 7 1)
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However, the requirement in question provides Putnam with a rationale for
rejecting only those statements that offer some criterion (or criteria) for beechhood that
could compete in semantic significance with beech’s role in laws. Beech’s place in laws
would make such criteria less than absolute, nullifying any proposed analytic tie. But
‘Buche’ doesn’t provide any such criterion (or criteria) to compete with others for being the
one tied to the meaning of ‘beech’. ‘Buche’ cannot name a criterion that has to share its
role in determining beechhood with beech-laws, and which thereby fails to capture the
essence of beech , since ‘buche’ is an exact svnonvm for ‘beech’.
That ‘beech’ figures in laws might not be the only disqualifying factor in ‘Beech =
Buche”s unsuccessful bid for analytic status. Another alleged problem is that ‘beech’ is
not a one-criterion word. Here, again, however, this does not present any of the problems
Putnam’s account is supposed to evade. If ‘beech’ is not a one-criterion word, and for
132
reasons already suggested, it cannot be mismatched w.th some unhappily proposed analytic
criterion (being Buche) that fails to capture the meaning of ‘beech’ in the sentence ‘Beech =
Buche : for ‘Buche’ is a svnonvm for ‘beech’.
So, if Putnam provides reasons in “The Analytic and the Synthetic” to restrict the
scope of analyticity, it would not appear that he provides any principled reason for
excluding ‘Beech = Buche' from the class of analytic sentences. If the marks he proposes
for analyticity are not to be found in ‘Beech = Buche', so much the worse for his proposed
marks. Analytic is not to be thieved, but accounted for.
II
It seems, it the above is right, just false to say that there are no non-trivial analytic
sentences involving natural-kind terms
.
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‘Beech = Buche’ is not trivial. Certainly an
intelligent bilingual speaker who has acquired the average person’s use of ‘beech’ and
Buche might not know that ‘Beech = Buche’ is even true, despite its analyticity. What
has not yet been argued is that theoretical identities , such as ‘Beech = DNA-type X’ and
‘Water = H2O’ are analytic. In these sentences, unlike in ‘Beech = Buche’, the second
term is a scientific one purporting to designate a certain microstructural form.
While I have not yet defended the analyticity of theoretical identities, the defense of
Beech = Buche s analyticity carries over. The reason that is generally given for rejecting
the analyticity ol Beech = DNA-type X’, ‘Water = H2O’, and similar sentences is that the
sentences are a posteriori. And if, as has been argued, ‘Beech is Buche’ is analytic, though
a posteriori, this ubiquitous objection to the analyticity of the theoretical identities is not
successful.
Other objections will, however, be offered against the proposed analyticity of
‘Water = H2O’ and the like. Those objections fall into two general camps, the first of
which will be addressed in the present section and the second in the next. The first type of
objection centers on the referential properties of ‘water’ and ‘H2O’. Such an objection
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typically holds that ‘water’ and ‘H20’ do not share the same “intension”, or, as I will
(roughly) understand that expression, necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to
the extension of a term (or for being denoted by it) 29 And this will be said to preclude any
analytic tie between them. The second type of objection focuses on other components or
alleged components of meaning: typically it will be said that ‘water’ and H20’ differ in
the “cognitive component” of meaning (see, e.g., McGinn 1982), or in “stereotype” (see
Putnam 1975b, 1975d, 1996), or in information content, etc., and this may be thought to
preclude any analytic tie between them. My strategy for handling these objections differs.
I argue that the first attempt to differentiate ‘water’ and ‘H20’ fails. The second succeeds,
but the difference marked does not preclude an analytic tie of the sort in question.
A crude objection of the first stripe stems from a natural, if mistaken, understanding
of the definitions causal theorists assign terms like ‘water’. To say that ‘Water = H?0’ is
analytic commits one to holding ‘H20’ to be synonymous with ‘water’, or perhaps to
holding H20 to be part (however that is to be filled out) of the meaning of ‘water’. But a
certain very natural suggestion for the meaning of ‘water’ would seem to preclude this
possibility. That suggestion is that the definition of ‘water’ may be expressed something
like this:
W) water —df. Substance instantiated by the majority of what English speakers call
‘water’
(or, alternatively,
W2) water =df. Substance instantiated by this or that sample).
If something like this is the definition of ‘water’, then, since ‘H20’ does not have a
definition like this, nor is mention of H20 found in the definition, there are apparent
difficulties with my thesis that ‘Water = H20’ is analytic (for a KP language, of course).
Fortunately, nothing like (W) or (W2) seems to capture the meaning of ‘water’. None of
134
the proponents of the new theory of reference thinks that ‘water’ is defined anything like
(W) or (W2) would have it. Kripke admits that this sort of “definition” (he uses scare
quotes) does express an a priori truth; nevertheless, he points out, ‘water’ might have
existed even if the samples mentioned in the definiens did not (1980, p. 135). He insists of
proposals like the description in (W) that they “should not be regarded as a synonym for
the term, but rather as a way of fixing the reference, or picking it out in this world (ibid.).
Putnam agrees:
Many terms are first introduced into language with the aid of descriptions, or at
least descriptions are implicit in the context. Thus a scientist may say ‘I think there
is a particle which is responsible for such-and-such effects. I shall call it a quark .’
... agree with Kripke that such dubbing ceremonies do not engender
synonymies
. ‘Quark’ is not synonymous with ‘particle responsible for such and
such effects’.... Rather, the description picks out the particle.... But such
statements as ‘Quarks might not have been responsible for those effects if
conditions had been different
... make sense and are even true, as they would not
be if dubbing the thing satisfying a description D by a term T were the same thing
as stipulating that T and D are synonymous expressions (1975e, p. 274).
Causal theorists appeal to the distinction between reference fixing and meaning to rule out
proposals like (W) as proper definitions. (W) may serve to fix the referent, but it does not
offer a proper condition that any substance, actual or possible, must meet to qualify as
water (so it does not offer an intension for the definiendum). Paul Teller handily
characterizes the reference-fixing function of descriptions like that used in (W):
the description functions, on the occasion of introduction, to pick out something
else; and after performing this service, the description is, as it were, thrown away.
Whatever it was that was picked out in the introductory act is left to carry on the
mediation between the term and its extension (1977, p. 182).
The real intension of ‘water’ is not given by the description in (W); rather, the real
intension is what this description picks out . This picked out item carries on the “mediation
between the term and its extension” (or denotation). It determines reference.
But then what is the intension of ‘water’? What is it that gets picked out by a
description like ‘substance instantiated by this or that sample’, and that does determine
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reference? Consider, first, the use of ‘water’ as a general term. So used, ‘water’ applies to
many particular things, which comprise its extension. What determines membership in the
extension of ‘water’ is membership in a certain kind, the kind the term is said to name.
Thus, Salmon 1981, p. 53: “the key feature of natural kind common nouns that suggests
the idea that they are names of kinds is just that these terms apply to an individual only by
virtue of that individual’s being one of a certain kind.” But, on the Kripke-Putnam picture,
the water-kind is the H20-kind: so stuff belongs to the extension of ‘water’ in virtue of
belonging to a certain kind, which is the same kind that stuff belongs to the extension of
‘H2O’ in virtue of belonging to. The intension, what it is that determines membership in
the extension, is the same for both terms. And it was back in 1750, too, before this was
known.
Taken as singular terms, ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ denote a particular kind, rather than
playing the predicative role of applying to samples of water, or samples of H2O. But both
singular terms apply to anything by virtue of its being a particular kind (or structure,
property, etc.), that particular one that both terms denote. So the picture is much the same
whether the terms in question are taken as general or singular terms: reference to a thing is
established in virtue of its satisfaction of the very same condition for both ‘water’ and
‘H2O’.
So the intensions of the two terms would seem to be the same. The same intension
is latched onto, it might be said, indirectly in the case of ‘water’, and directly in the case of
‘H2O’. The latter term is coined by specifying that the referent is composed of parts of
hydrogen and parts of oxygen in a certain relationship. ‘H2O’ could not have been coined
without prior understanding of hydrogen and oxygen. Not so for ‘water’. It was hooked
up to the H2O kind by way of H20’s satisfying a certain condition, under circumstances in
which no one could know a priori what satisfied the condition. The condition, of course,
was again something like microstructural kind exemplified in things people call ‘water’ (or
exemplified here or there, etc.) .
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I have proposed that in a KP language, ‘water' and ‘H20’ share the same meaning
(intension). The intension of 'water' is not, say, mierostruetural kind inslantia.eH
things English speakers call 'water'
. But something pointed to or picked out by the
description 'mierostruetural kind instantiated by most things English speakers call 'water”
ts the real enter,on. And that is H20. While the descript,on is no, a criterion, i, is used to
secure a criterion (H20-ness) that can serve to determine what counts as ‘water’s
extension without speakers knowing precisely what the criterion (H20-ness) is. ‘Water’
means H2O. Putnam seems to reject any such attempt to specify the intension of ‘water’.
He apparently feels that such specifications are ruled out by his famous attack on the
“traditional” notion of meaning. According to that notion, a (singular or general) term has
both an intension and an extension. The extension of a term is, of course, the things the
term applies to (so the extension of ‘cat’ contains all and only cats). But extension cannot
be all there is to meaning, since ‘hearted creature’ and ‘kidneyed creature’ have the same
extension (everything with a heart has kidneys, and vice-versa) but, presumably, different
meanings. They must have different intensions. Putnam sets out to clarify this notion of an
intension (p. 218).
He challenges two traditional
assumptions:
(I) That knowing the meaning of a term is just a matter of being in a certain
psychological state....
(II) That the meaning of a term (in the sense of ‘intension’) determines its
extension (in the sense that sameness of intension entails sameness of extension)
(P- 219).
Putnam’s Twin Earth story is supposed to show these two assumptions to be incompatible.
Oscar here on Earth is molecule for molecule identical to his Twin Earth counterpart, down
to brain states, as each says “Water, water everywhere, but not a drop to drink.” But since
the stuff on Twin Earth that corresponds to water on Earth is XYZ, not H2O, Twin Oscar
refers to this stuff, twater
.
and not water, with his utterance. Oscar, on the other hand.
refers to water. What determines reference cannot, then, be mere (narrow) psychological
state: it must have to do with the speaker’s environment, too. So the above two
assumptions are not compatible. Putnam decides to reject (I), keeping the idea that
meaning is what determines extension (pp. 234, 245-6 and elsewhere).
Now, Putnam’s work is supposed to have important consequences for analyticity,
consequences that prevent ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ from being cointensional; indeed,
consequences that apparently upset the whole idea that terms like ‘water’ have intensions
(see, e.g., Schwartz 1977, Goosens 1977, p. 133, Moravcsik 1981, p. 8, Boer 1985, pp.
1 03 ff
. ,
Wilkerson 1993, p. 7, Bolton 1996, pp. 150-156; analyses of meaning offered in
introductory logic books like Copi’s 1978, pp. 142-6 are typically singled out for targets).
But it is hard to see why it is supposed to have such consequences. I have taken ‘water’
and ‘H2O’ to share an “intension”, where that is understood to be something like a set of
necessary and sufficient conditions for something to belong in a term’s extension (or for
being denoted). Putnam understands ‘intension’ as I have (Putnam following traditional
usage, of course): “by assumption (II) the intension amounts to a necessary and sufficient
condition lor membership in the extension” (p. 222: again, Putnam refuses to relinquish
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II). So it seems hard to avoid the conclusion that ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ are cointensional:
in a KP language, what is it that water samples share in virtue of being water? The crucial
necessary and sufficient condition for a sample of matter to belong to the water kind is that
a sample be composed ofH2Q. We have even seen Putnam suggest something close to
this in an earlier quote: “the ... truth-condition for being water is being H2O”. And, of
course, it is a necessary and sufficient condition for some stuffs belonging to the extension
of ‘H?Q’ (as well as that of ‘water’), that it be composed of H2O. It certainly looks, then,
as if ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ share an intension .
Again, however, this does not seem to be Putnam’s conclusion. On the contrary,
after filling out his paper he apparently draws the bizarre moral that terms like ‘water’ do
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not have necessary and sufficient conditions for application. “The amazing thing about
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the theory of meaning is how long the subject has been in the grip of philosophical
misconceptions.... Meaning has been identified with a necessary and sufficient condition
by philosopher after philosopher” (p. 271). It is clear that Putnam (here) thinks this sort of
account of meaning, what determines extension, will never work for natural-kind terms,
and he chastises Locke, who uses these words as examples “and is not troubled by the idea
that meaning is a necessary and sufficient condition!” (p. 271).
The problem is apparently becoming familiar. Where Putnam denies, toward the
end of his paper, that terms like ‘water’ have intensions, he seems to be slipping back again
into the assumptions he has been trying to undermine: in particular, he is operating under
the assumption that intensions are in the head . This, of course, is Locke’s view, so Locke
makes a natural target.
But the problems Putnam has raised for traditional theories like Locke’s are not
generated by the adherence to the view that the terms in question have intensions, or
necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to the extension: they are raised only by
conjoining the view that words have this sort of intension with that other notorious view
that these intensions are represented by some (narrow) ideas in the mind of the speaker.
This latter view that intensions are narrow ideas is discarded early in “The Meaning of
'Y)
‘Meaning’”, before the rampage on intensions. After discarding that view Putnam
should have left intensions alone. Instead, he seems to have carelessly mishandled the
baby after throwing out the bath.
Ill
Above it is argued that Putnam should have acknowledged the cointensionality of
‘water’ and ‘H2O’ (on his understanding of intensions as reference conditions). So it
cannot be complained that ‘Water is H2O’ fails to pass the test for analyticity owing to
differing intensions for ‘water’ and ‘H2O’. On the contrary, those terms’ cointensionality
suggests that the sentence in question is analytic. This suggestion will be developed in
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what follows. I will argue that (Fregean) analyticity’s call for synonymy is met by
cointensionality
. ‘Synonymy’ is employed within stricter and looser implied contexts,
perhaps (or, it might be said, there are stricter and looser senses of the term). But
“synonymy” as in cointensionality is the synonymy that is relevant for analyticity.33
That cointensionality is what is relevant to analyticity is not obvious, so the richer
uses to which ‘synonymy’ and its kindred terms ‘sense’, ‘meaning’, etc. are often put
constitutes a pnma facie problem, or at least complication, for the proposed analyticity of
‘Water is H2O’, even granted the cointensionality of ‘water’ and ‘H2O’. Putnam, for
example, certainly takes there to be more factors to the meaning of a term than intension
(reference conditions): he also develops the notion of a “stereotype” speakers have of
ordinary members of the kind, including this as a component of meaning even though the
stereotype need not hold true of the kind, and thus it does not determine reference.
Meaning is, indeed, a multifarious concept. I do not wish to say that only those
facets assigned to meaning that happen to interest me here are genuine facets of meaning.
(William Lycan has formulated a satirical “double indexical theory of meaning: MEANING
-df- Whatever aspect of linguistic activity happens to interest me now” (1984, p. 272). I
wouldn’t care to embrace that theory.) But I do wish to distinguish the facets in order to
investigate which are pertinent to the analyticity of ‘Water is H2O’.
Now, it is well known that for Frege, sense plays more than one role. A number of
writers have undertaken the project of distinguishing these roles. Salmon (1981, p. 12),
for example, following Burge (1977, p. 366), suggests three discrete functions for sense:
sense 1 is roughly the mental representation of an object that is associated with the use of a
term; it is closely related to Putnam’s “stereotype”. Sense2 is “the mechanism by which the
reference of the term ... is secured and semantically determined.” Sense3 is the
34
information value of the term. Since the two terms ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ carry different
information (‘water is wet’ conveys different information from ‘H2O is wet’), ‘water’ and
‘H2O’ differ according to sense3. They also differ according to sense], since the concepts
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a competent speaker may be quite different:
invoked by ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ in the mind of
indeed, back in 1750 this would hold for aU competent speakers. But the two terms share
something like sense2. The same entity determines reference in each case: for reference is
determined in virtue of the same condition being satisfied.
Salmon points out that the new theory of reference “does not deny the existence of
any of the three kinds of ‘sense’ mentioned above.... What [it] denies is the Fregean
assumption that the same thing is responsible for all three, that the mental concept evoked
by a term is what secures the reference and is also what forms a part of the user’s beliefs
and desires” (p. 56).
Now, if all these kinds of sense were the same, then concepts in the minds of
speakers (sense j) would be what is responsible for reference (sense2) and a statement of
the form
oc = [3
that were true just in virtue of ot and [3 sharing the reference-determining sense2 would be a
prim- It would be a priori because a and [3 would also be equally informative, in virtue of
sharing sense 3 (cf. Salmon, p. 77). This might be the case if, for example, ‘water’ just
meant the same as ‘clear, drinkable liquid found in oceans, lakes, etc.’
In that case it would be very easy to see why ‘Water = H2O’ should be thought
non-analytic. The sense2 of ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ would drastically differ: the terms would
differ with respect to what determines reference as well as in informative content.
But the Fregean model is wrong. 35 And with it goes the intuitive plausibility that
mental associations carried around with a term should have much to do with the analyticity
of statements like the above. Analyticity is essentially concerned with truth in virtue of
meaning : and mental associations do not determine the truth value of a sentence if the
various senses are not the same. If there is no monolithic Fregean sense, by which is
meant something that performs all of the above duties of sense, then it is hard to see how
sense, or sense3 should matter at all to analyticity. The mental baggage carried around
With a term should be no more important to analytic, ty than tone, poet.c associations,
emotive meaning, and so on, which have long been discounted as irrelevant to analyticity,
precisely because they have been recognized to play no role in reference, or in the truth
conditions of a sentence.
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Salmon observes that these notions are not even semantic (Sense2, he says, is “a
semantical notion,” but sense i is “a psychological or conceptual notion,” and sense3 is “a
cognitive or epistemic notion”: p. 12.) And it is hard to see how non-semantic notions
could be relevant to analyticity. To be sure, it may be that there is a duty of the traditional
sense that is semantic but that does not determine reference. This would be what comes
into play in propositional attitude contexts. For example, it may be true that
G 1 ) Gretchen believes that water is wet
but false that
G2) Gretchen believes that H2O is wet.
If so, then there is a semantic component of the sentences that differs, and that difference
presumably attaches to water and ‘H2O’. But the difference is not in the reference-
determining mechanism, since whatever the status of Gretchen’s beliefs, ‘water’ and
‘H2O’ still both refer to some sample of matter just in case it is H2O.
How can we be sure that this component of meaning, call it ‘sensed (leaving it
open whether whatever performs the role of sense4 can be identified with whatever
performs the role of sense 1 and/or sense3 ), is irrelevant to analyticity? It is, after all,
semantic, and so cannot be dismissed as easily as idle mental baggage: on the contrary, it
should matter to the truth conditions of sentences.
The first thing to observe here is that it is an open question whether sense4 exists at
all. According to one well-known position, generally called the theory of direct
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reference, (Gl) and (G2) have the same truth conditions. Pragmatic considerations
alone would favor expressing Gretchen’s belief by (Gl) and not the misleading, though
true, (G2). If this is right, so that sense4 does not exist, then it does not, naturally,
concern analyticity.
Is the KP language a language with or without senses then? It would seem that
either language is possible: a community could adopt conventions embracing sense4 or
reject them. It is often supposed that the causal theory of reference is committed to the
theory of direct reference. These views are assumed to be part and parcel of the Kripke-
Putnam picture of proper names. Boer, for example, urges that on “the New Theory ...
there is nothing semantically different about ‘water’ and ‘H2O”’ (1985, p. 143: see also
surrounding discussion). If the KP language in question is like this, then there is no need
to be concerned with sense4, and ‘Water = H2O’ is plainly analytic, since ‘water’ and
H2O are straightforward synonyms, however strong your standards are, in this language:
the synonymy in question even guarantees trouble-free intersubstitutability in belief
contexts.
But suppose that this is not the case. Let’s look at a KP language with sense4. In
such a language, ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ are interchangeable in modal contexts, and all contexts
concerned just with referential conditions. But they aren’t interchangeable in propositional
attitude contexts.
There is still no special barrier to the analyticity of ‘Water = H2O’. These very
circumstances are mirrored by terms like ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried, eligible male’, or
‘fortnight’ and ‘two weeks’. If Gretchen can believe that water is wet, but not that H2O is
wet, then presumably she could believe that a fortnight is a long period of time while not
believing that two weeks is such a long period of time. And she could believe that
bachelors are sometimes married without believing that unmarried, eligible males are ever
married; and so on. Maybe she’s never heard of fortnights or bachelors, or maybe she’s
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misinformed about them, just as she may never have heard of H20, or be misinformed
about it.
But surely these long-known situations with respect to beliefs about bachelors and
fortnights do not obviously affect the analytic status of ‘bachelors are unmarried’ or ‘a
fortnight is a period of two weeks’
. Presumably no distinct words are synonymous in the
sense of being interchangeable saWa ventate in every non-quotational context, if something
semantic comes into play in propositional attitude contexts as suggested. This has never
daunted the analyticity theorist with respect to terms like ‘bachelor’, so there is no reason it
should daunt her with respect to terms like ‘water’. In any case, this is not a problem
ushered in by the extension of analyticity to natural-kind terms.
Clearly the analyticity theorist is looking for a less stringent notion than identity of
sense4 , in the search for synonymy, or sameness of meaning (but see note 33). When
‘Bachelors are unmarried, eligible men’ is said to be analytic in virtue of synonym
substitution, ‘synonym’ is not to be taken to indicate interchangeability in all non-
quotational contexts. There is a weaker use of ‘synonymy’. It is the one that is invoked
when authors urge that synonyms are intersubstitutable salva veritate except in certain
problematic contexts, like belief contexts. This is not an uncommon exception to make
(see, e.g., Burge 1978; Bach 1987, p. 266; Aune 1991, p. 147, n. 10). Representing this
tradition, Putnam recognizes, in an early paper, “synonymity in the strongest sense
(interchangeability in belief contexts and indirect discourse)” (1954, p. 1 19) as well as the
“undeniable” weaker, garden variety synonymy of such different expressions as ‘Greek’
and ‘Hellene’ (pp. 117f.).
It should be noted that, if words have sense of the sort that comes into play in
belief-contexts, then this will not be entirely irrelevant to analyticity. But since this
semantic feature comes into play only in propositional attitude contexts it will be relevant
only in such contexts. In a language that does not conform to the theory of direct
reference, the truth conditions of
Anyone who believes that bachelors are free believes bachelors are free
will be unaffected by a substitution of a synonym for the second ‘bachelor’ if and only if it
is a synonym in the strongest sense Putnam delineates above. But weaker synonymy
suffices for substitution in contexts like
Bachelors are bachelors.
Thus, in the first case, the analyticity of a resulting sentence requires strong synonymy,
whereas the second sentence remains analytic after substitution of a weaker synonym: for
the weak synonyms share all the semantic power that comes into play in determining the
truth of that sentence. Appropriately, Putnam employs weaker synonymy when defending
the analyticity of sentences like ‘bachelors are male’ in “The Analytic and the Synthetic”.38
IV
I have argued, helping myself to Putnam’s semantics, that identity statements
containing two vernacular, nontheoretical terms, are analytic. I have also argued that
theoretical identity statements like ‘Water = H2O’ are analytic. But the analyticity of the
above is a posteriori, contrary to a long-standing tradition that analyticity must be knowable
a priori.
It may be wondered what purpose there could be in recognizing analyticity, if
sentences like these are to be counted analytic. Does analyticity do the work tradition
assigns it, if it is recognized to apply to such a posteriori sentences, or does it lose its
interest?
Fregean analyticity loses none of its philosophical significance by encompassing the
likes of ‘Water = H2O’. Traditionally, the usefulness of analyticity, and indeed Kant’s
39 • •
famous reason for calling attention to it with a label in the first place,' has to do with its
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epistemological implications. During the present century, before the recent slump in its
popularity, analyticity was, as Gilbert Harman (1996, p. 396) observes, widely put to use
as an
important philosophical tool.... Analytic philosophers tried to show why certainclaims were necessarily true and/or knowable a prion without appeals to exotic
rea ms of being or special faculties of intuition, by providing analyses of key terms
analyTlo“ruts"5 “ qUeStl°n * * taUt0l0gieS ’«ent * "
But, of course, to count a posteriori claims such as ‘Water = U20' analytic does not
compromise this explanatory value of analyticity. The necessity of ‘Water = H2O’ is
located with logical truth and the substitution of terms with the same reference conditions.
Knowledge of such necessity is comfortably accounted for by way of explaining
knowledge of conventions governing reference, and knowledge of logic: this is the same
way knowledge about the unmarried, eligible, male state of bachelors is accounted for. All
that the tradition failed to mark is that a priori analysis alone is unable to discern the
reference conditions of terms whose reference conditions are established conditionally,
contingent on how some empirical state of affairs turns out. In such cases, empirical
investigation must be conjoined with the usual means of ascertaining the necessary truth of
an analytic sentence.
For this reason, I cannot accept the suggestion that the sentences in question are
analytic only on pain of watering down the use of ‘analytic’ beyond recognition or
profitable use. This impression is common enough. Salmon writes that “Donnellan,
Kripke, and Putnam all explicitly deny that their examples express analytic truths in any
sense resembling the traditional one” (1981, p. 81). Salmon may overstate matters, but his
observation gives an indication of how the newly conceived necessary sentences tend to be
thought to measure up to analyticity.
The impression that theoretical identities and the like are not analytic has naturally
encouraged, moreover, the conviction that the necessity involved must somehow be much
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more substantial than truths about bachelorhood. Sidelle characterizes this view as that
according to which the necessity in question has a certain “depth” that exceeds that
concerning bachelors (1989, pp. 9, 17). This realist position he reports to be common:
“indeed, most suppose that it is the straightforward understanding of the necessary a
posteriori” (p. 4; see also p. 3, esp. note 4).
When the theoretical identity statements are seen to be analytic, such
misunderstandings come to light. It is clear that the necessity in question is nothing
particularly scary or impressive. It calls for no unusual resources (i.e., resources beyond
those associated with the more familiar garden variety analyticity and with empirical
investigation of greater or lesser sophistication) for the explanation of the knowledge we
may have of it. It is not as if, say, the reference conditions of ‘water’ ensure only that pure
water must be a clear and tasteless liquid, while we somehow intuit, or discover by
empirical methods, that any such liquid is necessarily H2O. No, the necessary connection
between water and H2O is an immediate product of the reference conditions of ‘water’ and
‘H2O’ (and logical truth).
So, while analyticity is more variegated than philosophers have recognized, its
significance for epistemologists wary of exotic faculties, who feel the need to keep a close,
suspicious eye on the sources of necessity, is undiminished. I should like to return at this
point to the objection to the whole prospect of counting theoretical identities analytic on the
grounds that they are not a priori. Although bald stipulation cannot do much by way of
establishing that (the real, traditionally conceived) analyticity is a priori, it might be
supposed that the traditional notion of analyticity essentially, because analytically , involves
the a priority of its instances. The most likely support for this view would be something
along the lines that traditionally it was just taken for granted that analytic truths had to be a
priori. This is dubious support for the thesis that a priority is part of the very concept of
analyticity, however. After all, traditionally it was taken for granted that necessary truths
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had to be a prion, too, but no one has objected to the recently proposed a posteriori
necessity on the grounds that a priority is part of the concept of necessity.
Some might insist that analyticity is different. I disagree. But in any case, at worst
what has happened would seem to be that the discovery of a posteriori necessity dispelled
presuppositions serving as a background for the understanding people had of “analyticity”
prior to the last couple of decades, and that there is now just no answer as to whether
“analyticity” necessarily involves a priority. (The scare quotes around “analyticity” are to
indicate that what is at issue is what speakers called ‘analyticity’ prior to the last couple of
decades.) Now that the assumption that necessity is a priori has been dropped, there is no
fact of the matter as to whether one species (perhaps the only) of necessity, “analyticity,” is
a priori by virtue of the very concept “analyticity ”. A parity might be observed between
deciding, after conceptual upheaval, whether ‘analytic’ could apply to sentences that are not
a
.
priori, and deciding whether species terms could apply to phylogenetic units after the
discovery of evolution. The rules for proper use of such terms simply did not anticipate or
provide the means to address the question at issue.
For such cases what is needed is fiat. We must revise the use of our terms,
mapping them to the world as it is now viewed. In that case, the extension of analyticity I
have offered above should be seen as a revised proposal for the use of ‘analytic’, a
proposal that takes into consideration the phenomenon, not previously imagined, of a
posteriori necessity.
Even if the above thesis concerning analyticity amounts to an “explication”^ of
analyticity in this way, it should still be clear that the hostility against analyticity generated
by the work of causal theorists is ill-placed. For if ‘Water = H2O’ is analytic according to
some newly specified version of analyticity that I might employ, the significance of this fact
will rest on the import of the neo-analyticity in question. And I have stressed that this
version of analyticity would be worthy of the name ‘analyticity’. It is a version of
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analyticity worth recognition because it captures the epistemological significance the
traditional notion was suppose to capture in the first place.
Again, I am inclined to think that recognizing ‘analytic’ to apply to certain a
posteriori sentences for the reasons specified above does not effect abandonment of the
traditional notion of analyticity. I don’t think analyticity was ever conceptually tied to a
priority any more than necessity was. Similarly, I don’t think meaning
, svnonvmv
. etc.
are conceptually tied to a priority. (If they were, then the a priority could carry over to
analyticity.) It seems implausible, for example, to say that ‘gold’ and ‘chrysos’ must be
said to have different meanings just because of their independent baptisms, which make it
impossible to tell a priori that they name the same element. It is much more natural to say
that unrelated languages can have natural kind word synonyms. The contrary assertion
would seem calculated to keep analyticity a priori at all costs. So I stress that I am only
looking at a worst-case scenario, which I don’t think obtains, when I investigate the
possibility that by extending analytic status to theoretical identities, I somehow offer a
revised version of “analyticity”. The intent is simply to point out that even if this worst-
case scenario were to obtain, analyticity would in essence survive the causal theory’s
perceived attack, in revised form: for the revised form would capture what the traditional
notion was supposed to capture anyway. And that is the location of necessity in logical
truth, for epistemological manageability.
Above I have noted that the newly-found breadth of analyticity ’s reach does not
compromise its importance. I should like to add that the extension of analyticity to
theoretical identities actually secures the significance of analyticity in another respect. It is
often said that there are no philosophically interesting sentences that come out analytic on a
viable account of analyticity. Putnam for this reason has been particularly adamant about
tempering enthusiasm for the analytic/synthetic distinction. He writes in “The Analytic and
the Synthetic” that “the focus of this paper is the analytic-synthetic distinction, not because
I think that distinction is of itself of overwhelming importance. In fact, I think it is of
overwhelming unimportance" (p. 41). Lycan concurs, remarking that any analyticity there
may be would be useless, being “absurdly trivial” (1991, p. 280).
Now, the whole point of analyticity is that it marks a certain triviality, so it is no
strike against it that analytic sentences are all trivial. Putnam and Lycan are both well aware
of this, of course, and their point is something like this: any statements that may be
analytic are not ones philosophers would ever put forward as interesting examples of
necessity.
But if theoretical identities like ‘Water = H2O’ are analytic, it seems hard to
conclude that analyticity cannot usefully explain interesting necessity. Such claims are
interesting and in tact were very surprising when first introduced (or reintroduced: see
Wiggins 1994, p. 206) by Kripke a quarter of a century ago. So if claims like this are
analytic, then not only does analyticity retain the epistemological interest it has in virtue of
locating necessity in logical truth; furthermore, its applicability to interesting statements is
guaranteed, and that ensures further interest.
In view of these conclusions it seems that the causal theory of reference and
accompanying theoretical identities do not, after all, cast any shadow upon analyticity. On
the contrary, the famous statements thought to cause trouble are comfortably incorporated
into the body of analytic truths. The “second onslaught” on analyticity is ineffective as an
attack, whatever its independent interest. The Kripke-Putnam observations concerning
reference affect the linguistic landscape somewhat, but the atmosphere remains a habitable
one, indeed an inviting one, for interesting analyticity.
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It reduces the explanation to that of logical truths, at least. If logical truths
are analytic in some non-tnvial respect, as they are not on the Fregean
account I shall be discussing below, then a sentence’s being analytic mayfully explain our knowledge of its necessity.
Again, I do agree that water is in fact largely composed of H2O but this is not
to admit of any identity between the kinds water and H?0.
This is not immediately obvious. It might seem that I could say that ’Water =H 2 0’ is false, but nevertheless that it is not necessarily false. This claim would
be simpler than the one I make, but it is unfortunately ruled out by widespread
assumptions I would not want to violate, even if I did not share them. The first
assumption is that identity between an object and itself holds necessarily
(Kripke 1980, p. 3 famously revives an argument of R. B. Marcus’ [1947] to this
effect). Another assumption is that, as in the system S5 of modal logic, what is
possible with respect to one possible world is possible with respect to them all
Given these assumptions, it seems that if two objects are not identical, they
could not have been. Suppose that in the actual world, a, x and y. are distinct.
Now suppose that it could, nevertheless, have been the case that x = y. In that
case, there must be some possible world W_ at which x = y_. But in that case
identity need not be necessary, for it is contingent at W_: at W x is identical to
Y-, but on ly contingently, since from the perspective of W_ there is a possible
world, viz. a, at which x * y_. This violates the assumption that there could be
no contingent identity.
4
Note that KP. should not be understood necessarily to illustrate the morals that
Kripke and Putnam draw from it. Kripke and Putnam may, of course, be wrong
about many of the properties, and about the significance, of the language thev
describe.
It would differ because on the Kripke-Putnam picture, we could find out that
chemical structure is not really as explanatorily fruitful as we had thought, so
that some new category could become the relevant one for determining
whether a thing is water, gold, etc.
6
Defenses like the above do arise. It has been held by some philosophers, for
example, that Tyler Burge’s broadmindedness gives rise to metaphysical
absurdities. These philosophers are under some obligation to explain what is
wrong with Burge’s arguments for broadmindedness. Some philosophers
appear to give the following explanation of Burge’s error: Burge has just
made a mistake about the conventions of our language. Now, in that case the
alleged absurdities would not as a matter of fact arise. But this explanation is
lacking. Surely the contingent conventions of language cannot just happen
to be such as to prevent impossibilities from arising.
7
I am not the first to make the general suggestion of a posteriori analyticity,
however. Devitt, for example, believes aJI analyticity to be a posteriori, and he
is thinking of ‘Bachelors are married’-type examples (1993, pp. 52ff.). The
source of the alleged a posteriority is supposed to have to do with the meaning
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externalists (see, e.g., Consuelo Preti 1995, pp. 232f„ esp. notes 2 and 4).
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appealed to the notion before Frege, because of his characterization’s
importance in the historical tradition, including especially its central place inthe Quinean debates concerning analyticity (the bulk of Quine’s most
celebrated vituperation on that notion, “Two Dogmas of Empiricism,” is devoted
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s s to be faithful in representing what is intuitively going on with respect
to an analytic sentence; I do not assert that Frege’s account is complete, but it
is at least a substantial beginning.
Kant is now usually credited with first drawing the analytic/synthetic
distinction, albeit crudely. (Kant’s intent is, as Quine remarks [1961, p. 21],
“evident more from the use he makes of the notion of analyticity than from
his definition of it. ’) It was doubted by Kant’s contemporaries that he was the
first to discover the analytic/synthetic distinction (Proust 1989, p. xi). In any
case, it is generally acknowledged that Kant’s idea is at least foreshadowed in
the work of Leibniz and Hume (see, e.g., Quine 1961, p. 20). Locke also
t *1£ cbst * nct ' on
‘
t ^lough he is less frequently acknowledged (see my
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That Quine’s primary target in “Two Dogmas” is (non-trivial) Fregean
analyticity is indicated briefly after: “Our problem is analyticity; and here the
major difficulty lies not in the first class of analytic statements, the logical
truths, but rather in the second class, which depends on the notion of
synonymy” (p. 24). (See also Paul Boghossian (1996), §2.)
Or, on Fregean accounts that would avoid talk of synonymy, analytic
sentences are true just in virtue of logical truth and linguistic meanings. Of
course, if logical truths are themselves non-trivially analytic in some
worthwhile sense of ‘analytic’, then the Fregean account is importantly
incomplete, and analytic sentences will come out necessary just in virtue of
the meanings of contained terms, period.
" Of course, whatever one’s views about the a priority of synonymy,
presumably it will be agreed that ‘9’ and ‘the number of planets’ are not
synonyms, having different reference conditions.
l2Soames (1995) reviews the historical details.
n
For the present chapter, logical truth will be assumed, for simplicity, to be a
priori, though none of the substantial points made will rest on that being the
case: see Putnam (1983c, pp. 96f. ).
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A classic rejection of both alleged contributions is found in Locke Locke’sposition on the contribution of the world has received quite a bit of attention-
see, e.g., Mackie (1974b), Troyer (1975), LaPorte (1996b). His objection to thedivision of linguistic labor is as notable. Locke (1975) remarks that a child or
an unsophisticated speaker means by ‘gold’ something very different from
that which say, a metal smith means, since “A Man cannot make his Words thebigns ... of Conceptions in the Mind of another, whereof he has none of his
own (III. ii. 2: p; 406). So much for the average speaker’s employment ofbeach and elm’.
Certainly the philosophical tradition following Putnam has extended his
discussion of linguistic labor to such terms. Burge uses terms like ‘fortnight’(meaning a period of two weeks), ‘arthritis’ (inflammation of the joints) and
‘brisket’ (meat cut from the breast quarters) in his celebrated examples (see
his 1978, 1979).
Note that even if, as a matter of fact, the division of linguistic labor does
not involve terms like the above, it certainly could have: so there is no
principled reason for ruling out a priori the possibility considered below that
synonymy is an a posteriori matter, owing to the division of linguistic labor.
Note that such multiple naming often occurs in scientific cataloguing of
species. Often it takes considerable investigation to determine that two
biological species terms are synonymous , as the nomenclatural codes
regulating standard use count them. The code then has rules for determining
which of several synonyms is to be standard.
18As Kripke in effect stresses: “We may suppose that Pierre ... is a leading
philosopher and logician. He would never let contradictory beliefs pass. And
surely anyone, leading logician or no, is in principle in a position to notice
and correct contradictory beliefs if he has them.” Kripke concludes that
Pierre “lacks information, not logical acumen” (p. 257). The point that Pierre
is in no position to straighten out his beliefs by a priori analysis is clear, even
if there are complications concerning Kripke’s presumption that a logical
contradiction of the sort Pierre might be in would be subject to a priori
correction (see Millikan: 1993, pp. 282ff.).
Note that Kripke himself expresses agreement with Putnam’s extension
of the puzzle, and he also suggests agreement with Putnam’s convictions on
synonymy.
[I]t seems to me that Pierre, if he learns English and French separately,
without learning any translation manual between them, must conclude,
if he reflects enough, that ‘doctor’ and ‘medicin’ and ‘heureux’ and
‘happy’ are synonymous.... But what about Tapin’ and ‘rabbit’ or
‘beech’ and ‘hetre’? We may suppose that Pierre is himself neither a
zoologist nor a botanist. He has learned each language in its own
country and the examples he has been shown to illustrate Tes lapins’
and ‘rabbits’, ‘beeches’ and Tes hetres’ are distinct.... [PJaradoxes
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analogous to the one about London
beeches (pp. 264-5).
obviously can arise for rabbits and
The suggestion here is that knowledge of the synonymy of distinct terms inone s vocabulary is a priori for non-natural-kind terms, but not for natural
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Moreover, if we were inclined to banish =’ to the extra-logical realm on thebasis of anything like the usual considerations, that should not move us to
reject the analyticity of ‘Beech = beech’, but rather to modify Frege’s account
of analyticity for the sake of this extra-logical particle: for nothing is morefirmly analytic in the traditional sense than this sort of sentence.
Note that the example is clearest if ‘beech’ and ‘Buche’ are assumed to be two
terms independently anchored, so that even the dubbers couldn’t tell a priori
whether they are synonyms. If their status as cognates calls this into
question, substitute better examples: Putnam is clear that it should work for
non-cognates. Moreover, if quibbles be raised over the German-English mix,
examples other than ‘beech’ and ‘Buche’ would do. We could find suitable
synonyms in your language o_r collection of languages” (Putnam 1979, p. 286;
my emphasis).
2 2
Certainly Frege himself would not have recognized a posteriori analyticity,
being under the assumption that meanings are epistemically accessible by a’
priori introspection. He might, of course, have taken ‘Beech = Buche’ to be
analytic and a priori.
2 3Some accounts of analyticity are stronger than others, and some may be too
strong to work, or more precisely, to apply to any sentences. For example, the
common “true solely in virtue of the meanings of the contained terms” is too
strong if logical truths do not hold just in virtue of the meanings of logical
particles, since analytic sentences’ truth depends in part on logical truth. So
if the above characterization is a bad one, then presumably ‘Beech is Buche’
will, harmlessly, fail to satisfy its requirements since its truth will depend
partly on the non-analytic fact that beech is beech. I don’t need to take a
stand on this issue.
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Prov.ded the account applies analyticity to linguistic entities, as opposed tosay, propositions, judgments, thoughts and the like. Generally analyse, ty s'now attached to sentences, or, better, interpreted sentences: that is not Lt aString of orthographic symbols, but a sentence on a reading. I have beintacitly conforming to this use.
“ Despite this appearance, a better account of Knpke’s rejection of a posteriorina yticity might be that he takes it for granted that any statement true just in
virtue of me anings proper must be a priori. Stipulation would then enter the
arena only because he stipulates that an “analytic” truth is to be so
characterized in terms of meanings proper, as opposed to being characterized
as one whose truth is k nown by reference fixing (to be discussed). Thus,
Kripke: “I am presupposing that an analytic truth is one which depends onmeanings in the strict sense and therefore is necessary as well as a priori”
(1980, p. 122, n. 63; see. also p. 39).
~P
If this is Kripke s intent, though, it is not easy to square with his
observations above (see note 18) on synonymy, or with his apparent
conformity to the use of ‘meaning’ in the formal semantics of modal logic
where ’
The sense of a term t is usually taken to be the (possibly partial)
function which assigns to each possible world H_ the referent of t in H_.
For a rigid designator, such a function is constant. This notion of
‘sense’ relates to that of ‘giving a meaning’, not that of fixing a
reference (1980, p. 59n.).
No one could tell a priori whether ‘water’ and ‘twater’ had the same sense in
this sense.
2b
Thus, Jerrold Katz:
Putnam’s disagreement with Frege and Carnap is not at all like Quine’s
disagreement with them. In Putnam’s case, it is a Fregean family
squabble. As early as “Is Semantics Possible?” we find Putnam (1970, p.
151) saying that [m]eaning indeed determines extension’. Where he
disagrees with Frege and Carnap is on what constitutes meaning” (Katz
1997, p 7).
This is not, however, to be taken for granted. Biologists and philosophers of
biology have for some time generally held the contrary for biological species,
and a fortiori for higher taxa. Lange (1995) discusses much of the literature
on the subject. But again, in the KP world, there are laws, objective as you
please, about biological kinds.
~ 8The trivial ones I understand to be just the sentences true under any
interpretation of the contained non-logical terms.
This use of “intension” accords with Putnam’s use (see below), and, while I
hope that it accords with traditional use, may amount to something of a
technical use for the word (if the use of ‘intension’ is as slippery as that of
‘meaning’ ).
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There is, of course, more to be said concerning intension, or meaning than
that it amounts to a necessary and sufficient condition for reference. (Putnam
is aware of this: see 1975a, pp. 66f.). But it is not easy to specify further just
what is intended. One natural avenue for trying to clarify the notion is to take
an intension to be a set of ordered pairs, the first member of each pair being a
possible world, and the second being everything the term applies to in that
world. But then the terms ‘bachelor’ and ‘bachelor such that the circle cannot
be squared’, as well as ‘H 2 0’ and ‘H 20 such that 2 is prime’ are cointensional,
since they apply to exactly the same entities in all possible worlds. Intuitively,
these expressions have different referential conditions, however, and that is
what the analyticity theorist would like to more clearly characterize. (Of
course, bachelor such that the circle cannot be squared’ might be used to fix
the—re ference to the bachelor kind: but that is not to say it means bachelor 1
I brush this complication aside, because it has no special bearing on the
issue addressed in this chapter: the analyticity of a posteriori theoretical
identities. Rather, the above is a general issue that applies as well to any
explication of analytic meaning (as the examples above illustrate). It is a
long-standing issue (see the discussion of it by Carnap 1956, pp. 60ff., for
example; discussions continue: see Mondadori 1978, p. 22) that is not ushered
in by the particular examples I want to accommodate under the aegis of
analyticity. Nor has the issue played much of a role in disputes over the
legitimacy of analyticity.
At any rate this interpretation seems to be the most straightforward one
available, as well as the standard one in the literature: see references in the
last paragraph.
"Putnam gives an indication of the above confusion in various other writings,
as well, including those discussing related terms. Elsewhere he mentions his
claim that “different speakers use the word ‘electricity’ without there being a
discernible ‘intension’ that they all share. If an ‘intension’ is anything like a
necessary and sufficient condition then I think that this is right”( 1 975c, p.
200: reaffirmed in 1992, pp. 392f.). Tellingly, ‘bachelor’ is his example of a
word that is associated with such a condition (p. 201).
' 3
At least for the analyticity of propositional-attitude free sentences: see
below.
34 Sometimes distinctions roughly like the above promise to elucidate meaning ,
rather than Frege’s use of ‘sense’. Parsons (unpublished), for example,
recognizes a ‘conceptual’ and an ‘objectual’ aspect of meaning: the former is
essential to belief ascriptions, and so on. It involves associations speakers
have with words: information, misinformation, imagery. But it does not
determine reference (Parsons, pp. 2-3). The objectual part of meaning
determines reference. So the Earth-term ‘water’ has the same conceptual
meaning as the Twin-Earth term ‘water’ for Parsons, just as it has the same
sense] (Salmon, p. 67): but the objectual meaning and sense2 of the terms
differ.
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35At least it is wrong in
English, too.
our KP language, and for all I have said it is wrong for
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anal yticity theorists have been interested in what they havecalied cognitive meaning” (see, e.g., Carnap 1956, p. 6 , Aune 1991 D 147Blackburn 1994, p. 67), which amounts to what is strictly said, as opposed iosay, emotive meaning, or tone. If what is in the head is now seen not to
’
determine reference, however, ‘cognitive meaning’ may have been, in
retrospect, a misleading choice of terminology.
Though sometimes ‘direct reference theory’ is used more or less
interchangeably with ‘causal theory of reference’ (e.g., by Salmon 1981).
This is apparent from the context, though there
strong and weak synonymy in this paper.
is no explicit discussion of
The point of Kant’s division is,” as Blackburn indicates, “that we might notbe too disturbed” by analytic necessity. But with respect to nonanalytfc
necessity “the question how such knowledge is possible becomes urgent”
(1994, p. 15). &
0 See Carnap (1956, pp. 7-8) on explication, which he takes to be an important
philosophical enterprise.
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CHAPTER 6
PUTTING NATURAL-KIND NECESSITY TO WORK FOR ANALYTICITY
I have argued that the famous a posteriori necessary identity statements concerning
natural kinds are analytic. This is notable, because, as I have pointed out, those very
identity statements are generally supposed to be paradigms of non-analytic necessity.
Indeed, they are supposed to suggest that there is no interesting analyticity. It is also
notable for a second reason: to count the statements in question analytic is to associate a
very popular item with an unpopular one. Analyticity’ s lack of favor is no secret. Lycan
has recently noted that
Quine s rejection of analyticity still prevails — in that philosophers en masse have
either joined Quine in repudiating the “analytic”/“synthetic” distinction or have
remained (however mutinously) silent and made no claims of analyticity (1991, p.
E. J. Lowe observes that “most contemporary philosophers are very wary of appearing to
endorse the analytic-synthetic distinction following W. V. Quine’s devastating onslaught
upon it” (1995, p. 28). Sidelle characterizes analyticity as “the whipping boy of almost
four decades” (1989, p. xii). And Ayer (1992, p. 497) regrets the loss of popularity for
his thesis that there are analytic propositions. “Fifty years ago,” he recalls, “hardly any
philosopher called [this] in question; by now it has become unfashionable.” A similar
impression is conveyed in any number of other discussions.
The necessity surrounding natural kind identities is, on the other hand, all the rage
these days, having been catapulted into its present splendor by the remarkable work of
Kripke and Putnam. So the proposal to count the identity statements in question analytic
has the effect, as Akeel Bilgrami would put it, of hooking up a shiny new buggy to a
retired old cart horse.
This curious hitch will undoubtedly generate resistance. Quine is widely thought to
have discredited the alleged analytic/synthetic distinction, and if the distinction is no good
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then clearly the necessity attending natural kinds cannot be analytic. There must, then, be
something wrong with the proposal that they are.
The present chapter addresses this issue. I argue that proponents of the widely
approved Knpke-Putnam statements of necessity are not entitled to shun analyticity. Now,
there is already a well-known a general argument along these lines from the empiricist
camp. According to familiar lines of thought from that direction, any essentialist truths
whatever would either have to be analytic, or else they would have to ultimately derive their
modal force from analyticity, so there must be some analyticity. This is, for example,
Sidelle: if analyticity is bad, realism about necessity is worse (1989; see, e.g., p. 135).
Right or wrong, this classic line of thought requires the adherent to commit to highly
controverted empiricist premises. It is hardly surprising, therefore, that opponents of
empiricism offer resistance.
My case in favor of analyticity promises to evade controversies that plague its
empiricist cousin. I argue that even if someone rejects the familiar empiricist line and
embraces the apparently widespread position that there are essentialist truths owing nothing
to analyticity, that person is committed to rejecting the popular Quinean arguments against
analyticity.
1
Whatever their debt to analyticity, Kripke-Putnam statements of identity
critically undermine the familiar Quinean arguments against analyticity, if there is nothing
wrong with them. A proponent of these statements would seem committed to an
analytic/synthetic distinction. So the proponent of Kripke-Putnam essentialism is not free,
with respect to analyticity, to take it or leave it. She has to take it. In particular, she is not
free to take or leave the Quinean arguments opposing analyticity: she has to reject them.
There is no worry, then, that the proposal of the last chapter fails on account of subjecting
the genuine necessity attending natural-kind identities to the widely touted Quinean
maladies said to afflict analyticity. Anyone who recognizes the identities should not buy
the alleged maladies anyway.
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The relevance of the present thesis for the proposal of last chapter is clear. The
thesis is also independently interesting. For the position that there are necessary statements
concerning kinds like water and oak is widely embraced, and so is the position that the
analytic/synthetic distinction is untenable: it should be of some significance that these
widely held views are in fact incompatible. 2
Of course, the conflict allows more than one moral. It might be urged, in response
to the incompatibility of the Kripke-Putnam picture and the rejection of analyticity: so
much the worse for the necessity attending the Kripke-Putnam identity statements. That is
not my own conclusion, though I will have little to say about it. This is the way with
philosophy: one philosopher’s Modus Ponens is another’s Modus Tollens. That there is
an incompatibility will be used, however, to establish that if there are, as is widely
believed, any natural kind identity statements holding true by necessity, then there is
something wrong with Quine’s (better, Quinean) arguments against analyticity. This is
enough to safeguard my contention, argued in the previous chapter, that such identity
statements would be analytic, against the natural criticism discussed above. The argument
is also significant for undermining the Quinean arguments against an analytic/synthetic
distinction by bringing to light the high cost associated with them. Currently orthodox
claims of necessity ride on the failure of these criticisms of analyticity.
The following is divided into three sections. In the first section I examine two
arguments against analyticity, the argument from circularity and the argument from
counterexamples. The necessary a posteriori undermines both. In section two I discuss
the Quinean claim to revisability, and its threat to analyticity. In section three I address
Putnam’s moderate Quineanism. This discussion leads to the tying up of a loose thread
from the thesis of the last chapter. General conclusions are then drawn.
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IBecause of its relative modesty, Fregean analyticity happily escapes any number of
objections other versions of analyticity are vulnerable to. It is often complained, for
example, that analyticity is bankrupt, since there is no truth solely in virtue of meaning.
The typical idea here is that logical truths are obvious facts about the world, rather than
something true just in virtue of word meanings: since the truth of so-called analytic
statements hinges on logical truth, these statements are not really true solely in virtue of
word meanings. There is no truth in virtue of meanings alone , so there is no analyticity.
Clearly Fregean analyticity is modest enough to avoid this objection. For all this
conception of analyticity implies, logical truths may be true just in virtue of the meanings of
symbols, or in virtue of extra-linguistic fact. On the Fregean conception, analytic truths are
true by virtue of synonymy plus logical truth; if logical truth is not true in virtue of word
meanings alone, neither is Fregean analyticity.
Much the same can be said of truth by convention. It is often said that there is no
real truth by convention: the logic the world conforms to is true because the world
conforms to it, not because of our conventions. But again, Fregean analyticity makes no
pretense of being true by conventions alone. Conventions have something to do with
synonymy, no doubt, but Fregean analyticity is true in virtue of logical truth as well as
synonymy. So if logical truth is not true by convention, then neither is Fregean analyticity.
And, in fact, much the same can be said of unrevisability. Quine famously holds
that “[n]o statement is immune to revision,” not even statements of a logical or
mathematical character: “[rjevision even of the law of excluded middle has been proposed
as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics” ( 1961, p. 43). But there is no particular
reason an analytic truth of Frege’s variety should not be subject to the tribunal of
experience with the logical truth undergirding it, if logic is subject to the tribunal of
3
experience.
1 6 1
There are, however, Quinean complaints that certainly apply to Fregean analyticity.
Two Dogmas
,
Quine s most famous paper, is explicitly directed at non-trivial Fregean
analyticity
4
The first four sections of Quine’s “Two Dogmas” is spent on a search for
some illuminating definition for ‘analytic’. Unsurprisingly, none is found. “Self-
contradictory” (in the broad sense), “necessary,” “synonymous,” and “definition” are all
found wanting, since each seems to presuppose a prior understanding of analyticity. No
non-circular definition of ‘analytic’ is arrived at. That is supposed to constitute a difficulty
for the alleged dichotomy between the analytic and the synthetic.
Just about every supporter of analyticity since Quine has replied that this argument
from circularity is not very strong. Putnam remarks that
it is puzzling why this is supposed to be a good argument. Could it not, after all,
just be the case that the various members of the family of linguistic notions to which
the notion of analyticity belongs are not definable in terms of, or reducible to other,
non-linguistic notions? If this is the case, then something more doubtless needs to
be said about the status of linguistic theory; but a mere demonstration of definitional
circularity would hardly seem to be enough to overthrow as widely accepted and
used a notion as the notion of analyticity (1983c, p.88).
Any number of useful concepts resist speedy characterization: this would include even
grammaticality (Putnam 1983c, pp. 88-9), but of course no one proposes to dispense with
this notion. Even Quine (1990, p. 198) has confessed that non-circular definitions elude
many useful scientific expressions, and indeed expressions that he himself has made use
of, such as ‘perceptual similarity’. So according to one common assessment of Quine’s
discussion of circularity, that discussion does not do much to impugn analyticity. At best it
establishes only that any prior reservations someone may have concerning the intelligibility
or usefulness of analyticity will not be alleviated by attempts to explain the notion in terms
Quine readily recognizes, e.g., extensional terms. Those who take analyticity to be
intelligible and useful generally suggest that Quine’s failure to grasp the notion might be
remedied by his paying closer attention to the sorts of definitions that are offered (see, in
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addition to Putnam 1983c, his 1975a; Mates 1951; Grice and Strawson 1956; Sidelle 1989,
pp. 1 40ff
. ; Creath 1990, pp. 14-15; Ayer 1992).
Whatever the merits of the above rejoinder, and I will make no assumptions about
its merits, it seems safe to say that the argument from circularity is not conclusive.
Proponents evidently take the argument to point to the conclusion that analyticity is
confused and incapable of clarification, but no one supposes the argument to definitively
establish that analyticity is confused, by showing how there is some incoherence in the
notion. The best it could do is to sow doubts. I will shortly argue, however, that we have
every reason to think analyticity is not a confusion, if the necessary a posteriori is sound.
First, I would like to raise another well-known attack on analyticity that is similar in
important respects to the above. This attack makes use of counterexamples to proposed
analytic sentences. 5 The attack from counterexamples resembles the argument from
circularity in that it is not decisive. The failure of supposedly analytic sentences to live up
to their promise may point to difficulties for analyticity, but again it does not decisively
show that or how the notion is incoherent.
The critic who first comes to mind in connection with counterexamples is Harman,
who likens analyticity to witchcraft (1973, pp. 100ff.). Harman is happy to concede that
philosophers often agree on which sentences seem to be analytic, much as folks in Salem
might have agreed on which women seemed to be witches. But no real distinction beyond
appearances is grasped in either case. One of the chief means of disabusing subscribers to
witchcraft is to point out that apparently clear cases of witches do not really have the
required supernatural powers. “If we come to doubt a sufficient number of particular
cases, we will come to doubt whether there are any cases of witchcraft” (p. 104). The
same applies to purported cases of analyticity.
The problem with so many common examples of analyticity, Harman observes, is
that they are false. The most common example illustrating the notion is ‘Bachelors are
unmarried’. But, notes Harman, there are lots of bachelors living it up out there despite
still being technically married. Marriage is none too stable these days.
Katz (1974) is unimpressed. To call married playboys ‘bachelors’, he replies, does
not suggest their bachelorhood any more than calling police officers ‘pigs’ suggests their
pighood. The language is figurative. Harman’s (1976, pp. 389-90) rejoinder that such a
reply lacks evidence is not entirely convincing. When we are asked whether a police
officer is really a pig, we are inclined to reply in the negative: something similar might hold
in the event of our calling a married man a bachelor. That is at least some evidence that the
use in question is figurative.
Still, we must acknowledge on Harman’s behalf that there is a grade from speakers’
reference to semantic reference. Semantic reference is, of course, roughly what a linguistic
expression semantically refers to: e.g., for a description, what satisfies it. It is well
known, however, that we can succeed in communicating about a given object using a
description or name that does not really semantically denote it. This might be the case
when an insensitive person is referred to as “that trousered ape,” or a kind person “the
town angel”^
Unfortunately, the division between speakers’ and semantic cases of reference is
none too clear-cut, however, and seems largely to be a matter of degree. When Grandpa
offers a drumstick from the Christmas turkey, is he really offering an authentic drumstick,
or is his use of the word ‘drumstick’ just a manner of speaking? Can a generic photocopier
really produce Xerox sheets, or do we just call them Xerox sheets? Or, to continue the
proper name motif, how about our calling ordinary bandages Band Aids? I have been told
that ‘diaper’ similarly originates with the British surname ‘Diaper’, but if so, ordinary
napkins for babies are presumably still diapers, notwithstanding their source. Are the
things called ‘groovy’ or ‘cool’ really groovy or cool in some new sense of the words, or
is this just figurative? In the above cases, a term’s place on the scale between literal and
figurative use may be hard to locate. A brief investigation reveals the ubiquity of this sort
of language use that is neither decidedly figurative nor decidedly literal. This suggests
difficulties for defenses like Katz’s against counterexamples. If the application of
bachelor’ to married playboys is not determinately figurative, as seems likely enough, then
it is hard to maintain the claim that ‘Bachelors are unmarried’ is straightforwardly analytic.
There are counterexamples to many other allegedly analytic claims, in addition to
those counterexamples afflicting ‘Bachelors are unmarried’. To the claim ‘Women are
female’ Harman presents a woman disqualified from participating in the Olympics for
having too many Y chromosomes to count as female. Another common type of
counterexample to alleged analyticities invokes affinities between artifact-terms and natural-
kind terms. Consider a planet like ours on which sofas, microwave ovens, and the like are
organisms. Indeed, consider the case in which the sofas spawn microwave ovens, which
grow up to be ordinary sofas. Might we not in that case say that such microwave ovens are
(baby) sofas? If so, it cannot be .analytically true that sofas are seats, as might have seemed
likely.
^
If Harman and company are correct, then a variety of the most popular examples of
analytic sentences are false, or at least we can think of situations in which they would be
falsified, possible worlds in which they are false
.
9
That would seem to be a problem for
analyticity. It might cause us to doubt whether there is any real analytic/synthetic
distinction.
Again, even if all of the common, allegedly analytic sentences admit
counterexamples, this would not definitively show a confusion in the notion of analyticity.
Like the (alleged) failure to formulate explicit characterizations of analyticity,
counterexamples merely signal a possible confusion
;
10
they do not uncover any such
confusion. I will argue that the necessary a posteriori, and, in particular, the famous and
generally accepted natural kind identities, give us every reason to believe that there are
indeed analytic truths (or at least the possibility of them, in an ideal language), so that
analyticity must be cogent. If there is nothing wrong with the familiar a posteriori
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necessity, then there is good reason to believe that counterexample-proof analytic
statements are possible, even if hopeful examples have proven disappointing. There is
good reason to think that analyticity is not a confusion.
Recall KP English, which is a coherent, if fictional, alternative to our own untidy
language. In KP English ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ refer to the very same entity in all possible
worlds. So in any possible world, something is properly called ‘water’ (for KP speakers
in the actual world) if and only if it is also properly called ‘H2O’. There can therefore be
no counterexample, or even possible counterexample, to the identity statement ‘Water =
H2O
. There can be no recalcitrant world in which we ought to say that water is not
identical to H2O. But in that case, even if ‘Water = H2O’ is a synthetic, a posteriori
statement, it would seem that there could be no principled way to shut out by way of
counterexamples more traditional examples of analyticity. Perhaps the English expressions
bachelor and unmarried, eligible male’ fail to share reference conditions. Recall that
‘water’ and ‘H2O’ do not share reference conditions, either, in our vernacular English . 11
Nevertheless, ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ might have shared reference conditions. There might
have been a KP English, in which ‘water and ‘H2O’ are cointensional.
But if there might have been a tidier language in which ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ are
cointensional, then it would certainly be strange if there could not have been an analogously
cooperative language in which standard uses of ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried, eligible male’
are, as analyticity theorists have supposed, cointensional. What reason could be proposed
that they could not? The only apparent difference between this case and the ‘water’/‘H20 ’
case is that the reference conditions are established directly in the bachelor case: i.e., they
are established to be accessible to the a priori introspection of at least the dubber of
‘bachelor’, and not indirectly, by way of paradigmatic samples.
This meager difference between ‘water’ and ‘bachelor’, that the reference
conditions are established directly in the latter case and indirectly in the former, provides no
room for maneuvering an anti-analyticity charge. ‘Water’ came to refer to H2O in all
possible worlds 12 by means of a dubbing ceremony something like this: “By ‘water’ we
refer to that microstructure, whatever it is, that is instantiated in this sample (pointing)”. If
that is sufficient to attach ‘water’ to H2O in every world, surely an analogous ceremony
should do the trick for ‘bachelor’: “By ‘bachelor’ we refer to that combination of gender,
marital status, and marital eligibility status, whatever it is, that is instantiated by Supreme
Court justice David Souter.” Refinements may be needed in either case, but there is a
strong prima facie presupposition in favor of such refinements being available in both cases
if in either.
If these observations are on target, then just as ‘water’ can be grounded in samples
in such a way that all and only H2O belongs to ‘water” s extension in any possible world,
similarly ‘bachelor’ could be grounded in samples in such a way that all and only
unmarried, eligible males would belong to its extension in any possible world. In that
case, no counterexamples could be brought against the alleged necessity of either ‘Water is
H2O’ or ‘Bachelors are unmarried, eligible males’, ‘bachelor’s reference conditions being
secured as those of water are. The only way that an actual or possible counterexample
could arise in either case is if either statement were to fail to be necessary. Then there
would be some possible worlds in which the statement does not come out true. But ‘Water
is H2O is, by hypothesis, necessary, and it is hard to discriminate against the relevantly
similar ‘Bachelors are unmarried, eligible males’, where ‘bachelor’ is an “underlying-trait
term,” as it might be called, whose reference conditions are established indirectly.
If the above is right, then ‘bachelor’ could pick out all and only unmarried, eligible
males in all possible worlds if the term’s reference conditions are fixed by being grounded
in paradigmatic samples. But if these conditions can be so grounded indirectly, by way of
samples, surely it would be bizarre if there were no way to establish them directly, without
the roundabout use of samples. Why should there have to exist bachelors like David
Souter in order for us to have a term standing for what the English ‘bachelor’ is
traditionally taken to stand for?
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Let me drive the point further with another example. If we suppose that we cannot
possibly get two words that are analytically defined in the traditional way, which avoids the
use of samples, to have the very same conditions for reference, so that the analytic tie
between them is counterexample-proof across all possible worlds, then we must agree that
it is not possible, even in a cleaned up language (something like KP English) to dub a
synonym for potato
,
in the way analytic terms are traditionally taken to be dubbed. A
community could not, for example, succeed in any efforts to dub ‘spud’ as follows: “By
spud
,
we mean potato.” Nevertheless, if matters were to get desperate, and a synonym
were really desired, the community could be fairly sure of getting one by grabbing
exemplary potatoes and urging that “‘spud’ is to be applied to this kind of thing
(pointing)”.^
This state of affairs is paradoxical enough, but things get worse. Consider the case
of a community indirectly establishing the reference conditions of both ‘potato’ and ‘spud’
together, at the same time
,
using the same paradigms. “By ‘spud’ and ‘potato’ both, we
shall mean this kind of thing (pointing)”. Here the connection between each term and the
shared reference conditions would apparently be licit if the Kripke-Putnam theory of
natural-kind terms is right. But this is patently not any less objectionable than grounding
‘potato’ by way of samples, and subsequently decreeing “By ‘spud’ we mean potato”.
Certainly in either case the apriority of ‘Spuds are potatoes’ would be assured, so it is hard
even to use the respective aposteriority/apriority of resulting, allegedly necessary statements
as a wedge to separate the two cases.
It is very hard to see, then, how counterexamples to traditionally alleged analytic
sentences could fuel any principled objections to analyticity itself after the necessary but a
posteriori theoretical identities are admitted. So it is curious that such a case built on
counterexamples should be attributed the force it is generally conceded to have in a
philosophical climate favorably inclined toward Kripke-Putnam style a posteriori
14
necessity.
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Of course, the defense provided here for traditional analyticity appeals to the
counterexample-free nature of hypothetical, idealized languages; for all I have said, our
own familiar English contains no truly counterexample-proof analytic sentences. This,
however, is no strike against the rejoinder. For, as has often been observed (see, e.g.,
Creath 1990, p. 11; Boghossian 1996, pp. 370, 389 note 16), the Quinean attack on
analyticity aims to establish not that analyticity is uninstantiated, but rather that it is
somehow unintelligible
,
and thus (to state matters in a way Quine would not) necessarily
uninstantiated. And if there might have been a language, albeit a tidier one than our familiar
English, that contained traditional-style analyticity, then analyticity cannot be unintelligible.
It might be uninstantiated in any natural language, but to claim this raises no point of
contention with the analyticity theorist.^
II
The Quinean onslaught on analyticity is not limited, of course, to the above-
discussed criticisms. Indeed, the very core of the Quinean difference with analyticity has
yet to be broached. But considerations similar to those employed above may be effectively
used to undermine these still more central Quinean misgivings.
The real thrust of the Quinean attack centers on revisability. No statement,
according to Quine, is immune from revision. It has already been observed that Quine’s
claim to revisability does not necessarily present any cause for concern. Such a claim
naturally admits of various interpretations, some of which would hardly set Quine against
the analyticity theorist.
Grice and Strawson (1956) long ago granted that we can always revise a sentence,
or give it up, when there is a shift in the meanings of its constituent terms. The sentence
‘Bachelors are male’ may someday come to mean that bachelors and spinsters are male,
since ‘bachelor’ might gradually shift use to include females. Other terms have changed
this way. ‘Actor’, for example, was once applied only to males, and ‘actress’ was the
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corresponding term for females. But ‘actress’ is not often used anymore, ‘actor’ now
being commonly employed for both genders. In the event that ‘bachelor’ should similarly
change its meaning, the sentence ‘Bachelors are male’ will have to be rejected.
Clearly if Quine’s contention that any statement is subject to revision is to be of any
consequence, there must be more to it than that the meanings of our terms can change.
Analyticity is none the worse off for changes in language. Even if the meaning of a
sentence can change, a sentence on an interpretation may be analytic. It may be what is
unrevisable, even if it is true that in some manner any sentence can be revised.
Quine must also intend something more than just that logic is revisable. It has been
observed above that Fregean analyticity can admit of reusability if logical truths are
revisable. Recall that where Quine argues against Fregean analyticity, he sensibly concedes
the trivial analyticity of logical truths, taking aim specifically at non-trivial Fregean
analyticity (Quine 1961; again, see chap. 5, notes 8 and 9). Since logical truths are trivially
analytic on the Fregean account, whatever characteristics logical truths have, at least some
analytic truths (the logical truths) trivially have as well: so it cannot be impossible for an
analytic truth as such to have such characteristics. One such characteristic might be
revisability. Further, many characteristics of logical truths will naturally be inherited by
non-trivial analyticity, so it should come as no surprise that non-trivial Fregean analyticity
is revisable if logical truths are. The revisability of ‘Bachelors are bachelors’ would
generate a derivative revisability for ‘Bachelors are unmarried males’, but not a
troublesome revisability for a defender of non-trivial Fregean analyticity, who is worried
only by problems peculiar to the latter. The most that Fregean-style analyticity is
committed to is that analyticity is unrevisable, in whatever respect analytic truth is supposed
to be unrevisable, on condition that logical truth is granted .
Finally, Quine’s claim about revisability, if it is to have any force against
analyticity, cannot come down to a banal assertion of fallibilism (a point effectively stressed
by Georges Rey 1993, pp. 72, 81, passim). Because we are fallible agents, we are
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perhaps never able to rule out the possibility that some skeptical hypothesis obtains, such
that an apparent truth, even an apparent necessary truth, fails to be true or necessarily true.
It is possible, for all an agent may be able to satisfy herself before the skeptic, that even ‘22
= 4 is false. The agent may be unable to conceive how it could be false, but that does not
preclude the possibility. The agent’s inability may be explained by natural cognitive
limitations, and/or by there being yet no discovery of a rival theory (e.g. no alternative
arithmetic analogous to non-Euclidean geometry) and/or by the clever arts of an evil demon
or a mad scientist intent on deceiving the agent, and so on. Now, the possibility in
question here, the possibility that 2
2
* 4, is clearly epistemic
. It is epistemically possible,
the skeptic reminds us, that 2 ^ 4, or that in some metaphysically possible world that is
the case.
^
If analytic statements are in any interesting respect unrevisable, this surely cannot
amount to epistemic, skeptic-proof certainty, with respect to some sentences (the analytic
ones) that they are true (or analytic). Nothing inherent in the doctrine that there is an
analytic/synthetic distinction commits the adherent to rejecting the epistemic possibility that
her cherished truths of even logic and mathematics, let alone conceptual analysis, are
spurious, and that they only appear to be irrefutable, for some naturalistic or fanciful
reason.
Not only may the falsity of an analytic statement be epistemically possible, but an
agent might come to reject an analytic sentence. Someone might give up ‘Spuds are
potatoes’ because, under the influence of postmodernist writers, she decides that truth is up
for grabs. Black is white, too, she says. Clearly this should pose no problem for
analyticity theorists. Confusion concerning the truth of an analytic sentence can be granted
without surrendering its analytic status. Again, there is certainly no reason for an
analyticity theorist to hold knowing agents infallible when judging the truth of an analytic
statement.
Indeed, a person could even be rational in rejecting an analytic statement, and
nothing much follows for analyticity. You might rationally come to believe that you are
wrong about the apparent analyticity of ‘Bachelors are unmarried’ (even if, despite
objections noted above, this sentence is analytic) were, say, you to come to rationally
believe you have a disease that causes appearances to deceive the stricken concerning any
statement pertaining to marital status. Your physician might have cautioned you concerning
such appearances. A case that may be a little more likely is found in Elliott Sober’s Wise
One story (Sober 1984, p. 66: Sober credits the case to Philip Kitcher):
Suppose we know someone who is an extremely insightful and trustworthy
authority.^ We also know this person to be very honest. This Wise One says to us
one day, philosophers are always saying that all bachelors are unmarried. But if
you look very carefully at what these concepts mean, you’ll see that this doesn’t
have to be true. And, in fact, there are some bachelors who are not married.” Now
I suggest that it would be pigheaded to simply dismiss the remarks of the Wise One
out of hand. People have made mistakes in analyzing concepts before, and if the
Wise One is so smart and honest, we ought to take him seriously in the present
case.
Surely Sober is right. Surely it would be rational to back off from a belief that bachelors
are unmarried in the face of such testimony from the Wise One. We are fallible creatures,
and would do well in situations like the above to remember this. But there is no reason an
analyticity theorist should be embarrassed by fallibilism. 17 Even if we can never rule out
the possibility that we have made an error in thinking that a statement is necessarily true or
analytic, it may still be that some truths are in fact necessary, and it may still be that they do
in fact owe this necessity just to synonymy and logical truth. So it may still be that they are
analytic.
To sum up this discussion of fallibilism: analyticity is essentially concerned with
truth in virtue of meaning (and logical truth), not with answering philosophical skepticism.
So if the Quinean claim amounts to a reassertion of philosophical skepticism with special
focus on analyticity in particular, the assertion has little bearing on the credibility of
1
8
analyticity. I hope this point is clear, but to ensure agreement, it may help to close the
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topic with an offer: if anyone still insists on identifying analyticity with infallibility, that
person might be given the word ‘analytic’. A new term ‘schmanalytic’ can be introduced to
apply to sentences that are true in virtue of synonymy, or meaning, and logical truth,
period, with no skeptic-proof guarantees. Schmanalyticity carries all the interest analyticity
is supposed to carry (see § 5 of the previous chapter) without the quite extraneous tie to
skeptic-proof insight that would threaten to make the notion inapplicable to any sentence.
So if you insist on saddling “analyticity” with an answer to philosophical skepticism, take
what is at issue here to be whether there are cogent grounds for rejecting schmanalyticity.
Since I take there to be no good reason for supposing analyticity to bear the burdensome
weight of infallibilism, I will continue to use ‘analyticity’ for the notion at issue.
It is time to take stock: if Quine’s claim to universal revisability is to bear upon
analyticity, it cannot be the mere claim that our sentences could call for rejection after a
change in meaning. It also cannot be a mere assertion of fallibilism. Moreover, if
specifically Fregean analyticity is to be threatened, more must be at issue than the
revisability of logic. So what js the substantial Quinean issue with analyticity? Does
Quine’s claim to revisability engage analyticity, and, more specifically, Fregean analyticity?
It does. There is indeed a respect that is objectionable from a Quinean perspective
in which a sentence that is necessarily true solely in virtue of meaning (and logic) would be
unrevisable. It would be unrevisable in the respect that it could not be shown to be false:
so long as the sentence means what it does, it is necessarily true, and no empirical
discovery or new insight could in fact refute it. Quine would reject such unrevisability.
The position that only a change in the meanings of the constituent terms could make a given
sentence false is unacceptable to the Quinean, since on the Quinean picture, no distinction
can be drawn between a change in meaning and a change in theory. There is no difference,
for the Quinean, between allowing that a sentence we formerly took to be true has changed
its meaning, and allowing that we were just wrong about its truth, as “there is no real
distinction between a change of language and a change of view” (Harman 1973, p. 106; see
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also Harman 1996; Giaquin.o 1996, p. 250). So accord,ng to the Quinean we could, in the
face of empirical information, find that any sentence is false, and it cannot be said that we
have changed the meaning of our words any more than that we have come to a better
theory. Putnam puts the point in terms of word meanings:
I should like, with Quine, to stress the extent to which the meaning of an individual
word is a function of its place in the network, and the impossibility of separating, inthe actual use of a word, that part of the use which reflects the ‘meaning’ of the
wordand that part of the use which reflects deeply embedded collateral information(1975a, pp. 40f.).
The Quinean idea here is that you may hold bachelors to be unmarried, and also hold
bachelors to be unhappy, so that your use of ‘bachelor’ will reflect these beliefs. But there
is no real fact of the matter whether, for a given property properly ascribed to bachelors,
the property holds in virtue of the meaning of ‘bachelor’, or in virtue of certain non-
essential information concerning bachelors that happens to hold true. (Note that Putnam,
who only generally subscribes to the Quinean view, would not use ‘bachelor’ to illustrate
this point: see the discussion in the following section.)
Some have expressed this general point by saying that there is no real difference
between a dictionary and an encyclopedia. The latter just contains longer entries (Wilson
1967, p. 63; Harman 1973, pp. 97-100; see also Devitt 1993, p. 24). This way of putting
matters is less than perspicuous, since it isn’t exactly clear what dictionaries are supposed
to offer. It seems they do not purport to offer an analytic principle corresponding to each
entry. But the point is clear enough: on the view in question you cannot, even in principle,
separate linguistic from substantive information associated with a term.
This position that the meaning of a term and the information about the referent are
inseparable is surely not initially attractive. But it becomes plausible when examples of
revision are considered. Some commonly cited examples are provided by geometry.
Physicists, mathematicians, and indeed educated people in general held at one time that
‘straight line’ could be defined as the shortest path between two points . People believed
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many other apparently obvious conceptual truths about straight lines, as well. Everyone
believed, to offer another example, that if two objects traveling in straight lines remain for a
distance a constant measure of space apart, they must, if they are to continue traveling
along their respective straight paths, not converge.
But these truths turned out to stand in need of revision. They had to be qualified
because there are possible spaces that do not conform: indeed, physicists believe that our
own physical space fails to conform.
Physicists tell us that two straight paths may remain for some distance a constant
measure apart, and then converge. It might be objected that somehow modem physicists
are not using the word ‘straight’ in the same sense in which people formerly used the term.
The problem with this picture is that straightness was always supposed to apply to our own
familiar space, and if we insist on stemming the revisionary use of physicists, maintaining
that straight paths cannot converge after maintaining a constant distance apart, we get very
unintuitive results: “straight” lines end up not being the shortest paths, nor the paths light
rays follow, and a space vehicle following such a path would turn, accelerate and
decelerate, etc. Such paths, as Putnam puts it, “look crooked, act crooked, and feel
crooked” (1962, p. 664).
Even the formerly accepted “definition” of a straight line as the shortest path
between two points seems problematic. With General Relativity came the realization that
more than one path may be at least as short as any other path between pairs of points in
physical space.
Here it is natural to say that there has been no mere change in language, no simple
decision to alter our use of ‘straight line’. The changes noted above in our understanding
of ‘straight’ seem partially theoretical, too: we have learned something about a concept that
was in former times insufficiently grasped, but nevertheless grasped.
Putnam insightfully indicates that even an attempt at settling a term’s use by
stipulation may not forestall Quinean rejection, rejection that is no less a change in
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substance than a change in language. With respect to terms like ‘energy’, ‘species’, and
mammal’, he writes, “any one law, even a law that was felt to be definitional or stipulative
in character, can be abandoned, and we feel that the identity of the concept has, in certain
respects, remained” (1975a, p. 53). Putnam is well aware that scientists sometimes agree
to stipulate preferred uses of terms, or certain principles to be associated with a referent.
But, he notes, these stipulated principles may be revised in the event of the rejection of a
certain assumed context within which the stipulation was attempted (1975a, p. 45).
Something like this seems right. Consider the term ‘species’. Though it has
certainly seemed to biologists that this term is used to signify something salient and
important in the world, just how specieshood is to be characterized has proved to be most
elusive. Any number of definitions have been proposed. Now, at any given time scientists
are free to stipulate that one or another proposed definition is the proper one. But this may
not turn out to generate truths that are impervious to right-headed rejection, contrary to
what one might expect from such apparent truths by definition.
It certainly seems, at least initially, that scientists would ensure the analyticity of,
say, the phylogenetic species concept, or the biological species concept, by legislating that
it is to be the concept employed in connection with ‘species’. To see that such legislation is
no sure safeguard against revision, it may help to imagine what might have happened had
scientists done this at an earlier time. At some point in the early nineteenth century,
biologists might have grown weary of talking past one another, and convened to settle once
and for all how ‘species’ should be used (cf. Putnam’s similar tale in 1975a, p. 45).
Some, following Linnaeus, might have lobbied for some definition or other based on
similarity. This would have conflicted with reproductive definitions, which tie together
members of reproductive groups, regardless of variation. As reproductive continuity
proved a popular proposal in the early nineteenth century, it might have won out in a
convention like the one in question. One salient advantage reproductive criteria enjoyed is
that they dovetailed nicely with widely accepted creationist beliefs.
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Suppose, then, that the community at the above convocation were to have accepted
by vote the following definition: “A_species is an interbreeding community and all of iR
ancestors
. Such a proposal would have been popular enough, as the widespread
assumption was that each interbreeding community extends back to a single pair created by
God in the beginning (see, e.g., Mayr 1987, p. 151). Scientists might have breathed a
sigh ol relief after the vote: at last they could be confident that they would all be talking
about the same thing by the term ‘species’. The above definition certainly would have
appeared to prevail against the typological alternative, by sheer stipulative force.
But when certain assumptions of the members of the conference would later be
upset, the apparently stipulative definition would seem to be undermined by the facts. In
particular, when the theory of evolution would later earn wide favor, the definition would
lose credibility. Scientists would have to admit that their earlier proposed definition was
somehow unacceptable. After abandoning creationism scientists would quickly realize that
any proposed definition for ‘species’ that places all ancestors of a species in it is
unacceptable. The theory of evolution allows us post-Darwinians to see, as people did not
see in the early nineteenth century, that organisms of the most sophisticated species
descend from primitive organisms hardly fit to be counted conspecific Moreover,
primitive organisms branching into many species would be members of them all!
Now, it does seem that the replacement of the above definition with some other(s),
would not merely be a move to change the meaning of ‘species’. Rather, scientists before
and after Darwin would, at least in some loose respect, be talking about the same thing.
The rejection of the above definition would seem to be as much a change of theory about
what species are, as a change of definition, or meaning. The general rejection of a
definition on the basis of the rejection of its theoretical underpinnings is not simply
redefining. It comes closer to refuting. Yet the spumed definition was supposed to be true
by stipulation! So it seems that even this sort of legislative definition can be rightly rejected
and that this cannot be counted a mere change of meaning.
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Here the analyticity theorist will balk: surely if the above story is coherent, then the
stipulation about ‘species’ was never a full-blooded stipulation to begin with. It was a
~ feaSlble stlPulatlon a11 a]ong, to be held just in case an assumed context could be counted
on. In other words, the scientists were tacitly committed to standing largely by their
original, intuitive, working definition of ‘species’: they merely refined this by stipulation,
with the condition that the “stipulation” must not turn out to be incompatible with their
continued tacit use of ‘species’. But this kind of conservative stipulation as it might be
called, does not tell against the possibility of stipulation of a more radical nature, out and
out stipulation. Such radical stipulation might have taken place with a dubbing ceremony in
which it was decreed: “By ‘species’ we hereby mean interbreeding community and all of
its ancestors
. The above definition is legislated to hold no matter what that should force us
to conclude about species. If honoring it should force us to conclude that species are
theoretically uninteresting assortments of organisms, and that all of the interesting, familiar
groups we take to be a species are not species, then we must acknowledge that that is the
case. No matter how theoretically insignificant interbreeding communities of the above
variety turn out to be, they are what ‘species’ names.” If radical stipulation of this fashion
had been at issue at the above-discussed conference then the scientists would indeed have
learned from Darwin that every species includes primeval life forms.
One objection to this kind of radical stipulation is that it would hamper the progress
of science (Putnam 1975a). But this is not obvious. The result would rather be that the
scientific lexicon would be a veritable graveyard of discarded terms. Surely post-
conference scientists would have decided that their “species” are uninteresting, after the
discovery of evolution, and they would have invented a new term for the species we know.
They would have abandoned ‘species’.
The discarding of such terms is no clear barrier to communication, however. Often
conceptual disruption results in the rejection of a term in situations like the above anyway.
Decisions about whether to keep a term in the case of theoretical disruption like the above is
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largely optional. Theorists identifying their discovery with a traditional concept are likely
to retain terms, and theorists shunning tradition are likely to replace them. Originally
‘caloric’ and ‘electricity’ were both taken to refer to a fluid, but later discovery showed that
neither quantity is really a fluid: kinetic effect is actually responsible for the false
appearance in each case. Now we say that electricity exists, but that caloric fluid does not.
The abandonment of caloric’ is no obvious barrier to communication, and the retention of
electricity is no victory for clarity. A greater tendency to send terms the way of ‘caloric’
would bring no obvious harm.
There is another common Quinean response to the possibility of radical stipulation:
it is short-lived. As Quine famously puts the matter: “Legislative postulation contributes
truths which become integral to the corpus of truths; the artificiality of their origins does not
linger” (Quine 1976b, pp. 1 19-20; see also, e.g., Putnam 1975a, p. 55; Lycan 1991, p.
13 In.; Harman 1996, pp. 399-400).
But this response hardly seems conclusive, either. Even if the use of our terms
gradually shifts, and we relax radical stipulation to something of the status of conservative
stipulation, there is a short-lived phase of analyticity while the word is still used in
accordance with the terms of the radical stipulation. And if there can be short-lived
analyticity, can there be any theoretical barrier to longer-lived analyticity?
The reader will have divined the answer of an analyticity-sympathizer. But
stipulation is not a fresh issue. The issue of whether stipulation vindicates analyticity is
perhaps best left fallow for a time. So I will suppose that considerations along the above
lines will not conclusively vindicate analyticity. Though stipulation is often used to try to
show that analyticity is valid, it is not needed here. The aim here is to show that the threat
that Quinean revision poses to analyticity is defused by the possibility of Kripke-Putnam
essentialism.
There are other responses to the Quinean that I will similarly ignore. The alleged
Quinean problem for analyticity is, again, that any sentence whatever can be rejected
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Without error, in such a way that the change will no more be a change in language than a
change of theory. One available rejoinder to this alleged stumbling block for analyticity is
that the charge is irrelevant: all that analyticity involves is that an analytic sentence not be
rejected without error unless there is some meaning change, which there must be if there is
a change in meanmg/theory. So even if any sentence can be rejected in such a way that the
change is no more a change of language than a change of theory, this presents no problem
for analyticity.
Here again, I do not wish to press this reply, as I wish to avoid the traditional
battles. So I will ignore the possible merits of this reply, too, granting the Quinean that a
sentence is analytic only if rejecting it must be wrong, unless there is an simple change of
meaning, and not a change that is no more a change in the meaning of the original sentence
than in the theory about what it expresses.
Still, Quinean refutation presents little worry if the Kripke-Putnam identities hold
good. The argument is similar to one already seen in the last section, though last section
did not discuss Quinean revision. What is at issue here is whether any sentence is immune
to Quinean revision. Unlike the Quinean arguments of the last section, the possibility of
Quinean revision is supposed to constitute a decisive objection to analyticity. It is
supposed to show that the notion makes demands that cannot be met. But analyticity's
demands can be met if the case for a posteriori necessity is cogent.
If water is indeed identical to H2O, then something is water in any possible world if
and only if it is H2O. Given that this is the case, there is no way we could ever discover
water that were not H2O or H2O that were not water. To be sure, for all we can tdl a
priori
,
water is not H2O at all, but rather some other compound. But given that water is in
fact H2O, as we may suppose, no discovery to the contrary is metaphysically possible (see
note 12 ). Anything water must be straightforward H2O, and anything H2O must be
straightforward water. Conclusions to the contrary will be false.
But if there is no genuine, metaphysical possibility of our ever concluding without
error that something that is H20 fails to be straightforward water or that something that is
water fails to be straightforward H20, then the dreaded Quinean possibility of properly
concluding that water is not H20 remains only an epistemic possibility. Such a conclusion
about our water, what we mean by ‘water’ would have to be false.
All of this holds because ‘water’ and ‘H2O’ both refer to the same kind in all
possible worlds. They have the very same reference conditions. But if that is the case,
then it is hard to avoid concluding that two terms that are not independently grounded could
come to have the very same reference conditions, though those conditions would be
assigned in a way that would make their connection to the word knowable a priori, as
tradition would have it for analytically defined words. The reason should be familiar
enough: it seems unprincipled to insist that two terms must be anchored by samples in
order to come to have the same reference conditions. If there is some way to get two terms
to have the same reference conditions at all, and there clearly must be such a way for the
Kripke-Putnam picture to get going, then it should be possible to do so without using
paradigm samples.
The Quinean skeptical doubts over analyticity lose their force with such
concessions. Let us revisit ‘potato’ and ‘spud’, to offer an example. If the Kripke-Putnam
picture of reference is coherent, a community of English speakers could fix the reference
conditions of ‘spud’ and ‘potato’ via samples in such a way that each would be a rigid
designator for the kind potato . The community might use different paradigm potatoes to
ground, on different occasions, ‘potato’ and ‘spud’, and then set out to discover whether
potatoes are spuds. In such a case, since both ‘potato’ and ‘spud’ would rigidly designate
the potato kind, ‘A spud is a potato’ would be true in all possible worlds.
But again, if it is possible to get both ‘spud’ and ‘potato’ to rigidly designate the
potato kind by way of reference-fixing examples, it should be possible to dispense with the
examples, too, in one or the other case. It should be possible to ground, say, ‘potato’ by
way of exemplary potatoes so that it rigidly refers to the potato kind, and then just coin
‘spud’ directly
,
without the use of any independent samples: “By ‘spud’ we shall mean
potato.” In that event ‘spud’, too, would rigidly refer to the potato kind, because it would
refer to any kind in any possible world just in case that kind is the potato kind. That this
traditionally analytic coining of ‘spud’ is a permissible means of establishing the desired
reference conditions if the use of samples is permissible has already been argued in the
previous section. If the arguments for a parity are any good, then ‘A spud is a potato’ is
still true in all possible worlds, even in the event that ‘spud’ is coined in traditionally
analytic fashion. The sentence is still necessary.
But now it is clear that the sentence is analytic. It is not revisable in any analyticity-
threatening respect. There is no metaphysical possibility of making an empirical discovery
under which we would legitimately conclude that spuds are not potatoes. There is no such
possibility because in every possible world ‘spud’ designates just the potato kind.
Of course ‘Spuds are potatoes’ might still be revisable in other respects, but
apparently not respects that are of much consequence. We could always decide that ‘spud’
would be a nice word for soup. But that isn’t interesting.
There is also the epistemic possibility that somehow we have made a mistake, so
that the sentence in question is wrong. For all we can be sure, the appearance of analyticity
is spurious, and we could find out that there really is some object in some possible world,
perhaps the actual world, that is not a potato but that we wouldn’t be wrong to count a
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spud. ^ In that case ‘Spuds are potatoes’ could be counted false, and this would neither
be incorrect nor a mere change of language.
But that there are no epistemic guarantees otherwise is just a familiar doctrine that
we have already reviewed and found uninteresting: fallibilism. Perhaps even our clearest
ideas could, for all we are epistemically guaranteed, turn out to be confused: that evil
demon could be prowling about, and that alone is sufficient to motivate such a worry. But
no one ever claimed, or ought to have clatmed, that tl is a distinguishing mark of analyticity
that it confutes the fallibilist.
The point behind analyticity, rather, is that it guarantees, in spite of our fallibility,
that a sentence is necessarily true by virtue of linguistic meanings and logical truth.
Perhaps we never achieve demon-proof certainty that any statement is analytic. But for all
that, an analytic statement cannot in tact be revised without error, barring a straightforward
change of meaning.
In sum, if revisability is to hurt, it has to be metaphysical. But we have no reason
to suppose every sentence revisable in this sense. According to Kripke we would never
count anything that isn’t H2O to be water (so long as the samples used to dub ‘water’ are in
tact H2O). Putnam agrees: “nothing counts as a possible world in which water isn’t H2O”
( 1975d, p. 238). You just couldn’t correctly conclude that water is not H2O. There is no
possible refutation in the strong, metaphysical sense of showing, in some possible world,
that the sentence is false there. And, of course, even if ‘Water = H2O’ is not analytic, there
is no reason we should doubt that its unrevisability ( metaphysical unrevisability) is unique
and not even possibly extended to an old-fashioned analytic statement. The cat is out of the
bag, after unrevisability is granted.
Notice that the general strategy above can be used to make inroads into the Quinean
position even without appeal to Kripke-Putnam statements of essentialism. Any necessity
causes problems for Quine’s attack from universal revisability.
This problem is not immediately obvious. Certainly the claim to revisability has an
appearance of being perfectly true. We have, after all, revised some of our most cherished
doctrines in the past, finding cause to reject them as not quite right. Moreover, Quineans
are ingenious at fathoming possible circumstances in which apparently necessary
statements would have to be rejected. How could we seriously deny that any of our other
favored statements could be found to demand rejection for similar reasons? The temptation
for the analyticity theorist is to reply with examples of analytic necessity so plausible that
the Quinean is unable to imagine how they could be false. But clearly this will not suffice
to quell the Quinean doubts. Such an example, the Quinean defender is right to say,
would show only the limits of my ability to conceive certain possibilities” (Giaquinto
1996, p. 253). The Quinean claim is merely that any sentence could be revised, not that we
can conceive how it could be revised. And this seems hard to deny. The Quinean certainly
seems to be on solid ground.
But grave weaknesses in this position are exposed by a strategy like that employed
above. The position’s initial plausibility trades heavily on ambiguity. What is meant by
saying that any statement is revisable, or that any statement can be legitimately rejected? If
this is an epistemic claim, a mere admission to the skeptical possibility that any statement,
however certain it seems, could turn out false, then it is true, but of no consequence to
analyticity. It is true because even when a statement seems self-evident, error can never be
ruled out. Frege probably took the axioms of his naive set theory to enjoy maximal
certainty, but he learned, to his sorrow, that a contradiction in them had escaped his notice.
Still, there is no worry for analyticity here. The possibility that we could be subject
to error in thinking that a statement is metaphysically necessary does not preclude the
statement’s being metaphysically necessary, nor does it preclude the statement’s being
necessary in sole virtue of synonymy and logical truth, i.e. in virtue of being analytic.
Again, however, if the claim that any statement can be revised is to be construed as
a metaphysical claim, rather than an epistemic one, then it is implausible. The metaphysical
claim is that any statement is such that there are metaphysically possible circumstances in
which it is false, or in which we would not be wrong, nor merely using the sentence with
some non-conventional meaning — changing the subject, as Quine would say - to conclude
that it is false. This strong metaphysical claim might indeed threaten dire consequences for
analyticity if it is true; but if this is what revisability amounts to, it is not the irresistible
doctrine it appeared to be. On the contrary, anyone embracing necessity of any sort at all is
committed against it. For a necessarily true statement is one that is true in all possible
worlds: there are thus no metaphysically possible circumstances in which it is not true.
And thus there are no possible circumstances in which we could reject it without error.
If there is any necessity then there must be some truths not subject to the
metaphysical possibility of refutation. That is not to establish, of course, that there are any
analytic truths: even if there are truths that are (metaphysically) immune to revision,
perhaps none are necessary in virtue of synonymy and logical truth. Nevertheless, a
crucial objection to any analytic unrevisability is removed: namely, the Quinean objection
that there are no unrevisable statements of any kind at all.
The Quinean argument from revisability does not establish that there is no
analyticity; this important negative conclusion is established with the help of the most
uncontroversial necessity one might wish to consider. The positive conclusion that indeed
there are analytic, unrevisable sentences seems guaranteed by the legitimacy of the Kripke-
Putnam identities (which are also enough, of course, to establish the negative conclusion).
I have already argued that one is not entitled to endorse these without also accepting
traditional analyticity. The only way so discriminate would be to claim that reference
conditions of, say, potato can be established indirectly by way of samples and only
indirectly by way of samples. But that is unlikely.
So it seems that the Quinean opponent of analyticity cannot take a modest position.
The Quinean attack on analyticity is committed to going all the way to a rejection of
necessary truth. This extreme position cannot be expected to deter anyone who rejects
metaphysical necessity anyway. So it is fitting that the most prominent opponents of
analyticity have tended to be less than receptive toward necessity. Particularly notable in
this regard is, of course, Quine. The incompatibility between essentialism, or any form of
necessity, and his own arguments against analyticity should offer him no motive at all to
reject those arguments. But if Quine is in a position to happily retain his hostility toward
analyticity, philosophers on the whole are not. Few are eager to surrender necessity,
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which has become an established pan of today's philosophical landscape. Kripke's case
for essentialism has assured that.
Ill
I have already noted that Putnam is a Quinean of sorts. Although Putnam defends
an analytic/synthetic distinction, he also holds analyticity to be philosophically
uninteresting, and he takes Quinean problems to afflict all but a very few trifling sentences.
In particular, Putnam supposes that there are no non-trivial analytic truths about
scientifically interesting entities, such as natural kinds.
In order to maintain the claim of last chapter, that natural kind identities are analytic,
it is necessary to reject not only the view that there is no analytic/synthetic distinction at all,
but also the more moderate view that there is such a distinction but that analyticity does not
apply to sentences about scientifically important entities. This is a topic for the present
section. In ‘ The Analytic and the Synthetic”, Putnam offers a diagnosis of the Quinean
obstacle to analyticity. An examination of Putnam’s view of the Quinean problem will be
necessary in order to expose problems with his conclusions about the trifling nature of
analyticity. If Putnam’s diagnosis is right, then examining it will also be edifying for
illuminating the source of Quinean revision. The following discussion will lead naturally
back to a loose end from last chapter concerning the analytic status of the Kripke-Putnam
identities themselves. For the present, however, the reader may continue to ignore the
thesis of last chapter.
Putnam claims that for a word to be analytically defined it must be associated with
exactly one necessary and sufficient criterion of application. Furthermore, he insists that
this criterion be the one operationally used by speakers to determine whether something
24belongs in the word’s extension.
The point behind the requirement of an analytically defined word being associated
with just one criterion is clear enough. A community of speakers that associates a term
with two or more necessary and sufficient criteria for application shares the position of a
government that endows the authority of a king to two or more people. So long as there is
no apparent conflict, things run smoothly. Thus, the Spartans maintained a stable diarchy:
one of the kings just spent a lot of time out fighting battles, while the other stayed home.
But in the event of a conflict, a revision of subjects’ allegiances would have been called for.
Would this necessarily have amounted to a mere change in government, or might the same
government be said to have survived the transition in authority? There doesn’t seem to be a
fact of the matter.
In the same way, if multiple necessary and sufficient criteria associated with a word
are employed without conflicting over cases, things run smoothly. It is when the criteria
fall apart that there is trouble. When a candidate for reference is found to satisfy one
necessary and sufficient criterion but not another, revision is required. At least one of the
criteria must be rejected, to prevent the candidate’s both belonging and failing to belong to
the term’s extension. Would this amount to a change in meaning, or would the same
meaning have survived the rejection of a criterion? Again, many feel there is no fact of the
„
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matter.
Putnam supposes that sentences like ‘Species are such and such’ or ‘A straight line
is thus and so’ cannot be analytic. The problem is that “law-cluster” terms, such as
‘species’, or ‘straight line’ are not one-criterion terms. They are associated with any
number of implicit conditions for application: they figure into a number of statements
concerning natural laws, and their role in these law-statements provides a cluster of
conditions for the proper application of the terms. Since these conditions might be found to
conflict with any criterion used by speakers, and the terms’ roles in law-statements might
be selected for continued association with the term at the expense of the criterion, law-
cluster terms cannot be analytically identified with any criterion.
Thus, ‘species’ was never analytically tied to any one criterion biologists may have
relied heavily on. Biologists may have relied heavily on the criterion interbreeding
community and all of its ancestors
,
but confl.ct might open up between this criterion and
semantically significant principles concerning species and parasites, species and ecology,
species and sex and gender, etc. ‘Species' figures in law-like statements in all of these
categories, but these statements would be jeopardized by retaining the above criterion, and
thereby including primeval organisms in every species.
Similarly, our criteria for identifying straightness fell apart. It was necessary to
give up either the conclusion that there are straight lines in physical space or that straight
lines obey Euclidean principles.
The non law-cluster words, “one-criterion” words, that Putnam offers as examples
are bachelor’ and ‘vixen’. These words, according to Putnam, can be analytically defined.
Since the only necessary and sufficient condition associated with being a bachelor is
whether it is an unmarried man, and the only necessary and sufficient condition associated
with being a vixen is whether it is a female fox, and these conditions are operationally used
for determining whether something is a bachelor or a vixen, these truths hold analytically.
For if we were to abandon the sole criterion used in one of these cases for some other, we
would have to be making a straightforward decision to use the term for different things.
That is the case because there would be no way for the necessary and sufficient conditions
associated with a term to be found to come apart, so that while some might be sacrificed for
the sake of others, some condition or conditions would continue to be associated with the
term to tie it to past use. Rather, there is only one criterion, and no other competing
conditions to begin with: to abandon that criterion would leave no remaining condition
tying the term to past use.
Unfortunately there are problems with Putnam’s venerable examples of analyticity.
Consider the following cases (borrowed from M. Giaquinto 1996, pp. 25 If.). First,
zoologists studying vixens’ social and biological behavior engage in extensive studies on
vixens bearing and rearing cubs. At one point it is learned that most of the animals thought
to be female are in fact hermaphrodites. It turns out that while foxes play only a male or a
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female role, not both, many have both male and female organs, and scientists determine
that this is enough to exclude them from either gender. Now, it had been assumed in the
literature on vixens that females bear and raise cubs. Now that this assumption is shown
not to obtain, the question arises: was all that literature on vixens really reporting
observations of vixens, or was it reporting on something else, viz. vixens plus some
hermaphrodites? It seems as good an answer as any to say that the observations concern
true vixens. It might be more disruptive to abandon the gender criterion than the field
criterion, so that zoologists decide it best to classify hermaphrodites playing a female role
as vixens.
Now, the above shift would certainly not represent a straightforward discovery that
vixens are not necessarily female. But neither would it represent a mere decision to use the
word with a different meaning, as would be the case if, in the absence of any unusual
discoveries or new considerations, we were to decide to use ‘piano’ to mean musical
instrument
,
or binoculars to mean lenses . In the above case concerning canines, there
seems no fact of the matter whether the newly recognized organisms are vixens, so that the
field observational sentences about them are literally true, or non-vixens, so that the
observations are false. The possibility of ‘vixen’ having to apply or not apply to such
cases had never been considered, so the matter is undecided. When the animals are
counted vixens, therefore, this represents neither a straightforward belief change nor a
straightforward language change.
A similar story can be told about bachelorhood. An unmarried man agrees to marry
a woman to save her from deportation. He never meets her. He just signs the proper
documents, and continues to enjoy the lifestyle of a single man. Here social scientists
might rationally count the man a bachelor, concluding that marital status, a poor predictor
of social behavior, is not really what they were after in bachelor-talk. This conclusion
would be particularly attractive if such marriages became common, owing to social
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circumstances. The change would certainly be a linguistic one, but it would be as much a
change of theory.
It looks, in the light of these stories, as if even such seemingly analytically defined
terms as ‘vixen’ and ‘bachelor’ are in fact not analytically defined. These words certainly
have the appearance of being one-criterion words, but apparently they cannot be. ^ The
key feature of a one-criterion term is that it is paired with just one necessary and sufficient
condition for application. This condition applies, of course, counterfactually (Putnam
1975a, pp. 66f., esp. 66n.). So if ‘vixen’ were truly a one-criterion term associated with
female foxhood
,
then something would be a vixen in any possible world just in case it were
a female fox in that world, period. Female foxhood would be the one and only condition
for vixenhood, so anything failing to be a female fox would therefore fail to be a vixen.
But that is not the case, if the above counterexample succeeds. In a world in which
foxes playing the female role turn out to fail the test for femalehood, these would
nevertheless not fail the test for vixenhood: on the contrary, it is neither wrong nor a
straightforward change of meaning to call the animals ‘vixens’. And that is because ‘vixen’
is tied not only to the principle that vixens are female foxes but also to such principles as
that only vixens behave in such and such a manner with respect to offspring. ‘Vixen’ is
not associated with one criterion of application. Where the criteria disagree, something has
t •
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to give.
It seems, then, that not only exceptionless natural laws but even ordinary
generalities associated with a term may cause it to be subject to Quinean difficulties.
‘Vixen’ and ‘bachelor’ are not associated with exceptionless natural laws, yet less strict
generalities of the sort one would have gathered from Putnam to be innocuous (see, e.g.
1975a, pp. 57ff.), turn out to allow for Quinean refutation. This may cause suspicion that
there aren’t any one-criterion words, not even among non-law-cluster words.
29
But again, there will have to be one criterion words if the Kripke-Putnam natural
kind identity statements are indeed necessarily true. For if ‘Water = PQO' is necessarily
true because ‘water’ refers just to H2O in every possible world then, for reasons already
discussed, ‘Spuds are potatoes’ can be necessarily true on account of ‘spud’ referring just
to potatoes in every possible world. And this can be so even if ‘spud’ is defined as
analyticity theorists have supposed. But then ‘spud’ will clearly be associated with just one
criterion: being a potato. ‘Spud’ will be a one-criterion word, and this will be what
ensures the metaphysical unrevisability of ‘Spuds are potatoes’.
If being a potato were only one of multiple criteria for spudhood, then in possible
worlds in which some potatoes lacked other criteria of spudhood, there would not be a fact
of the matter that those potatoes are spuds, nor would there be a fact of the matter that non-
potatoes meeting the other criteria are not spuds. So ‘Spuds are potatoes’ would not as a
matter of fact be true in such worlds; on the contrary, it would neither be wrong nor
changing the subject to deny that the sentence is true in such a possible world. Hence,
‘Spuds are potatoes’ would fail to be true in all possible worlds, and thus it would fail to be
a necessary truth.
But this is not the case where ‘spud’ is a one-criterion word. If the sole necessary
and sufficient condition for being a spud really is being a potato then such a story is
impossible. For in that case there are no multiple criteria to fall apart, by failing to apply to
the same things.
Notice, however, that even words whose reference conditions are established
indirectly
, by way of samples, may be associated with just one necessary and sufficient
criterion of application. Even if ‘spud’ were to be attached to the potato kind by way of the
use of sample potatoes in a Kripkean baptismal ceremony, it would still be associated with
exactly one necessary and sufficient, though no longer a priori accessible, criterion for
application: namely, the very same one it has if analytically defined. Similar words apply
to ‘water’. On the Kripke-Putnam picture, ‘water’ refers to something in any possible
world if and only if it is H2O. There are no other criteria (e.g., role in laws) that matter to
its application. ‘Water’ is a one-criterion word!
Of course, that is not to say that the criterion associated with ‘water’ is in the head
But water is in fact associated with only one necessary and sufficient condition for
application. This shows that words figuring in law-statements, such as natural kind
words, can be one-criterion words. Putnam is wrong to say that they can not be.30
It appears, then, that if Putnam wants to stand by Knpke’s account of the reference
conditions of ‘water’, he cannot claim that role in laws is any theoretical barrier to a term’s
association with a single criterion. The most that he can claim is that only words that are
not involved in law-statements are hkdy to be associated with a single criterion in our
ordinary, familiar languages, on account of the tendency of role in law statements to
become tacit criteria.31
It is worth now taking a moment to return to a claim made last chapter that ‘Water =
H2O’ is analytic, if indeed it is true and necessary as the famous Kripke-Putnam picture
would have it. While I did attempt in the last chapter to show that my claim that ‘Beech =
Buche enjoys analytic status escapes possible criticisms from Putnam’s “The Analytic and
the Synthetic,” I had not spelled out Putnam’s views thoroughly enough to do the same for
the more complicated case of Water = H2O’. Let me do so now. The conditions Putnam
offers in “The Analytic and the Synthetic” (see also 1983c, p. 89; Putnam is thinking of
sentences of the form If something is water then it is H2O’, but this can be ignored) would
require, for ‘Water = H2O’ to be analytic, that being LbO is a necessary and sufficient
criterion for being denoted by ‘water’, and that this is the only necessary and sufficient
condition associated with the term. Now, being H2O is certainly a necessary and sufficient
condition for being water (again, see note 12), and no other such condition has
intentionally or inadvertently been assigned to ‘water’ to compromise the semantic tie
between ‘water’ and H2O. That is why Putnam is able to affirm, with Kripke, the
necessity of ‘Water = H2O’. This guarantees that Quinean revision is out of the question.
There could be no empirical discovery justifying the conclusion that water isn’t H2O, as “it
isn’t logically possible that water isn’t H2O” (1975d, p. 233): if it were logically possible,
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the tie could not have been necessary in the first place. Since immunity from Quinean
revision is what Putnam is properly striving to secure for the analytic, it seems that he
offers no principled reasons for denying that ‘Water = H2O’ is analytic.
Putnam might reply that H2O cannot be analytically associated with ‘water’ since
people do not (or did not always) determine whether something is water by determining
whether it is H2O. This would be enough, by his characterization, to preclude the
analyticity of ‘Water = H2O’. But, as there seem to be no real theoretical reasons for
insisting that being H2O would have to be a criterion in this sense of having an a priori
connection to ‘water’ for a competent speaker, such a rejection would seem unprincipled.
The reply amounts to little more than foot-stomping insistence that analytic statements must
be a priori, and that their meanings must be in the head. This is precisely what I have taken
pains to deny, in arguing for the analyticity of natural kind identities. To use brute force to
exclude ‘Water = H2O’ from the analytic camp on these grounds would be to thieve the
expression ‘analytic’.
Even more dogmatic would be to rule out ‘Water = H2O’ because ‘water’ is a law-
cluster term. The whole point of denying law-cluster words analytic status in the first place
is that role in laws is supposed to be semantically significant, so that a law-cluster word is
not supposed to be able to be associated with just one condition of application. But, by
hypothesis, ‘water’ is associated with just one condition, H2O, role in laws
notwithstanding. So the motivation for the no-laws requirement dissolves.
The time has come to draw conclusions. The present chapter and the preceding one
establish, if they are sound, that if Kripke-Putnam essentialism is intelligible, so is
analyticity. Widespread doubts about analyticity are therefore ill-founded. The causal
theory of reference, which has appeared to many to undermine analyticity, does not. On
the contrary, the celebrated essentialist truths associated with the causal theory seem to be
analytic. Furthermore, and for independent though related reasons, these same truths belie
Quinean doubts about more traditional analyticity. The philosophical community has
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already abandoned Quine’s doubts about essentialism. If this was the step forward it
seems to have been then Quinean doubts about analyticity should be left behind as well.
O f course, this argument will still be a boon to the empiricist program Onestacle to counting essentialist truths analytic is removed, if the" argument
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be aPParent that other popular essentialist claims,inc u g famous Kr.pkean claims regarding individuals (e.g., ‘Cicero islully ) would do as well for undermining the Quinean case.
Thus, Putnam embraces Quine’s claims about the revisability of mathematics
and logic but nevertheless embraces a version of analyticity that is supportedby revisable logic (1983c, esp. pp. 96f.).
FF
Observe that if ‘Water = H 2 O’ and the like are analytic, as is maintained
in the previous chapter, then another respect in which analytic truth is
revisable becomes immediately apparent. Such a statement is a posteriori so
our embracing it or rejecting it depends on what we find out about the world
This role of empirical inquiry has nothing to do with the usual concerns over
logical truth, but rather with the meanings of non-logical terms. Depending
on the products of research in chemistry, we will embrace or reject the
statement. But again, for the bulk of the present chapter I am ignoring the
proposal that the Kripke-Putnam identities are analytic.
See the previous chapter, notes 8 and 9. Quine takes aim at non -Fregean
claims to analyticity in other papers, including (1976a) and (1976b).
Notice that this latter tactic complements the circularity argument. Even if
the circularity argument is unpersuasive on its own, there is mutual
reinforcement between it and the argument from counterexamples. If
philosophers cannot appeal to an explicit definition that avoids circularity, it
will be necessary to grasp the notion in question implicitly
. Using a tacit
understanding, a principled division, if perhaps a fuzzy one, might be drawn
between sentences that are to be counted analytic and those not to be so
counted. Investigation into the essential properties of each side of the division
would then be a subsequent task.
Here is where examples become important. The analyticity theorist
adduces the usual litany of intuitively analytic sentences, to show that there
must be something to the distinction: ‘Bachelors are unmarried males’,
‘Women are female’, etc. On the other hand, the opponent of analyticity
attempts to undermine our confidence in such examples. If we become
convinced that there is something wrong with the examples we are supposed
to have principled methods of assembling, then our implicit grasp of
analyticity will be called into question. Then, with our having been shown to
possess no non-circular explicit characterization, and with the implicit grasp
of the concept, which we might have hoped to fall back upon, under attack,
doubts will be raised about whether we have any grasp at all of a real notion.
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Sometimes counterexamples are said to demonstrate that analytic sentences
are either false or conceivably false, or that they are either false or
una R inab| y fa,se > rather than that they are either false or metaphysically
false
- “Conceivability” and “imaginability” present a problem of
interpretation. For Kripke, it seems that what is metaphysically impossible
can only appear to be conceived (1980, pp. 141-4), while Putnam claims that
such impossibilities as water’s not being H 2O are in fact conceivable (1975d;
^99 ?
a
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m ' ater became aware of his failure to accord with Kripke’s use: see his
II it is only what is metaphysically possible that can be conceived, then
the claim that counterexamples are conceivable is as good as the claim that
they are metaphysically possible; the above discussion addresses this claim. If,
on the other hand, we want to say that what is conceivable is something like
just what cannot (for an agent at a time) be ruled out a priori , then to say that
it is conceivable that an allegedly analytic sentence should come out false
seems uninteresting, and no threat to its analytic status: I have claimed in the
previous chapter that what is relevant to analyticity are reference conditions,
be they knowable a priori to competent users of the word in question or not, so
the falsity of an analytic sentence might be conceivable. Nevertheless, below
I suggest that traditionally recognized analytic sentences are such that we can
rule out their falsity a priori, and thus their falsity is inconceivable in either
sense of the term.
10
At best, the case from counterexamples suggests this. It may, of course, show
nothing at all. If the counterexamples are spurious anyway, as some readers
will probably suppose, then of course the case collapses. I do not address this
reply, because my aim is to take a non-traditional tack against analyticity’s
opponents. I hope to show that even if the alleged counterexamples were
genuine, they should not give a proponent of natural-kind necessity
sufficient cause to reject analyticity.
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See chapter 4.
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somethln g less artificial is generally supposed to havethe job. If something less than explicit should get the reference
conditions right in the case of indirect assignments, it would, of course behard to deny the same possibility in the case of direct, traditional assignments
f reference conditions, which make no use of paradigmatic samples.
For testimony to the persuasion the cases have, see
Sidelle (1989, p. 136) and Boghossian (1996, p. 368).
discussions by, e.g.,
To concede that analyticity is intelligible but that it may be uninstantiated in
natural language would not affect the agenda of the traditional analyticity
theorist, who hopes to employ analyticity in the service of epistemology. Even
where it is questioned whether analyticity is instantiated, it can be maintained
that, in the event that a given candidate for knowledge of necessity under
scrutiny is genuine
,
analyticity would seem to explain it; if, on the other hand,
the knowledge is spurious, no explanation is needed, so analyticity would also
prove unneeded, and uninstantiated in this case.
Note that it would be strange indeed were no counterexample-free
traditional analyticity to be found in English, if English supported the familiar
supposedly necessary a posteriori statements. In both cases the problem is to
locate two expressions with the same reference conditions.
There are, of course, stronger and weaker brands of epistemic possibility.
Every statement may be possible in the respect that the skeptical possibility of
error cannot be ruled out. But often the realm of epistemic possibility at issue
in philosophical discussions includes something like just what is not known a
priori to be false, skeptical hypotheses aside. Some notion like this is at issue
when the truth or the falsity of Goldbach’s conjecture is said to be possible,
while the falsity of ordinary truths of arithmetic is said to be impossible.
There is no reason an apriorist should be embarrassed by fallibilism either.
At minimum, this is because even if any truth might be rationally
relinquished on the basis of empirically acquired information (e.g., on the
basis of testimony), certain knowledge may still be rationally acquired without
the need for empirical investigation. See, in addition to Sober (pp. 63-7), Alvin
Plantinga’s helpful discussion of the matter in his (1993, pp. 110-113; also pp
18-19).
18
Moreover, it would be hard to see what would be so Quinean about the
Quinean claim, if this were what it amounted to, since these skeptical issues
have been discussed for centuries, and their obvious application to analyticity
hardly needs pointing out.
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Of course, for all this says, an agent may have no skeptic-proof epistemicguarantees against the possibility that the sentence is false.
It might be objected that Frege’s account leaves it open whether it isled even to this sort of unrevisability. There is no need to dispute the point
It the details of Frege’s account could be filled out to provide a negative
answer, I would choose to consider, in accordance with traditional expectations(analyticity s alleged usefulness has, after all, derived from a claim to explainknowledge of ne cessity ) some version of Fregean analyticity that j_s
unrevisable in this respect. Such a version of analyticity might be
characterized as necessary truth of one of two varieties: narrow or broad
logical truth.
A final complication: the necessity in question might have to be taken
to be narrower than truth in all possible worlds. It will, if logical truth is
revisable in the strong sense noted below, so that it does not hold in all
possible worlds; in this case, the necessity in question would embrace all
possible worlds in which the logic holds good, or in which the logical truth at
issue does not disintegrate, the various criteria associated with it coming apart.
(See discussion below.) Note that the revisability of logic that is generally
conceded to Quine is of a merely epistemic nature, though, and not this potent
variety (see, e.g. Putnam 1983c, p. 96), so few might insist on the restriction athand
.
Though it is generally agreed that this Quinean issue against analyticity
involves a certain indeterminacy of meaning, there is disagreement
concerning the relationship between the above indeterminacy and Quine’s
(1960, chap. 2) more radical views on the indeterminacy of translation (see,
e.g., the exchange between Boghossian 1996 and Harman 1996). Translation is
of no direct concern to the issues that follow, and will be bypassed in the
present discussion.
There are actually a few biologists who would find no problem with lumping
together an amoebae and a human into a single species, under certain
genealogical circumstances (see, e.g., Kitcher 1989 for discussion). However,
this position is highly controversial, and, in any case, the required
circumstances are not generally met, so that even biologists who allow the
theoretical possibility of such diverse species would be unable to accept the
above, modified definition, which would impose such membership universally.
2_
I owe this particular example to David Papineau (1996, p. 19).
23 We could find this out by a priori analysis about what would count as a spud
in any possible world, or by encountering some refractory spuds. The
orthodox Quinean would appeal to the latter type of case, to specifically
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Thus it is apparent that when more than one necessary and sufficient
criterion is associated with a term, each associated criterion is strictly
speaking relegated to the status of a would-be necessary and sufficient
condition (at least if, in any possible world, an item satisfies one but not
another), since where the criteria disagree, none will determine the proper
application of the term. Rather, in such a situation, the term’s proper
application will be indeterminate. Competition nullifies a necessary and
sufficient criterion. It is just when a term is associated with a single
necessary and sufficient criterion that the term really does apply to an objectjust in case the object satisfies the criterion.
"After writing “The Analytic and the Synthetic” Putnam became inclined to
agree that such examples fail (see 1975d, p. 244).
27
Notice that the problem arises from the legitimacy of concluding that
something fails to be a female fox though it is a vixen, or vice-versa. It should
be apparent that the problem is not supposed to be that borderline or
indeterminate female foxes are borderline or indeterminate vixens. That
would not be enough to impugn any analytic connection. Though vagueness
or indeterminacy certainly plays a role in Quinean refutation, its mere
connection with a word does not pose a problem for analyticity.
8
At least for all the counterexamples depend on, Putnam is right about this,
though it is hard to see how Putnam could be entitled to think that there are no
objective, non-statistical laws concerning female foxes, given his commitment
to biological laws about horses and the like (see, e.g., his 1983b, p. 71).
9 Or at least the metaphysical possibility of them.
It might be objected that H_2Q- cannot be a criterion for being water, since it
is not used by speakers to determine what things are water. This objection is
not a very deep one. At the very least, it is a necessary and sufficient
condition for being water that something is H 2 O: this holds whether the
condition is known a priori or not, whether it is operationally used by
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,
in any possible world, to the extension of ‘water’, which Ins itreference conditions established indirectly then there ic
s
other term could no, be
would be a criterion by anyone’s use of ‘criterion’ fn u • ,
H
-
(
o^her term. Bn, of course
y
,he ^ ,1 ^water does. the reference conditions are the same for each tenr, f .
can have a single necessary and sufficient criterion for application' despite^
rp
fUrin 8 in '^.'Statements, so, presumably, could another term whose
P
eference conditions are the same, but established without the use of samples
term r
terminological quibble might be sparked by calling certain
s iguring in law-statements
‘one-criterion’ terms. Perhaps Putnamould complain that he just by ‘one-cr,ter,on term’ something that
reply
,8
is that m?**' } ^ ^ law 'statements ’ But if so, then the proper
^
not only one-criterion words,” as Putnam allows, but also would-
~ one-criterion words” disqualified from “one-criterion” status only
figuring in law statements, are immune from Quinean troubles, and so are alsoanalytically defined. Putnam is in trouble either way: the reason is justcouched in different terms. J
I'Since writing “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’” Putnam seems to have become
aware himself that his espousal of Knpke’s essentialism does not harmonize
with his words about law-cluster terms in “The Analytic and the Synthetic.”
erms like water certainly seem to be law-cluster words, but in affirming the
exclusive necessary and sufficient tie to H 2 0, Putnam thereby repudiates his
Mnoo\
C
l?
im t0 SUCh a tCrm S semantlc Be to role in law-statements. In his(1992a) Putnam tries to remedy these problems. He concludes that he was
mistaken in supposing the reference of ‘water’ to depend just on
microstructure. ‘Water’ figures in law-statements, and its role in these
statements provides conditions on the proper application of the term.
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